The being that knew too much

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion -     

Egg arrangement in avian clutches covaries with the rejection of foreign eggs

In birds, the colour, maculation, shape, and size of their eggs play critical roles in discrimination of foreign eggs in the clutch. So far, however, no study has examined the role of egg arrangement within a clutch on host rejection responses. We predicted that individual females which maintain consistent egg arrangements within their clutch would be better able to detect and reject foreign eggs than females without a consistent egg arrangement (i.e. whose eggs change positions more often across incubation). We tested this “egg arrangement hypothesis” in blackbirds (Turdus merula) and song thrush (T. philomelos). Both species are suitable candidates for research on egg rejection, because they show high inter-individual variation and individual repeatability in egg rejection responses. As predicted, using our custom-defined metrics of egg arrangement, rejecter females’ clutches showed significantly more consistent patterns in egg arrangement than acceptor females’ clutches. Only parameters related to blunt pole showed consistent differences between rejecters and acceptors. This finding makes biological sense because it is already known that song thrush use blunt pole cues to reject foreign eggs. We propose that a disturbance of the original egg arrangement pattern by the laying parasite may alert host females that maintain a consistent egg arrangement to the risk of having been parasitized. Once alerted, these hosts may shift their discrimination thresholds to be more restrictive so as to reject a foreign egg with higher probability. Future studies will benefit from experimentally testing whether these two and other parasitized rejecter host species may rely on the use of consistent egg arrangements as a component of their anti-parasitic defence mechanisms.     

How simulations fail

‘The problem with simulations is that they are doomed to succeed.’ So runs a common criticism of simulations—that they can be used to ‘prove’ anything and are thus of little or no scientific value. While this particular objection represents a minority view, especially among those who work with simulations in a scientific context, it raises a difficult question: what standards should we use to differentiate a simulation that fails from one that succeeds? In this paper we build on a structural analysis of simulation developed in previous work to provide an evaluative account of the variety of ways in which simulations do fail. We expand the structural analysis in terms of the relationship between a simulation and its real-world target emphasizing the important role of aspects intended to correspond and also those specifically intended not to correspond to reality. The result is an outline both of the ways in which simulations can fail and the scientific importance of those various forms of failure.     

Rational social and political polarization

Philosophical Studies - Public discussions of political and social issues are often characterized by deep and persistent polarization. In social psychology, it’s standard to treat belief...     

Philosophy for Computers: Some Explorations in Philosophical Modeling

Philosophical modeling has a long and distinguished history, but the computer offers new and powerful prospects for the creation and manipulation of models. It seems inevitable that the computer will become a major tool in future philosophical research. Here I offer an overview of explorations in philosophical computer modeling that we in the Group for Logic and Formal Semantics at SUNY Stony Brook have undertaken: explorations regarding (1) the potential emergence of cooperation in a society of egoists, (2) self-reference and paradox in fuzzy logic, (3) a fractal approach to formal systems, and (4) on-going explorations with models for the emergence of communication. The attempt is not to give a detailed report on any of these but to give a bird s-eye view of them all, emphasizing the general form that the models take, the philosophical motivations behind them, and the kinds of philosophical results that they may have to offer.