Semantic Knowledge,Semantic Guidance,and Kripke's Wittgenstein

Saul Kripke's influential ‘sceptical paradox’ of semantic rule‐following alleges that speakers cannot have any justification for using a word one way rather than another. If it is correct, there can be no such thing as meaning anything by a word. I argue that the paradox fails to undermine meaning. Kripke never adequately motivates its excessively strict standard for the justified use of words. The paradox lacks the resources to show that its standard is truly mandatory or that speakers do not frequently satisfy the well‐motivated competitor I offer. So the paradox fails.     

Spectral weights and the profile bowl

In these experiments, listeners detected changes in the shape of a complex spectrum that varied in overall level. With multicomponent complexes, a typical finding is that the listeners were more sensitive to changes made in the middle components of the spectrum than to changes made at either edge. We used a technique developed by Berg (1989) to estimate the weight listeners attached to the different components of the spectrum in making these judgements. For reasons not understood, the pattern of spectral weights was nearly optimum for a change made in the middle component of the spectrum and much poorer when the change occurred at either edge.