What the Problem with Russell Isn't

Mark Nelson thinks that Bertrand Russell's well-known criticisms of St. Thomas Aquinas turn on Russell's acceptance of a highly implausible epistemic principle (DAM), and that my previous objection to this claim depends upon the attribution to Russell of an even more implausible Insincerity Objection. While I agree that Russell's criticisms do not turn on the Insincerity Objection, I argue that my previous rejection of the attribution of (DAM) to Russell is well-justified: there is a plausible reading of Russell that requires neither (DAM) nor the Insincerity Objection.     

Gender differences in health anxiety: An investigation of the interpersonal model of health anxiety

Health anxiety (HA) involves persistent worry about one’s health and beliefs one has an illness or may contract a disease. In the present study, gender differences in Noyes et al.’s (2003) interpersonal model of health anxiety (IMHA) were examined. Using a sample of 950 undergraduates (674 women; 276 men), multigroup confirmatory factor analyses suggested the measurement model for key dimensions of the IMHA (i.e., reassurance-seeking, alienation, worry, and absorption) were invariant across gender. This suggests key dimensions of this model are applicable to and generalizable across women and men. Coefficients alpha for and bivariate correlations between these IMHA dimensions were also roughly comparable across women and men. As hypothesized, mean levels of reassurance-seeking and worry were significantly higher in women compared to men. No gender differences were observed in mean levels of alienation or absorption. Reassurance-seeking and worry appear salient in the interpersonal behavior and emotional life of women with HA. The present study helps to clarify gender differences in the IMHA and other HA models involving similar variables.     

Biodata Validity Decay and Score Inflation with Faking: Do Item Attributes Explain Variance Across Items?

Rating scales were developed to assess the biodata dimensions offered by Mael (1991). Biodata items assessing conscientiousness were administered under honest-responding and faking-good conditions. Item attributes were examined to determine their value in predicting item validity for honest respondents and item validity for faking respondents. Analyses were also conducted to determine whether the degree of item faking was related to item attributes. Item attributes associated with item validity for honest respondents are not the same as the item attributes indicative of item validity for the faking respondents. We suggest that this makes it very difficult to develop a biodata questionnaire which will be equally valid for both honest and faking respondents.     

Age differences in sensation seeking and impulsivity as indexed by behavior and self-report: evidence for a dual systems model

It has been hypothesized that sensation seeking and impulsivity, which are often conflated, in fact develop along different timetables and have different neural underpinnings, and that the difference in their timetables helps account for heightened risk taking during adolescence. In order to test these propositions, the authors examined age differences in sensation seeking and impulsivity in a socioeconomically and ethnically diverse sample of 935 individuals between the ages of 10 and 30, using self-report and behavioral measures of each construct. Consistent with the authors' predictions, age differences in sensation seeking, which are linked to pubertal maturation, follow a curvilinear pattern, with sensation seeking increasing between 10 and 15 and declining or remaining stable thereafter. In contrast, age differences in impulsivity, which are unrelated to puberty, follow a linear pattern, with impulsivity declining steadily from age 10 on. Heightened vulnerability to risk taking in middle adolescence may be due to the combination of relatively higher inclinations to seek excitement and relatively immature capacities for self-control that are typical of this period of development.     

The theoretical diagnosis of skepticism

Radical skepticism about the external implies that no belief about the external is even prima facie justified. A theoretical reply to skepticism has four stages. First, show which theories of epistemic justification support skeptical doubts (show which theories, given other reasonable assumptions, entail skepticism). Second, show which theories undermine skeptical doubts (show which theories, given other reasonable assumptions, do not support the skeptic’s conclusion). Third, show which of the latter theories (which non-skeptical theory) is correct, and in so doing show that all of the rival theories of justification, skeptical and non-skeptical alike, are mistaken. Fourth, explain why skeptical doubts are sometimes (or sometimes merely seem) intuitive, and thereby accommodate skeptical doubts without capitulation. Michael Williams has pioneered the very idea of a theoretical reply. A theoretical diagnosis consists in just the first two stages. An adequate reply, which is correct at each stage, would rebut the skeptic entirely. Williams’ own reply, I argue, is inadequate. I offer in its place an exhaustive and accurate diagnosis of skepticism. I distinguish four kinds of skepticism and five theories of justification. I then show which theories do, and which theories do not, support which kinds of skepticism.     

More than One Flaw: Reply to Millican

Millican (Mind 113(451):437–476, 2004) claims to have detected ‘the one fatal flaw in Anselm’s ontological argument.’ I argue that there is more than one important flaw in the position defended in Millican (Mind 113(451):437–476, 2004). First, Millican’s reconstruction of Anselm’s argument does serious violence to the original text. Second, Millican’s generalised objection fails to diagnose any flaw in a vast range of ontological arguments. Third, there are independent reasons for thinking that Millican’s generalised objection is unpersuasive.