The Beck Depression Inventory: Item Order and the Impact of Response Sets

The lack of subtle content in the item groups of the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) and the consistency in the ordering of the items from least to most pathological make this instrument unduly susceptible to either defensive or malingering response sets. Two experimental forms were developed for the BDI: a backwards version (a simple reversal of the order of items within each group) and a random-order version. These forms, together with the original item order, were given to college undergraduate women along with the Depression scale from the MMPI and the Burks-Martin Questionnaire covering recent life changes and current stressful situations. The random order BDI results in a significantly higher depression score than did either the original or backwards version. Correlations with the other instruments were comparable for all three forms. The random order of items within each set appears to break up a response set to endorse either the first or last item and is, therefore, recommended.     

New Perspectives on Incentive System Design: Integrating the Theory of the Firm and the Theory of Individual Behavior

Classical incentive reward systems motivate employees, but because the designs of these systems neglect consideration of key factors, the rewards typically do not achieve the right degree of employee motivation. Adding insights from the effort-net return model of employee motivation and from the economic theory of the firm helps management achieve the proper amount of employee motivation. The slope of the employee's perceived reward function is most critical in coupling the interests of the firm with those of the individual.     

The Mutual Development of Intersubjectivity and Metacognitive Capacity in the Psychotherapy for Persons with Schizophrenia

While cognitive behavioral approaches have been shown to help some individuals with schizophrenia, these approaches may be limited when working with patients with impairments in the metacognitive abilities required to form complex and integrated representations of themselves and others. In response, this paper explores the possibility that a key to working with patients with relatively impaired self-reflectivity lies in explicitly focusing on a patient’s intersubjective experience within psychotherapy. We offer theoretical and empirical support for the assertion that the tolerance and capacity for intersubjectivity is a basis for the development of self-reflectivity in general. We also explore how the fostering of intersubjective processes in psychotherapy might enable some patients to form more complex ideas about themselves and so better ward off delusions in the face of the challenges of daily life. To illustrate these principles we present the case of a patient with tenaciously held delusions and limited capacity for self-reflection. We discuss when and how the therapist’s awareness and verbalization of intersubjective processes within session allowed her and the patient to develop more complex and consensually valid ideas about him as a being in the world, which then assisted the patient to achieve improvements in a number of domains in his life.     

Fiction,Meaning, and Utterance

A Gricean preamble concludes that though utterances have unintended meanings, those cannot be considered apart from their intended meanings. Intention distinguishes artworks from natural phenomena. To allocate an artwork to a genre, to accept its normal authorial boundaries and that its content is not random but chosen, is to concede intention's centrality. Wimsatt and Beardsley were right that meaning is public. But they think 'intention' is 'private' or 'unavailable'. However, it too is public, in the work. Fictions are utterances of a curious kind. They may mimic, but are not meant to be taken for, veridical reports. Neither are they 'pseudo-statements' (Richards) nor 'pretended illocutionary acts' (Searle). Their logical form is actually this: 'I [author] invite you [reader] to imagine that S [content].' This prescribes no response, nor claims to describe the 'real' world, even though it may elicit a response appropriate to real-life events. One reason for imagining fictional situations may be to strengthen the perceptions necessary for (civilized) real life.     

Representation and cognitive science

‘Representation’ is a concept which occurs both in cognitive science and philosophy. It has common features in both settings in that it concerns the explanation of behaviour in terms of the way the subject categorizes and systematizes responses to its environment. The prevailing model sees representations as causally structured entities correlated on the one hand with elements in a natural language and on the other with clearly identifiable items in the world. This leads to an analysis of representation and cognition in terms of formal symbols and their relations. But human perception and cognition use multiple informational constraints and deal with unsystematic and messy input in a way best explained by Parallel Distributed Processing models. This undermines the claim that a formal representational theory of mind is ‘the only game in town’. In particular it suggests a radically different model of brain function and its relation to epistemology from that found in current representational theories.     

Transfer Effects between Automatically-Paced Training Schedules in a Perceptual-Motor Task

A reanalysis of constant and variable input effects in multitrial free recall was undertaken with the use of a new method of measuring organization (ITOV) and a mathematical model of retention-forgetting. Results indicate that ITOV apparently measures a different type of organization than traditional measures. In addition, the trial-to-trial (TTT) model of retention-forgetting quantitatively reveals results about free recall not apparent from traditional analysis.