Responsible Psychopaths Revisited

This paper updates, modifies, and extends an account of psychopaths’ responsibility and blameworthiness that depends on behavioral control rather than moral knowledge. Philosophers mainly focus on whether psychopaths can be said to grasp moral rules (or reasons, or demands) as such, whereas it seems to be important to their blameworthiness that typical psychopaths are hampered by impulsivity and other barriers to exercising self-control. I begin by discussing an atypical case, for contrast, of a young man who was diagnosed as a psychopath at one point but who lacks the element of impulsivity. He exhibits the usual deficits of empathy and related moral emotions, but by now he has developed effective alternative means of conforming to moral rules, essentially on the basis of self-interest. I think it does seem reasonable to hold him morally responsible if he should violate a rule, despite his refusal to acknowledge any specifically moral reasons. I then turn to more typical cases, arguing that blameworthiness is mitigated by the difficulty of learning alternative means of self-control. In a departure from my earlier work, I do not take responsibility to have degrees. But since both blameworthiness and freedom to do otherwise have degrees that depend on the same factors, I go on to explain how it can be reasonable to blame a typical psychopath for an act he may not have been free to avoid. More generally, my suggestion is that notions commonly conflated in philosophers’ treatments of responsibility should be prized apart.     

Impulse and Self-Reflection: Frankfurtian Responsibility versus Free Will

Harry Frankfurt's early work makes an important distinction between moral responsibility and free will. Frankfurt begins by focusing on the notion of responsibility, as supplying counterexamples to the principle of alternative possibilities; he then turns to an apparently independent account of free will, in terms of his well-known hierarchy of desires. But the two notions seem to reestablish contact in Frankfurt's later discussion of issues and cases. The present article sets up a putative Frankfurtian account of moral responsibility that involves the potential for free will, as suggested by some of Frankfurt's later remarks about taking responsibility. While correcting what seem to be some common misinterpretations of Frankfurt's view, the article attempts to extract some reasons for dissatisfaction with it from consideration of cases of unfreedom, particularly cases involving addiction.     

Moral Responses and Moral Theory: Socially-based Externalist Ethics

The paper outlines a view called social (or two-level) response-dependency as an addition to standard alternatives in metaethics that allows for a position intermediate between standard versions of internalism and externalism on the question of motivational force. Instead of taking psychological responses as either directly supplying the content of ethics (as on emotivist or sentimentalist accounts) or as irrelevant to its content (as in classical versions of Kantian or utilitarian ethics), the view allows them an indirect role, as motivational props to moral teaching and thus to the general institution of moral discourse. However, they are not implied by any particular moral judgment (or speaker), so that amoralism comes out as possible. The response that defines the distinctively moral notion of wrong on this account is the second-level (social) response of forbidding some behavior; but this is ultimately to be understood in terms of (variable) individual reactions. Natural human emotion tendencies thereby constrain the content of ethics, while allowing for some degree of social variation in moral codes.     

Free will and the Genome Project

...I want to argue that the Human Genome Project itself poses no special problem for human freedom, understood in relation to the philosophical issue of free will versus determinism. It seems to pose a problem only if one muddles the interpretation of the issue or of the project that is supposed to bear on it. There is a need for conceptual clarification to point this out, perhaps, but I see no need for "research" in the sense that implies original investigation. However, I also want to probe a bit deeper to identify a distinct set of philosophical worries about freedom that seem to have been misplaced onto the standard issue, the issue of freedom versus determinism, in this discussion and elsewhere. After arguing that the genome project has no real bearing on free will versus determinism, I shall attempt to identify the threat it poses to freedom partly by detaching it from this standard version of the free will question. I shall argue that the worrisome forms of genetic influence that the project might uncover do not really presuppose determinism. But what they do presuppose -- some form of internal or psychological constraint on behavior -- suggests an alternative version of the free will question as the source of popular fears about scientific explanation of human behavior. What is under threat on this version of the question is the Aristotelian notion of character formation and self-control.     

Identifying the multi-risk family prenatally: Antecedent psychosocial factors and infant developmental trends

Little is known about the relationship between mother and infant within multiproblem, so-called “hard to reach” families. In an effort to understand factors contributing to problems in caring for the young children of these parents, a group of 47 families was recruited for study by the Clinical Infant Development Program of the National Institute of Mental Health. Serious social pathology was found within 75 percent of families. The lives of mothers in these families was marked by long term disruptions: 64 percent were from families characterized by recurring poverty and psychiatric illness, and 69 percent reported disruptions in parental care prior to age twelve, while more than two-thirds reported a history of being physically and/or sexually abused as children. More than 75 percent of this group of women presently showed psychiatric distress. Many of these women have difficulty in providing adequately for their young children and require innovative intervention programs in order to facilitate parenting.     

Psychological predictors of HIV-preventive behavior among Zimbabwean students

This report is based on a study of 852 sexually active volunteer student teachers in Zimbabwe who were assessed on their AIDS risk reduction behavior and the Health Belief Model of Janz and Becker. The model posits that behavior modification occurs if there is knowledge of the disease and its severity, susceptibility, effective prevention, self- efficacy for prevention, accessible health care and advice, normative support for behavior change, and few barriers to action. Behavior change is measured by reduced numbers of sexual partners, increased condom use, and decreased prostitute contact. The 404 women showed no sex differences from the 448 men, except that men reported lower self- efficacy. The multiple linear regression analysis revealed that for men the Health Belief Model was significant and explained 15% of the variance (F=7.50, p.0001). Behavior risk reduction was predicted by self-efficacy (B=.10, p.0001), perceived barriers to action (B=-.19, p.01), and belief in the effectiveness of preventive practices (B-.10, p.001). The women's model was also significant and explained 12% of the variance (F=4.06, p.001). Preventive behavior was predicted by perceived susceptibility to infection (B=.19, p.01), access to health care and advice (B=.09, p.05), and belief in the efficacy of preventive measures (B=.06, p.05). Future research in planned to try to augment the Health Belief Model results by including the following variables: contact with AIDS-affected persons and specific barriers to action such as dependence on paid sex, the breakdown in traditional values, familial separation, and attitudes toward monogamy. Also, the role of alcohol and drugs in the context of sexual behavior will be considered. Other alternative models will also be examined, such as Bandura's social learning theory and Fishbein's theory of reasoned action. New theories which are uniquely applied to AIDS may need to be formulated.