Truth Approximation, Social Epistemology, and Opinion Dynamics

This paper highlights some connections between work on truth approximation and work in social epistemology, in particular work on peer disagreement. In some of the literature on truth approximation, questions have been addressed concerning the efficiency of research strategies for approximating the truth. So far, social aspects of research strategies have not received any attention in this context. Recent findings in the field of opinion dynamics suggest that this is a mistake. How scientists exchange and take into account information about each others’ beliefs may greatly influence the accuracy and speed with which the scientific community as a whole approximates the truth. On the other hand, social epistemologists concerned with peer disagreement have so far neglected the question of how practices of responding to disagreements with peers fare with respect to the goal of approximating the truth. Again, work on opinion dynamics shows that this may be a mistake, and that how we ought to respond to disagreements with our peers may depend on the specific purposes of our investigations.     

Suicide Crisis Syndrome: A review of supporting evidence for a new suicide‐specific diagnosis

Suicide is a major public health problem, and suicide rates are still on the rise. Current strategies for identifying individuals at risk for suicide, such as the use of a patient's self‐reported suicidal ideation or evidence of past suicide attempts, have not been sufficient in reducing suicide rates. Recently, research groups have been focused on determining the acute mental state preceding a suicide attempt. The development of an acute suicidal diagnosis, the Suicide Crisis Syndrome (SCS), is aimed at capturing this state to better treat individuals. The SCS has five main evidence‐based components—entrapment, affective disturbance, loss of cognitive control, hyperarousal, and social withdrawal. The SCS may provide clinicians with the ability to identify individuals who are experiencing an acute pre‐suicidal mental state, regardless of their self‐reported suicidal ideation. Future research leading to the incorporation of this diagnosis into clinical practice could improve the quality of care and reduce the personal, societal, and legal burden of suicide.     

Measurement invariance of the Phubbing Scale across 20 countries

Mobile phone addiction is a robust phenomenon observed throughout the world. The social aspect of mobile phone use is crucial; therefore, phubbing is a part of the mobile phone addiction phenomenon. Phubbing is defined as ignoring an interlocutor by glancing at one's mobile phone during a face-to-face conversation. The main aim of this study was to investigate how the Phubbing Scale (containing 10 items) might vary across countries, and between genders. Data were collected in 20 countries: Belarus, Brazil, China, Croatia, Ecuador, India, Israel, Italy, Netherlands, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, UK, Ukraine and USA. The mean age across the sample (N = 7696, 65.8% women, 34.2% men) was 25.32 years (SD = 9.50). The cross-cultural invariance of the scale was investigated using multigroup confirmatory factor analyses (MGCFA) as well as the invariance analyses. Additionally, data from each country were assessed individually via confirmatory factor analyses (CFAs). We obtained two factors, based on only eight of the items: (a) communication disturbances and (b) phone obsession. The 8 items Phubbing Scale.     

The influence of rule availability and item similarity on metacognitive monitoring during categorisation

In four experiments, we examined the sources of metacognitive judgments during the categorisation of new items after the learning of old items was completed. In the rule condition, the categorisation rule was explicitly given to the participants during learning, while in the no-rule condition participants relied on feedback to infer category membership. In the transfer phase, two types of novel items were used: good and bad transfer items. Transfer items also differed in the level of similarity to their training pairs. In the rule condition, all types of transfer items were classified with high accuracy and confidence. In the no-rule condition, a dissociation between accuracy and confidence was revealed. Good transfer items were classified more accurately than bad transfer items, whereas similar items were classified with higher confidence than dissimilar items. The obtained results suggest the utilisation of two potential cues for metacognitive judgments: declarative knowledge if the correct rule is explicitly available, and item similarity if it is difficult to infer the correct rule from feedback.     

Visual search for changes in scenes creates long-term,incidental memory traces

Humans are very good at remembering large numbers of scenes over substantial periods of time. But how good are they at remembering changes to scenes? In this study, we tested scene memory and change detection two weeks after initial scene learning. In Experiments 1–3, scenes were learned incidentally during visual search for change. In Experiment 4, observers explicitly memorized scenes. At test, after two weeks observers were asked to discriminate old from new scenes, to recall a change that they had detected in the study phase, or to detect a newly introduced change in the memorization experiment. Next, they performed a change detection task, usually looking for the same change as in the study period. Scene recognition memory was found to be similar in all experiments, regardless of the study task. In Experiment 1, more difficult change detection produced better scene memory. Experiments 2 and 3 supported a “depth-of-processing” account for the effects of initial search and change detection on incidental memory for scenes. Of most interest, change detection was faster during the test phase than during the study phase, even when the observer had no explicit memory of having found that change previously. This result was replicated in two of our three change detection experiments. We conclude that scenes can be encoded incidentally as well as explicitly and that changes in those scenes can leave measurable traces even if they are not explicitly recalled.     

Nozick’s experience machine: An empirical study

Many philosophers deny that happiness can be equated with pleasurable experiences. Nozick introduced an experience machine thought experiment to support the idea that happiness requires pleasurable experiences that are “in contact with reality.” In this thought experiment, people can choose to plug into a machine that induces exclusively pleasurable experiences. We test Nozick’s hypothesis that people will reject this offer. We also contrast Nozick’s experience machine scenario with scenarios that are less artificial, and offer options which are less invasive or disruptive than being connected to a machine, specifically scenarios in which people are offered an experience pill or a pill that improves overall functioning.     

Consistent Belief in a Good True Self in Misanthropes and Three Interdependent Cultures

People sometimes explain behavior by appealing to an essentialist concept of the self, often referred to as the true self. Existing studies suggest that people tend to believe that the true self is morally virtuous; that is deep inside, every person is motivated to behave in morally good ways. Is this belief particular to individuals with optimistic beliefs or people from Western cultures, or does it reflect a widely held cognitive bias in how people understand the self? To address this question, we tested the good true self theory against two potential boundary conditions that are known to elicit different beliefs about the self as a whole. Study 1 tested whether individual differences in misanthropy—the tendency to view humans negatively—predict beliefs about the good true self in an American sample. The results indicate a consistent belief in a good true self, even among individuals who have an explicitly pessimistic view of others. Study 2 compared true self‐attributions across cultural groups, by comparing samples from an independent country (USA) and a diverse set of interdependent countries (Russia, Singapore, and Colombia). Results indicated that the direction and magnitude of the effect are comparable across all groups we tested. The belief in a good true self appears robust across groups varying in cultural orientation or misanthropy, suggesting a consistent psychological tendency to view the true self as morally good.     

Between Academic Pimping and Moral Harassment in Higher Education: an Autoethnography in a Brazilian Public University

It is shocking to notice that universities still research few of what daily happens inside their walls. Even though knowledge amount to just a small part of the numerous things that are produced in/between academic relations, it is rare to find investigations in which academic modus operandi is the research focus. The text relies on references like Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari to investigate the subjectivities produced in Academia’s daily routines. With attention to experiences, to what many times is naturalized and said only in the corridors and behind the scenes, this paper uses autoethnography as its method with the aim of analysing academic relations in the context of a Brazilian public university. The narratives constructed here are traversed by songs, lived situations, and affectations. Stories that deal with trajectories of a professor since his arrival at a new workplace. E-mails, threats, exoneration. What is considered to be normal in Academia? What still shocks and affect us? The paper draws on concepts like moral harassment and academic pimping to guide the written narratives and to deepen analyses built throughout the paper. How is it possible to de-naturalize what we daily do in universities? Without predefined or definite answers, the text questions the ways how we relate to each other in Academia and stimulates reflections on the impacts of our academic relations, not only to work itself, but also to the lives of the involved ones.     

Fitch’s Paradox and Probabilistic Antirealism

Fitch’s paradox shows, from fairly innocent-looking assumptions, that if there are any unknown truths, then there are unknowable truths. This is generally thought to deliver a blow to antirealist positions that imply that all truths are knowable. The present paper argues that a probabilistic version of antirealism escapes Fitch’s result while still offering all that antirealists should care for.