Emotion words and categories: evidence from lexical decision

We examined the categorical nature of emotion word recognition. Positive, negative, and neutral words were presented in lexical decision tasks. Word frequency was additionally manipulated. In Experiment 1, “positive” and “negative” categories of words were implicitly indicated by the blocked design employed. A significant emotion–frequency interaction was obtained, replicating past research. While positive words consistently elicited faster responses than neutral words, only low frequency negative words demonstrated a similar advantage. In Experiments 2a and 2b, explicit categories (“positive,” “negative,” and “household” items) were specified to participants. Positive words again elicited faster responses than did neutral words. Responses to negative words, however, were no different than those to neutral words, regardless of their frequency. The overall pattern of effects indicates that positive words are always facilitated, frequency plays a greater role in the recognition of negative words, and a “negative” category represents a somewhat disparate set of emotions. These results support the notion that emotion word processing may be moderated by distinct systems.     

The Chalcedonian Logic of John Wesley's Christology

This article addresses John Wesley's theology of the person of Jesus Christ. Against those who have discerned either a Monophysite or a Nestorian trajectory, it argues that Wesley's Christology as a whole conforms to a Chalcedonian grammar, displaying certain Alexandrian–Lutheran tendencies in particular. It does so in three stages. First, it examines Wesley's emphasis on Christ's divinity, his ostensible reservations about Christ's humanity, and his view of the hypostatic union in the context of dogmatic christological traditions. Second, it situates his christological emphases within his deistic ideological context. Finally, it briefly illuminates the connection between Wesley's thought on Christ's person and his theology of Christ's work.     

Non-Naturalist Moral Realism,Autonomy and Entanglement

It was something of a dogma for much of the twentieth century that one cannot validly derive an ought from an is. More generally, it was held that non-normative propositions do not entail normative propositions. Call this thesis about the relation between the natural and the normative Natural-Normative Autonomy (or Autonomy for short). The denial of Autonomy involves the entanglement of the natural with the normative. Naturalism entails entanglement—in fact it entails the most extreme form of entanglement—but entanglement does not entail naturalism. In a ground-breaking paper “The autonomy of ethics” Arthur Prior constructed some intriguing counterexamples to Autonomy. While his counterexamples have convinced few, there is little agreement on what is wrong with them. I present a new analysis of Autonomy, one which is grounded in a general and independently plausible account of subject matters. While Prior’s arguments do establish shallow natural-normative entanglement, this is a consequence of simple logical relationships that hold between just about any two subject matters. It has nothing special to do with the logical structure of normativity or its relation to the natural. Prior’s arguments (along with several others) leave the fundamental idea behind natural-normative Autonomy intact. I offer a new argument for deep entanglement. I show that in any framework adequate for dealing with the natural and the normative spheres, a purely natural proposition entails a purely normative proposition, and vice-versa. But this is no threat to non-naturalist moral realism. In fact it helps ameliorate the excesses of an extreme non-naturalism, delivering a more palatable and plausible position.     

Incremental validity of the MMPI-2 PSY-5 scales in assessing self-reported personality disorder criteria

The Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2 (MMPI-2) Personality Psychopathology-Five (PSY-5) scales were developed to measure abnormal personality symptomatology. The present study examines the incremental validity of the PSY-5 scales beyond the clinical and content scales in assessing criteria associated with personality disorders. The current sample includes 240 male and 407 female clients from private practice settings who completed the MMPI-2 and the Multiaxial Diagnostic Inventory (MDI), a self-report checklist of Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3rd ed., revised) symptoms. Six of the MDI personality disorder scales, conceptually related to the PSY-5 scales, are used as criteria. Hierarchical regression analyses determine the incremental validity of each PSY-5 scale. In most analyses, PSY-5 scales add a significant increment of variance to the clinical and content scales. Implications of the results are discussed.