Feeling socially powerless makes you more prone to bumping into things on the right and induces leftward line bisection error

Social power affects the manner in which people view themselves and act toward others, a finding that has attracted broad interest from the social and political sciences. However, there has been little interest from those within cognitive neuroscience. Here, we demonstrate that the effects of power extend beyond social interaction and invoke elementary spatial biases in behavior consistent with preferential hemispheric activation. In particular, participants who felt relatively powerless, compared with those who felt more powerful, were more likely to bisect horizontal lines to the left of center, and bump into the right-hand (as opposed to the left-hand) side when walking through a narrow passage. These results suggest that power induces hemispheric differences in visuomotor behavior, indicating that this ubiquitous phenomenon affects not only how we interact with one another, but also how we interact with the physical world.     

Connecting Data to Action: How the Santa Cruz County Community Assessment Project Contributes to Better Outcomes for Youth

Community indicator projects have the potential to deliver new knowledge about the quality of life in local communities and drive actions to improve them (Phillips 2003; Holden Social Indicators Research 92:429–448, 2009; Memon and Johnstone 2008). However, the connection between the information produced by community indicator projects and the actions taken to improve conditions in communities remains under-researched (Holden Social Indicators Research 92:429–448, 2009; Hezri and Dovers Ecological Economics 60:86–99, 2006). This is because community indicator projects have mainly been conceptualized as producing information for action rather than as part of an action process (Memon and Johnstone 2008). This paper provides a case study of a community indicator project with an explicit plan to move beyond the data and into action. A review of one of the oldest community indicator projects in the United States, the Santa Cruz County Community Assessment Project (CAP) demonstrates how an action oriented community improvement cycle has contributed to measurable improvements for children and youth in one California County. The paper identifies key elements that were important for turning CAP data into local actions and concludes with lessons for community indicator practitioners and questions for future research.     

A balancing act: Physical balance, through arousal, influences size perception

Previous research has demonstrated that manipulating vision influences balance. Here, we question whether manipulating balance can influence vision and how it may influence vision--specifically, the perception of width. In Experiment 1, participants estimated the width of beams while balanced and unbalanced. When unbalanced, participants judged the widths to be smaller. One possible explanation is that unbalanced participants did not view the stimulus as long as when balanced because they were focused on remaining balanced. In Experiment 2, we tested this notion by limiting viewing time. Experiment 2 replicated the findings of Experiment 1, but viewing time had no effect on width judgments. In Experiment 3, participants' level of arousal was manipulated, because the balancing task likely produced arousal. While jogging, participants judged the beams to be smaller. In Experiment 4, participants completed another arousing task (counting backward by sevens) that did not involve movement. Again, participants judged the beams to be smaller when aroused. Experiment 5A raised participants' level of arousal before estimating the board widths (to control for potential dual-task effects) and showed that heightened arousal still influenced perceived width of the boards. Collectively, heightened levels of arousal, caused by multiple manipulations (including balance), influenced perceived width.     

Russell’s Repsychologising of the Proposition

Bertrand Russell’s 1903 masterpiece The Principles of Mathematics places great emphasis on the need to separate propositions from psychological items such as thoughts. In 1919 (and until the end of his career) Russell explicitly retracts this view, however, and defines propositions as “psychological occurrences”. These psychological occurrences are held by Russell to be mental images. In this paper, I seek to explain this radical change of heart. I argue that Russell’s re-psychologising of the proposition in 1919 can only be understood against the background of his struggle with the problem of the unity of the proposition in earlier work. Once this is recognized, and the solution to the problem offered by the 1919 theory is appreciated, new light is also shed on Russell’s naturalism. I go on to compare Russell’s psychological “picture theory” with the vehemently anti-psychological picture theory of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and suggest that, once the background of the dispute is brought into clearer focus, Russell’s position can be seen to have many advantages over its more celebrated rival.     

Training staff in multiple family therapy in a children's psychiatric hospital: from theory to practice

This article describes a systematized method for training clinical staff from a variety of mental health professions while implementing supportive, process‐oriented multiple family therapy (MFT) in a children's psychiatric hospital. The model uses a step‐by‐step approach based upon learning objectives specific to the theory and practice of MFT for each stage of the process. External consultants skilled and experienced in MFT supported tuition in the initial stages. The method employs seminars with theoretical and experiential components, highlighting the major conceptual features of group, family therapy and MFT. Advanced stages of the training model include experiential learning in small groups and ongoing peer group supervision with live families. The systematic procedure has relevance for ongoing supervision, research and best standards of clinical practice in the hospital.     

Relationship Between Work Performance and Personality Traits in Hong Kong Organizational Settings

Four hundred and thirty‐seven employees from four Hong Kong organizations completed the Traditional Chinese versions of the Fifteen Factor Personality Questionnaire Plus (15FQ+) and the Cross‐Cultural Personality Assessment Inventory (CPAI‐2) (indigenous scales) and provided objective and memory‐based recent performance appraisal scores. A number of significant bivariate correlations were found between personality and performance scores. Hierarchical multiple regression analyses revealed that a number of the scales from the 15FQ+ contributed to significantly predicting four of the performance competency dimensions, but that the CPAI‐2 indigenous scales contributed no incremental validity in performance prediction over and above the 15FQ+. Results are discussed in the light of previous research and a call made for continued research to further develop and increase the reliability of the Chinese instruments used in the study and to enable generalization of the findings with confidence.     

TESTIMONIAL JUSTIFICATION: INFERENTIAL OR NON-INFERENTIAL?

Anti-reductionists hold that beliefs based upon comprehension (of both force and content) of tellings are non-inferentially justified. For reductionists, on the other hand, comprehension as such is not in itself a warrant for belief: beliefs based on it are justified only if inferentially supported by other beliefs. I discuss Elizabeth Fricker's argument that even if anti-reductionism is right in principle, its significance is undercut by the presence of background inferential support: for mature knowledgeable adults, justification from comprehension as such plays no active role, and is superseded by inferential warrant. I show that her argument begs important questions. Inferential and non-inferential support combine to over-determine the justification of comprehension-based beliefs.     

Form as Structure: It's not so Simple

Hylomorphism is the theory that objects are composites of form and matter. Recently it has been argued that form is structure, or the arrangement of an object's parts. This paper shows that the principle of form cannot be ontologically exhausted by structure. That is, I deny form should be understood just as the arrangement of an object's parts. I do so by showing that structure cannot play the role form is supposed to in a certain domain of objects, specifically, in mereological simples. Thus, I show that Hylomorphism does not reduce to Structuralism. I also draw out some important consequences from my argument for Hylomorphism in general.