A Sketch of a Theory of Moral Blameworthiness*

In this paper I sketch an account of moral blame and blameworthiness. I begin by clarifying what I take blame to be and explaining how blameworthiness is to be analyzed in terms of it. I then consider different accounts of the conditions of blameworthiness and, in the end, settle on one according to which a person is blameworthy for φ‐ing just in case, in φ‐ing, she violates one of a particular class of moral requirements governing the attitudes we bear, and our mental orientation, toward people and other objects of significant moral worth. These requirements embody the moral stricture that we accord to these others a sufficient level of respect, one that their moral worth demands. This is a familiar theme which has its roots in P. F. Strawson’s pioneering views on moral responsibility. My development of it leads me to the conclusion that acting wrongly is not a condition of blameworthiness: violating a moral requirement to perform, or refrain from performing, an action is neither necessary nor sufficient for being blameworthy. All we are ever blameworthy for, I will argue, are certain aspects of our mental bearing toward others. We can be said to be blameworthy for our actions only derivatively, in the sense that those actions are the natural manifestations of the things for which we are strictly speaking blameworthy.     

Financial Doping in the English Premier League

Whilst the relationship between money and success in elite sport is acknowledged, the exact nature, extent and implications of this relationship is one that has not been carefully examined. In this paper, we have three main aims. Firstly, to provide empirical evidence of the extent that money buys success in the English Premier League. Secondly, to evaluate this evidence from a sports ethics perspective, and finally, to discuss potential solutions to the problem. We argue that the evident performance advantage teams gain through financial investments is contrary to the spirit of sport as it undermines athletic excellence and the ‘sweet tension of uncertainty of outcome’ that is central to good competition. Consequently, financial investments in elite football ought to be regulated and controlled. We argue, however, that current attempts to do so (via Financial Fair Play Regulations) are inadequate as they focus on issues concerning financial health, rather than the health of the game in terms of spirit and fairness.     

Women’s Ideals for Masculinity Across Social Contexts: Patriarchal Agentic Masculinity is Valued in Work,Family, and Romance but Communal Masculinity in Friendship

The present study explores women’s ideals for masculinity in different social contexts (work, family/romance, and friendship) and compares how traditional (agentic) and non-patriarchal (communal) masculinity are valued in each context. Survey data were collected from one international (N = 159) and three South African samples (Ns = 86, 100, 161) of women. Results show that although women value patriarchal ideals for masculinity, agentic and communal versions of masculinity are valued differently across contexts. Specifically, traditional agentic versions of masculinity were most valued in the contexts most important to the long-term production of viable identity (family/romance and work). It was only in friendship that non-patriarchal communal masculinity was consistently idealized over traditional agentic masculinity. The results are discussed in relation to hegemonic masculinity (HM) and system justification theory (SJT). Congruent with SJT, women idealized versions of masculinity that may not be in their own or their group’s best interests, but in line with HM, the results emphasized the fluidity of masculinity and that the same individual can simultaneously idealize different versions of masculinity depending on the context. Because stereotypes are both explanations for the status quo and warrants for behaving in one way or another, these collective ideals for masculinity and contextual boundaries may be important obstacles to achieving gender equity.     

赫拉克利特:流变、秩序与知识

赫拉克利特不仅仅思考宇宙论问题,也关注人类社会和知识问题。本文从文本分析入手,从古典语文学的角度考察了赫拉克利特残篇的语言风格,据此重构了赫拉克利特思想的主要方面。首先分析赫拉克利特论变化、秩序等宇宙论问题,强调他主张一切具体事物都是流变的,但是事物的变动、转化有其数量、比例和秩序,因此作为整体的世界是有秩序和统一的。其次探讨赫拉克利特如何以此为基础阐明了人类知识问题,他既强调知识的经验来源,又强调通过logos来直觉地、归纳地把握世界的总体性和普遍真实性。     

Disagreement

There has been a recent explosion of interest in the epistemology of disagreement. Much of the recent literature is concerned with a particular range of puzzle cases (discussed in the “Cases” section of my paper). Almost all of the papers that contribute to that recent literature make mention of questions about religious disagreement in ways that suggest that there are interesting connections between those puzzle cases and real life cases of religious disagreement. One important aim of my paper is to cast doubt on that suggestion. More generally, the aim of my paper is to give a reasonably full account of the recent literature on the epistemology of disagreement, and then to give a serious discussion of some of the epistemological issues that are raised by real world religious disagreements.     

The role of comparison in preschoolers’ novel object categorization

We examined the role of the comparison process and shared names on preschoolers’ categorization of novel objects. In our studies, 4-year-olds were presented with novel object sets consisting of either one or two standards and two test objects: a shape match and a texture match. When children were presented with one standard, they extended the category based on shape regardless of whether the objects were named. When children were presented with two standards that shared the same texture and the objects were named with the same noun, they extended the category based on texture. The opportunity to compare two standards, in the absence of shared names, led to an attenuation of the effect of shape. These findings demonstrate that comparison plays a critical role in the categorization of novel objects and that shared names enhance this process.     

Against the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Mind</Emphasis> Argument

The Mind Argument is an argument for the incompatibility of indeterminism and anyone’s having a choice about anything that happens. Peter van Inwagen rejects the Mind Argument not because he is able to point out the flaw in it, but because he accepts both that determinism is incompatible with anyone’s having a choice about anything that happens and that it is possible for someone to have a choice about something that happens. In this paper I first diagnose and clear up a confusion in recent discussions of the Mind Argument and then go on to show why it is a bad argument.