Non-Naturalist Moral Realism,Autonomy and Entanglement

It was something of a dogma for much of the twentieth century that one cannot validly derive an ought from an is. More generally, it was held that non-normative propositions do not entail normative propositions. Call this thesis about the relation between the natural and the normative Natural-Normative Autonomy (or Autonomy for short). The denial of Autonomy involves the entanglement of the natural with the normative. Naturalism entails entanglement—in fact it entails the most extreme form of entanglement—but entanglement does not entail naturalism. In a ground-breaking paper “The autonomy of ethics” Arthur Prior constructed some intriguing counterexamples to Autonomy. While his counterexamples have convinced few, there is little agreement on what is wrong with them. I present a new analysis of Autonomy, one which is grounded in a general and independently plausible account of subject matters. While Prior’s arguments do establish shallow natural-normative entanglement, this is a consequence of simple logical relationships that hold between just about any two subject matters. It has nothing special to do with the logical structure of normativity or its relation to the natural. Prior’s arguments (along with several others) leave the fundamental idea behind natural-normative Autonomy intact. I offer a new argument for deep entanglement. I show that in any framework adequate for dealing with the natural and the normative spheres, a purely natural proposition entails a purely normative proposition, and vice-versa. But this is no threat to non-naturalist moral realism. In fact it helps ameliorate the excesses of an extreme non-naturalism, delivering a more palatable and plausible position.     

Incremental validity of the MMPI-2 PSY-5 scales in assessing self-reported personality disorder criteria

The Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2 (MMPI-2) Personality Psychopathology-Five (PSY-5) scales were developed to measure abnormal personality symptomatology. The present study examines the incremental validity of the PSY-5 scales beyond the clinical and content scales in assessing criteria associated with personality disorders. The current sample includes 240 male and 407 female clients from private practice settings who completed the MMPI-2 and the Multiaxial Diagnostic Inventory (MDI), a self-report checklist of Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3rd ed., revised) symptoms. Six of the MDI personality disorder scales, conceptually related to the PSY-5 scales, are used as criteria. Hierarchical regression analyses determine the incremental validity of each PSY-5 scale. In most analyses, PSY-5 scales add a significant increment of variance to the clinical and content scales. Implications of the results are discussed.     

Delusions and decision-making style: use of the Need for Closure Scale

Clinicians and researchers have suggested that rapidity in belief formation, due to having a high 'need for closure' (NFC), may contribute to the acceptance of delusional explanations. The aim of the study is to determine whether NFC has such a direct link with delusions. A secondary aim is to examine if NFC is related to the delusion-associated reasoning process of 'jumping to conclusions'. One hundred and eighty-seven patients with psychosis, recruited for a treatment trial of psychological therapy (the PRP trial), completed the Need for Closure Scale (NFCS), symptom measures, and probabilistic reasoning tasks. The NFCS was considered in terms of its two dimensions: a desire for simple structure and a preference for quick, decisive answers. The individuals with psychosis reported being poor at making quick, decisive answers but required a greater need for simple structure. NFC was associated with levels of anxiety and depression. There were weak links between NFC and both positive and negative symptoms of psychosis, but these were explained by differences in affect. NFCS scores were unrelated to jumping to conclusions. Contrary to the argument that NFC is directly linked to delusions, individuals with delusions actually perceive themselves as indecisive. There was no evidence that NFC-at least as assessed by the NFCS-could be a proximal cause of delusions. Any potential effect on psychotic symptom presentation is indirect, mediated through affect. The use of the NFCS on its own in the study of psychotic symptoms cannot be recommended.