More on parts in object concepts: Response to Tversky and Hemenway

This articleresponds to the comments ofTversky and Hemenway (1991), who criticized the logic, stimuli, and data analysis of Murphy (1991). It is argued here that their objections do not mitigate the conclusions drawn by Murphy. In particular, the objection that the stimuli were not natural enough to reveal differences between category levels seems to presuppose an answer to the question under investigation. However, further experimentation with other stimuli might resolve this issue empirically.     

Parts in object concepts: Experiments with artificial categories

Previous research has demonstrated that basic-level categories are associated with the parts of objects. Five experiments were conducted to investigate whether this correlation is caused by a psychological principle that requires basic concepts to have common parts. This hypothesis was investigated in the experiments by separating part and nonpart information in artificial categories. Basic-level structure was measured in two ways: as the level with the highest ratio of within-category similarity to between-category similarity, and as the level with the fastest categorization time in an object-identification task. The results revealed that basic-level structure could be found in categories that did not have parts in common. Furthermore, nonpart information, such as size, color, and texture, could both enhance the basic level and eliminate the basic-level advantage, depending on whether the nonpart information was consistent with or contradicted the part information. These results suggest that, psychologically, parts are neither necessary nor sufficient to form a basic level.     

Experiencing double-bind conflict: A semantic differential assessment of interaction perceptions

Four interaction-perception perspectives of the fictitious target of a double-bind conflict were provided by four groups of subjects. The perspectives included perceptions of a daughter about herself and her father (the double-bind source), and her estimates of his perceptions of both himself and her. As predicted, the target saw herself as weak but “good”, and as cooperative and highly frustrated, while attributing all the opposite characteristics to the source, who was seen as strong but “bad”, and uncooperative and not frustrated. Further, it was found that she believed he saw himself as strong and very good, but frustrated and moderately cooperative. These observations are consistent with a hypothesis that double-bind experiences result in frustration and mixed feelings toward one's self and the source of the dilemma. It was also concluded that the target's belief that her father would not recognize her weakness, nor her cooperativeness, nor her frustration, and would disinterestedly evaluate her as neither good nor bad resulted from the inconsistent and contradictory communications which had contributed to the double bind.     

Encoding origin of the terminal asymmetry effect in recall

Jones (1976) found that the accuracy of recall of the order in which a series of pictures was seen was dependent upon the way in which recall was cued. For the latter part of a series, sequential position was a more effective cue for the recall of the corresponding picture than the picture was for sequential position. Two experiments reported here (testing altogether 100 subjects) investigated whether this terminal asymmetry effect (TAE) arises at encoding or only at retrieval. It was found that the TAE was affected by the conditions of presentation of the series but not by the post-presentation factors studied.     

APT PC and APT II: Experiment development systems for the IBM PC and Apple II

Systems for creating and running psychology experiments on an Apple II or IBM PC are described. Without programming, psychologists using the APT systems can construct and conduct an experiment, summarize the data, and revise the experiment. The systems are easily used by students but powerful enough to be used by psychologists in their research.