Dimensions of Perfectionism and Anxiety Sensitivity

The current study investigated the extent to which dimensions of perfectionism are associated with components of the anxiety sensitivity construct. A sample of 177 undergraduate students completed the Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale, the Perfectionism Cognitions Inventory, the Perfectionistic Self-Presentation Scale, and the Expanded Anxiety Sensitivity Index developed by Taylor and Cox (1998). The results confirmed that automatic thoughts involving perfectionism and the interpersonal aspects of the perfectionism construct are associated with anxiety sensitivity. Examination of the Anxiety Sensitivity Index factors showed that perfectionism cognitions were associated primarily with anxiety sensitivity involving fears of cognitive dyscontrol, while socially prescribed perfectionism and perfectionistic self-presentation were associated primarily with fears of publicly observable anxiety reactions in a manner suggesting that the interpersonal perfectionism dimensions are linked closely with an anxious sensitivity to negative social evaluation and subsequent panic attacks. The theoretical and treatment implications of the link between perfectionism and anxiety sensitivity are discussed.     

Guardianship determinations by judges, attorneys, and guardians

Guardianship is intended to protect incapacitated individuals through the appointment of a surrogate decision maker. Little is known about how judges, attorneys, and professional guardians assess the need for guardianship, to what extent they apply statutory guidelines when making these determinations, and how their decisions compare. Three groups of participants (probate judges, elder law attorneys, and professional guardians) read vignettes portraying older adults that varied in the extent to which the evidence supported the appointment of a guardian. They were asked about the appropriateness of various resolutions. Participants were reluctant to endorse full guardianship even when warranted by the evidence and preferred informal, family-based interventions that do not involve legal action. Professional groups did not always agree on the appropriate resolutions, suggesting that one's professional orientation may play a role in perceptions of older adults.     

Dirty work, clean hands: The moral psychology of indirect agency

When powerful people cause harm, they often do so indirectly through other people. Are harmful actions carried out through others evaluated less negatively than harmful actions carried out directly? Four experiments examine the moral psychology of indirect agency. Experiments 1A, 1B, and 1C reveal effects of indirect agency under conditions favoring intuitive judgment, but not reflective judgment, using a joint/separate evaluation paradigm. Experiment 2A demonstrates that effects of indirect agency cannot be fully explained by perceived lack of foreknowledge or control on the part of the primary agent. Experiment 2B indicates that reflective moral judgment is sensitive to indirect agency, but only to the extent that indirectness signals reduced foreknowledge and/or control. Experiment 3 indicates that effects of indirect agency result from a failure to automatically consider the potentially dubious motives of agents who cause harm indirectly. Experiment 4 demonstrates an effect of indirect agency on purchase intentions.     

The Briefest of Glances: The Time Course of Natural Scene Understanding

ABSTRACT— What information is available from a brief glance at a novel scene? Although previous efforts to answer this question have focused on scene categorization or object detection, real-world scenes contain a wealth of information whose perceptual availability has yet to be explored. We compared image exposure thresholds in several tasks involving basic-level categorization or global-property classification. All thresholds were remarkably short: Observers achieved 75%-correct performance with presentations ranging from 19 to 67 ms, reaching maximum performance at about 100 ms. Global-property categorization was performed with significantly less presentation time than basic-level categorization, which suggests that there exists a time during early visual processing when a scene may be classified as, for example, a large space or navigable, but not yet as a mountain or lake. Comparing the relative availability of visual information reveals bottlenecks in the accumulation of meaning. Understanding these bottlenecks provides critical insight into the computations underlying rapid visual understanding.     

Metacognition of agency

The feeling that we are agents, intentionally making things happen by our own actions, is foundational to our understanding of ourselves as humans. People's metacognitions of agency were investigated in 4 experiments. Participants played a game in which they tried to touch downward scrolling Xs and avoid touching Os. Variables that affected accuracy included speed of the scroll, density of the targets, and feedback. Of central interest were variables directed not only at accuracy but also at people's control: the turbulence of the cursor and how close the cursor had to come to the target for a hit (i.e., "magic"). After each trial, people made judgments of agency or judgments of performance. People were selectively sensitive to the variables to which they should be responsive in agency monitoring--whether the cursor moved in close synchrony to their movements and whether targets disappeared by magic. People knew, separably from their objective or judged performance, when they were in control and when they were not. These results indicate that people can sensitively monitor their own agency.     

Memory for unidentified items: Evidence for the use of letter information in familiarity processes

Participants can give accurate recognition judgments to word fragments that they are unable to complete. In three experiments, the generality of this finding was examined across tasks. Accurate memory judgments in the absence of identification were obtained in item recognition and judgments of presentation frequency but not in associative recognition or list discrimination. The former two tasks are thought to involve the use of familiarity; the latter two are thought to rely on recollection. The present results are consistent with the claim that recognition without identification reflects familiarity processes.     

Visual-auditory events: cross-modal perceptual priming and recognition memory.

Modality specificity in priming is taken as evidence for independent perceptual systems. However, Easton, Greene, and Srinivas (1997) showed that visual and haptic cross-modal priming is comparable in magnitude to within-modal priming. Where appropriate, perceptual systems might share like information. To test this, we assessed priming and recognition for visual and auditory events, within- and across- modalities. On the visual test, auditory study resulted in no priming. On the auditory priming test, visual study resulted in priming that was only marginally less than within-modal priming. The priming results show that visual study facilitates identification on both visual and auditory tests, but auditory study only facilitates performance on the auditory test. For both recognition tests, within-modal recognition exceeded cross-modal recognition. The results have two novel implications for the understanding of perceptual priming: First, we introduce visual and auditory priming for spatio-temporal events as a new priming paradigm chosen for its ecological validity and potential for information exchange. Second, we propose that the asymmetry of the cross-modal priming observed here may reflect the capacity of these perceptual modalities to provide cross-modal constraints on ambiguity. We argue that visual perception might inform and constrain auditory processing, while auditory perception corresponds to too many potential visual events to usefully inform and constrain visual perception.