Training and Consultation in Psychological Assessment With Professional Psychologists: Suggestions for Enhancing the Profession and Individual Practices

Once central to the identity and practice of clinical psychology, psychological assessment (PA) is currently more limited in professional practice and generally less emphasized in graduate training programs than in the past. Performance-based personality tests especially are taught and used less, even though scientific evidence of their utility and validity has never been stronger. We review research on training in PA and discuss challenges that contributed to its decreased popularity. We then review continuing education requirements for ethical practice in PA and recommend that PA should be reconceptualized as a specialty best practiced by psychologists who have the resources and time to maintain competency. We offer recommendations about how professional organizations concerned with PA can promote its practice and how individual expert clinicians can assist. We conclude by describing a collaborative model for providing group consultation in PA to practicing psychologists. If implemented widely, this model could help promote PA and raise its standard of practice.     

Impairment in risk-sensitive decision-making in older suicide attempters with depression

Suicidal behavior is a potentially lethal complication of late-life depression. In younger adults, suicide has been linked to abnormal decision-making ability. Given that there are substantial age-related decreases in decision-making ability, and that older adults experience environmental stressors that require effective decision-making, we reasoned that impaired decision-making may be particularly relevant to suicidal behavior in the elderly. We thus compared performance on a probabilistic decision-making task that does not involve working memory ("Cambridge Gamble Task") in four groups of older adults: (1) individuals with major depression and a history of suicide attempt (n = 25), (2) individuals with major depression with active suicidal ideation but no suicide attempt (n = 13), (3) individuals with major depression without suicidality (n = 35), and (4) nondepressed control subjects (n = 22). There was a significant effect of group on quality of decision-making, whereby the suicide attempters exhibited poorer ability to choose the likely outcome, compared with the nonsuicidal depressed and nondepressed comparison subjects. There were no group differences in betting behavior. The suicide attempters differed in several aspects of social problem-solving on a self-report scale. Quality of decision-making was negatively correlated with the score on the impulsive/careless problem-solving subscale. These data suggest that older suicide attempters have a deficit in risk-sensitive decision-making, extending observations in younger adults. More specifically, older suicide attempters seem to neglect outcome probability and make poor choices. These impairments may precipitate and perpetuate suicidal crisis in depressed elders. Identification of decision-making impairment in suicidal elders may help with designing effective interventions.     

Feeling bad about screwing up: emotion regulation and action monitoring in the anterior cingulate cortex

This study examined neural features of emotional responses to errors. We specifically examined whether directed emotion regulation of negative emotion associated with error modulates action-monitoring functions of anterior cingulate cortex, including conflict monitoring, error processing, and error prevention. Seventeen healthy adults performed a continuous performance task during assessment by fMRI. In each block, participants were asked either to increase or decrease their negative emotional responses or to react naturally after error commission. Emotion regulation instructions were associated with modulation of rostral and dorsal anterior activity and of their effective connectivity following errors and conflict. Cingulate activity and connectivity predicted subsequent errors. These data may suggest that responses to errors are affected by emotion and that aspects of emotion and cognition are inextricably linked, even during a nominally cognitive task.     

Response repetition as an error‐correction procedure for sight‐word reading: A replication and extension

We evaluated the effects of response repetition (RR) as an error‐correction procedure for increasing sight‐word reading for four individuals using a multiple baseline design. The results for each participant showed that correct responding increased following the introduction of the RR procedure. In addition, responding for three of four participants showed evidence of stimulus generalization, response generalization, or both. Likewise, we found that comparable behavior changes were produced when a participant's paraprofessional implemented RR in a typical classroom. These findings are briefly discussed in terms of procedures that promote behavior acquisition and generalization via negative reinforcement. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Poor performance on cognitive tasks in depression: Doing too much or not enough?

Depressed people perform poorly on cognitive tasks. It is unclear whether these deficits are due to decreased devotion of task-related resources or to increased attention to non-task-related information. In the present study, we examined the degree to which depressed and healthy adults displayed pupillary motility that varied at the frequency of presented stimuli on a cognitive task, which we interpreted as task-related processing, and at other frequencies, which we interpreted as reflecting intrinsic processing. Depressed participants made more consecutive errors than did controls. More pupillary motility at other frequencies was associated with poorer performance, whereas more pupillary motility at the frequency of presented stimuli was associated with better performance. Depressed participants had more pupillary motility at other frequencies, which partially mediated observed deficits in cognitive performance. These findings support the hypothesis that allocating cognitive resources to intrinsic processing contributes to observed cognitive deficits in depression.     

Mental-state attribution drives rapid, reflexive gaze following

When presented with a face stimulus whose gaze is diverted, observers’ attention shifts to locations fixated by the face. Such “gaze following” has been characterized by some previous studies as a consequence of sophisticated theory of mind processes, but by others (particularly those employing the “gaze-cuing” paradigm) as an involuntary response that is triggered directly and reflexively by the physical features of a face. To address this apparent contradiction, we modified the gaze-cuing paradigm using a deception procedure to convince observers that prerecorded videos of an experimenter making head turns and wearing mirrored goggles were a “live” video link to an adjacent room. In two experiments, reflexive gaze following was found when observers believed that the model was wearing transparent goggles and could see, but it was significantly reduced when they believed that the experimenter wore opaque goggles and could not see. These results indicate that the attribution of the mental state “seeing” to a face plays a role in controlling even reflexive gaze following.     

Intentionalism and Change Blindness

According to reductive intentionalism, the phenomenal character of a conscious experience is constituted by the experience's intentional (or representational) content. In this article I attempt to show that a phenomenon in visual perception called change blindness poses a problem for this doctrine. Specifically, I argue that phenomenal character is not sensitive, as it should be if reductive intentionalism is correct, to fine-grained variations in content. The standard anti-intentionalist strategy is to adduce putative cases in which phenomenal character varies despite sameness of content. This paper explores an alternative antiintentionalist tack, arguing, by way of a specific example involving change blindness, that content can vary despite sameness of phenomenal character.