Power,Situation, and Character: A Confucian-Inspired Response to Indirect Situationist Critiques

Indirect situationist critiques of virtue ethics grant that virtue exists and is possible to acquire, but contend that given the low probability of success in acquiring it, a person genuinely interested in behaving as morally as possible would do better to rely on situationist strategies - or, in other words, strategies of environmental or ecological engineering or control (Doris, 2002, 1998; see also Levy 2012). In this paper, I develop a partial answer to this critique drawn from work in early Confucian ethics and in contemporary philosophy and psychology. From early Confucian ethics, I lean on the concept of li, or ritual. Ritual represents both a set of situational manipulations that are especially effective at directly producing moral behavior and at indirectly cultivating virtue over time, and also a virtue that consists of facility with and expertise in these situational manipulations (Mower 2013; Slingerland, 2011; Sarkissian, 2010; and Hutton, 2006). Appealing to the particular example of social power, I then argue that one is justified in attempting to acquire virtue if one (a) knows that one will frequently encounter circumstances in which purely situationist strategies lose effectiveness, (b) if these circumstances also carry moral urgency: the risk of great harm or opportunity for great benefit to others is high, and (c) if utilizing the potent combination of situationist strategies and virtue envisioned by the early Confucians as ritual is possible.     

The Chalcedonian Logic of John Wesley's Christology

This article addresses John Wesley's theology of the person of Jesus Christ. Against those who have discerned either a Monophysite or a Nestorian trajectory, it argues that Wesley's Christology as a whole conforms to a Chalcedonian grammar, displaying certain Alexandrian–Lutheran tendencies in particular. It does so in three stages. First, it examines Wesley's emphasis on Christ's divinity, his ostensible reservations about Christ's humanity, and his view of the hypostatic union in the context of dogmatic christological traditions. Second, it situates his christological emphases within his deistic ideological context. Finally, it briefly illuminates the connection between Wesley's thought on Christ's person and his theology of Christ's work.     

Non-Naturalist Moral Realism,Autonomy and Entanglement

It was something of a dogma for much of the twentieth century that one cannot validly derive an ought from an is. More generally, it was held that non-normative propositions do not entail normative propositions. Call this thesis about the relation between the natural and the normative Natural-Normative Autonomy (or Autonomy for short). The denial of Autonomy involves the entanglement of the natural with the normative. Naturalism entails entanglement—in fact it entails the most extreme form of entanglement—but entanglement does not entail naturalism. In a ground-breaking paper “The autonomy of ethics” Arthur Prior constructed some intriguing counterexamples to Autonomy. While his counterexamples have convinced few, there is little agreement on what is wrong with them. I present a new analysis of Autonomy, one which is grounded in a general and independently plausible account of subject matters. While Prior’s arguments do establish shallow natural-normative entanglement, this is a consequence of simple logical relationships that hold between just about any two subject matters. It has nothing special to do with the logical structure of normativity or its relation to the natural. Prior’s arguments (along with several others) leave the fundamental idea behind natural-normative Autonomy intact. I offer a new argument for deep entanglement. I show that in any framework adequate for dealing with the natural and the normative spheres, a purely natural proposition entails a purely normative proposition, and vice-versa. But this is no threat to non-naturalist moral realism. In fact it helps ameliorate the excesses of an extreme non-naturalism, delivering a more palatable and plausible position.     

Consumer perceptions of bundles and time‐limited promotion deals: Do contracts matter?

Marketers use various types of deals to positively influence consumers' product evaluations. Across two experiments, we manipulated print advertisements to examine whether the commonly used deal content of both bundling and time‐limited promotions affect consumers' perceived confusion, risk and value. In study 1, the influence of this content was tested in the context of a 2‐year telecommunications (telco) contract. Here, consumers associated a three‐item bundle with greater perceived value than a single item, but perceived value was reduced and risk heightened when it was only available for a limited time. We speculate that this is because of the long‐term nature of the contract. Study 2 removed the contract restriction, examining the bundling of a video game console and game(s), again with a time‐limited promotion. However, in this context, we failed to locate any interaction effects. It appears that consumers further appraise the drawbacks of a long‐term telco contract when accompanied by a time‐limited promotion and may perceive the switching costs for study 1 three‐item telco bundle to be particularly risky. Our studies represent the first empirical investigation of the effect on consumers' perceptions of offering a bundle in conjunction with a time‐limited promotion. Testing these effects in contract and no contract conditions adds to the contribution of our studies by delineating a boundary condition. From a managerial perspective, our findings are thought‐provoking in respect to information integration, or how consumers process different deal content together. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.