Islands of memory: Autobiographical remembering in amnestics

In amnestics with anterograde amnesia, memories of post-onset autobiographical experiences, if present at all, are typically barren and impoverished. However, there have been sporadic reports of islands of memory—memories that are vivid, detailed, and specific to time and place. The aim of this study was to verify the presence of such memories and examine their incidence rate. Anterograde amnestics were interviewed in their home using a narrative interviewing strategy with a view to describing memory in everyday life. Each autobiographical memory of a post-onset event was coded for quantity-length, and quality-episodicity. In just over half of the amnestics (8 out of 14), a memory that was lengthy, rich in personal details, and localisable was recollected. The quantitative and qualitative aspects of these island memories were significantly different from the other autobiographical memories that the amnestics supplied. These memories were at odds with what would be expected on the basis of their performance on standardised memory instruments. Our findings suggest there is occasionally more variability in remembering of autobiographical experiences in some amnestics than has traditionally been believed.     

“The ball don't lie”: How inequity aversion can undermine performance

Previous research has found that people are often averse to inequity, even when it works to their own advantage. The present research extends previous demonstrations of inequity aversion by examining how it plays out in a real-world context in which self-interest motivations and competitive pressures are substantial. National Basketball Association games were examined and instances of obviously incorrect foul calls were identified. Players were found to make a substantially lower percentage of the foul shots they were awarded as a result of incorrect calls, indicating that they were troubled by the inequity. This drop-off in performance was only observed when the shooter's team was ahead, highlighting the trade-off between the two conflicting motives of self-interest (the desire to win) and inequity aversion.     

Coping With Threats to Just‐World Beliefs: Derogate,Blame, or Help?1

The present research investigated Lerner's (1970, 1980) just‐world theory by manipulating victim‐related factors in a scenario and measuring several possible strategies for dealing with the threat to participants' just‐world beliefs created by the victim's intense suffering. Participants read a story about a victim who varied in terms of his character (likeable vs. unlikeable) and behavioral responsibility for causing his accident (high vs. low). The general pattern of results showed that for the unlikeable low‐responsibility victim, the primary response to protect justice beliefs appeared to be character derogation; for the likeable high‐responsibility victim, the primary protective strategy appeared to be blame; and for the likeable low‐responsibility victim, the primary protective strategy appeared to be compensation. Implications for just‐world theory are discussed.     

A visualization technique for Bayesian reasoning

We tested a method for solving Bayesian reasoning problems in terms of spatial relations as opposed to mathematical equations. Participants completed Bayesian problems in which they were given a prior probability and two conditional probabilities and were asked to report the posterior odds. After a pretraining phase in which participants completed problems with no instruction or external support, participants watched a video describing a visualization technique that used the length of bars to represent the probabilities provided in the problem. Participants then completed more problems with a chance to implement the technique by clicking interactive bars on the computer screen. Performance improved dramatically from the pretraining phase to the interactive‐bar phase. Participants maintained improved performance in transfer phases in which they were required to implement the visualization technique with either pencil‐and‐paper or no external medium. Accuracy levels for participants using the visualization technique were very similar to participants trained to solve the Bayes theorem equation. The results showed no evidence of learning across problems in the pretraining phase or for control participants who did not receive training, so the improved performance of participants using the visualization method could be uniquely attributed to the method itself. A classroom sample demonstrated that these benefits extend to instructional settings. The results show that people can quickly learn to perform Bayesian reasoning without using mathematical equations. We discuss ways that a spatial solution method can enhance classroom instruction on Bayesian inference and help students apply Bayesian reasoning in everyday settings.     

How many variables can humans process?

The conceptual complexity of problems was manipulated to probe the limits of human information processing capacity. Participants were asked to interpret graphically displayed statistical interactions. In such problems, all independent variables need to be considered together, so that decomposition into smaller subtasks is constrained, and thus the order of the interaction directly determines conceptual complexity. As the order of the interaction increases, the number of variables increases. Results showed a significant decline in accuracy and speed of solution from three-way to four-way interactions. Furthermore, performance on a five-way interaction was at chance level. These findings suggest that a structure defined on four variables is at the limit of human processing capacity.     

Load theory of selective attention and cognitive control

A load theory of attention in which distractor rejection depends on the level and type of load involved in current processing was tested. A series of experiments demonstrates that whereas high perceptual load reduces distractor interference, working memory load or dual-task coordination load increases distractor interference. These findings suggest 2 selective attention mechanisms: a perceptual selection mechanism serving to reduce distractor perception in situations of high perceptual load that exhaust perceptual capacity in processing relevant stimuli and a cognitive control mechanism that reduces interference from perceived distractors as long as cognitive control functions are available to maintain current priorities (low cognitive load). This theory resolves the long-standing early versus late selection debate and clarifies the role of cognitive control in selective attention.     

A cognitive complexity metric applied to cognitive development

Two experiments tested predictions from a theory in which processing load depends on relational complexity (RC), the number of variables related in a single decision. Tasks from six domains (transitivity, hierarchical classification, class inclusion, cardinality, relative-clause sentence comprehension, and hypothesis testing) were administered to children aged 3-8 years. Complexity analyses indicated that the domains entailed ternary relations (three variables). Simpler binary-relation (two variables) items were included for each domain. Thus RC was manipulated with other factors tightly controlled. Results indicated that (i) ternary-relation items were more difficult than comparable binary-relation items, (ii) the RC manipulation was sensitive to age-related changes, (iii) ternary relations were processed at a median age of 5 years, (iv) cross-task correlations were positive, with all tasks loading on a single factor (RC), (v) RC factor scores accounted for 80% (88%) of age-related variance in fluid intelligence (compositionality of sets), (vi) binary- and ternary-relation items formed separate complexity classes, and (vii) the RC approach to defining cognitive complexity is applicable to different content domains.     

Children''s ability to make transitive inferences: The importance of premise integration and structural complexity

Four experiments investigated 4- to 6-year-olds' transitive inferences. In Experiments 1–3, there was a nonmapping condition in which inferences were made either about stacked blocks, or about sticks ordered left to right. In the mapping condition, inferences were made by mapping either from blocks to sticks, or the reverse. In Experiments 2–4, relational complexity was manipulated by requiring either 1 or 2 premise relations to be processed in a single decision. Mapping was harder than nonmapping, but relational complexity was the main source of variance, with 2 relations being harder in both mapping and nonmapping conditions. The percentage of participants integrating 2 relations in a single decision was estimated at 20% at age 4, 53% at age 5 and 57% at age 6, suggesting gradual development of transitive inference ability. Results suggest that relational complexity has a strong effect on transitive inference in 4- to 6-year-old children.     

Set-size effects in primary memory: An age-related capacity limitation?

Set size was varied as a factor in the primary memory paradigm developed by Wickens and colleagues (Wickens, Moody, & Dow, 1981; Wickens, Moody, & Vidulich, 1985). In Experiment 1, using adults and teenagers, no proactive interference (PI) was observed at set size 4, consistent with previous research, but PI was observed at set size 10. In Experiment 2, with adults, PI was observed at set sizes 6, 8, and 10, but not at set size 4. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that sets of more than 4 items overload primary memory, so that some items have to be retrieved from secondary memory. In Experiment 3, 8- to 9-year-olds were used with set sizes of 2 and 4. Proactive interference was observed with the larger, but not with the smaller, set. This suggests that primary memory was overloaded by 4 items at this age, indicating that its capacity increases with age.     

Memory strategies with brain damage

The ability of anterograde amnesics with and without a history of alcoholism and patients with frontal lobe damage to think about memory, memorizing, and remembering was assessed. Alcoholic Korsakoffs' and frontal lobe patients' knowledge and use of memory strategies was deficient when compared with controls whereas nonalcoholic amnesics' was not. The use of the categorization mnemonic was assessed in a verbal learning experiment. Frontal lobe patients failed to spontaneously categorize a categorizable word list when trying to memorize it. Nevertheless, when forced to categorize the list, they benefited from the imposed structure. Nonalcoholic amnesics spontaneously categorized the list and benefited from the resulting organization.