The Growing-Block: just one thing after another?

In this article, we consider two independently appealing theories—the Growing-Block view and Humean Supervenience—and argue that at least one is false. The Growing-Block view is a theory about the nature of time. It says that (a) past and present things exist, while future things do not, and (b) the passage of time consists in new things coming into existence. Humean Supervenience is a theory about the nature of entities like laws, nomological possibility, counterfactuals, dispositions, causation, and chance. It says that none of these entities are fundamental, since if they were, this would entail the existence of irreducible necessary connections between matters of fact. Instead, these entities supervene on a fundamental, non-nomological ‘Humean mosaic’ of property instances at spacetime points. We will further explain and motivate the Growing-Block view and Humean Supervenience in Sects. 2 and 3, but first, we turn to our master argument.     

A high-field functional MRI study of quadri-lingual subjects

We assessed six multilingual subjects by functional MRI using a Noun Verb Generation task in four different languages. We hypothesised that the degree of proficiency in each language would be related to the extent of functional activity measured in a region of interest analysis. Proficiency in each language was quantified using two neuropsychological tests. All four languages activated overlapping brain areas, corresponding to the major language regions. The number of activated voxels correlated with proficiency, so that the activated volume increased for languages in which a subject had poorer proficiency. Activation did not appear to be dependent on the age at which the language was learnt.     

Acquisition of structured knowledge without instruction: the relational schema induction paradigm

Participants learned about a structure without explicit explanation, either by using relational schema induction (G. S. Halford, J. D. Bain, M. T. Maybery, & G. Andrews, 1998), which requires completion of instances of the structure, or by memorizing instances. Emergence of structured knowledge over trials was assessed by ability to map the structure to an isomorph and thereby to generate novel instances of the structure (the generativity test). Schema induction was found to be an effective way to induce acquisition of the structure, and the generativity test was a sensitive measure of structure acquisition, as indicated by converging measures. Memorization produced only low levels of structured knowledge. A conception of structured knowledge acquisition based on relational schema induction is proposed.     

Separating cognitive capacity from knowledge: a new hypothesis

We propose that working memory and reasoning share related capacity limits. These limits are quantified in terms of the number of items that can be kept active in working memory, and the number of interrelationships between elements that can be kept active in reasoning. The latter defines the complexity of reasoning problems and the processing loads they impose. Principled procedures for measuring, controlling or limiting recoding and other strategies for reducing memory and processing loads have opened up new research opportunities, and yielded orderly quantification of capacity limits in both memory and reasoning. We argue that both types of limit might be based on the limited ability to form and preserve bindings between elements in memory.