The anchoring bias reflects rational use of cognitive resources

Cognitive biases, such as the anchoring bias, pose a serious challenge to rational accounts of human cognition. We investigate whether rational theories can meet this challenge by taking into account the mind’s bounded cognitive resources. We asked what reasoning under uncertainty would look like if people made rational use of their finite time and limited cognitive resources. To answer this question, we applied a mathematical theory of bounded rationality to the problem of numerical estimation. Our analysis led to a rational process model that can be interpreted in terms of anchoring-and-adjustment. This model provided a unifying explanation for ten anchoring phenomena including the differential effect of accuracy motivation on the bias towards provided versus self-generated anchors. Our results illustrate the potential of resource-rational analysis to provide formal theories that can unify a wide range of empirical results and reconcile the impressive capacities of the human mind with its apparently irrational cognitive biases.     

Determining informative priors for cognitive models

The development of cognitive models involves the creative scientific formalization of assumptions, based on theory, observation, and other relevant information. In the Bayesian approach to implementing, testing, and using cognitive models, assumptions can influence both the likelihood function of the model, usually corresponding to assumptions about psychological processes, and the prior distribution over model parameters, usually corresponding to assumptions about the psychological variables that influence those processes. The specification of the prior is unique to the Bayesian context, but often raises concerns that lead to the use of vague or non-informative priors in cognitive modeling. Sometimes the concerns stem from philosophical objections, but more often practical difficulties with how priors should be determined are the stumbling block. We survey several sources of information that can help to specify priors for cognitive models, discuss some of the methods by which this information can be formalized in a prior distribution, and identify a number of benefits of including informative priors in cognitive modeling. Our discussion is based on three illustrative cognitive models, involving memory retention, categorization, and decision making.     

Composing lexical versus functional adjectives: Evidence for uniformity in the left temporal lobe

Psychonomic Bulletin & Review - Featural information (e.g., color or shape) allows interlocutors to focus their attention on the specific items under discussion from the vast set of...     

Making Space for a Dialogical Notion of Religious Subjects: A Critical Discussion From the Perspective of Postsecularity and Religious Change in the West

In this article I address some topical themes from the ongoing discussion on contemporary religious change in the West and how it poses conceptual challenges to the study of religion. The academic discussion on religious change is vast and my observations are, of course, by necessity limited to my particular interest and argument in this article. On the one hand, I draw on some of the literature that has evolved within and around the concept of postsecularity and, on the other, on more general literature on contemporary religious change. Based on some selected observations, I underline the need to critically rethink how we conceptualize both religion and religious subjects. In my view, current research fosters a greater attentiveness of complexity with regard to religion, but simultaneously it requires us to take seriously a dialogical notion of religious subjects that provides a conceptual account of a subject constituted by being located within and emerging through ongoing social process. This dialogical notion provides a better tool for how current social and cultural reconfigurations of religion are simultaneously played out as a diversity of identities that challenge received categories, such as the religious and the secular.     

Time-varying decision boundaries: insights from optimality analysis

The most widely used account of decision-making proposes that people choose between alternatives by accumulating evidence in favor of each alternative until this evidence reaches a decision boundary. It is frequently assumed that this decision boundary stays constant during a decision, depending on the evidence collected but not on time. Recent experimental and theoretical work has challenged this assumption, showing that constant decision boundaries are, in some circumstances, sub-optimal. We introduce a theoretical model that facilitates identification of the optimal decision boundaries under a wide range of conditions. Time-varying optimal decision boundaries for our model are a result only of uncertainty over the difficulty of each trial and do not require decision deadlines or costs associated with collecting evidence, as assumed by previous authors. Furthermore, the shape of optimal decision boundaries depends on the difficulties of different decisions. When some trials are very difficult, optimal boundaries decrease with time, but for tasks that only include a mixture of easy and medium difficulty trials, the optimal boundaries increase or stay constant. We also show how this simple model can be extended to more complex decision-making tasks such as when people have unequal priors or when they can choose to opt out of decisions. The theoretical model presented here provides an important framework to understand how, why, and whether decision boundaries should change over time in experiments on decision-making.     

Holistic face representation is highly orientation-specific

It has long been argued that face processing requires disproportionate reliance on holistic processing (HP), relative to that required for nonface object recognition. Nevertheless, whether the holistic nature of face perception is achieved via a unique internal representation or by the employment of an automated attention mechanism is still debated. Previous studies had used the face inversion effect (FIE), a unique face-processing marker, or the face composite task, a gold standard paradigm measuring holistic processing, to examine the validity of these two different hypotheses, with some studies combining the two paradigms. However, the results of such studies remain inconclusive, particularly pertaining to the issue of the two proposed HP mechanisms—an internal representation as opposed to an automated attention mechanism. Here, using the complete composite paradigm design, we aimed to examine whether face rotation yields a nonlinear or a linear drop in HP, thus supporting an account that face processing is based either on an orientation-dependent internal representation or on automated attention. Our results reveal that even a relatively small perturbation in face orientation (30 deg away from upright) already causes a sharp decline in HP. These findings support the face internal representation hypothesis and the notion that the holistic processing of faces is highly orientation-specific.     

Surprising depth cue captures attention in visual search

A substantial amount of evidence indicates that surprising events capture attention. The present study was primarily intended to investigate whether expectancy discrepant depth information also is able to capture attention immediately and—more specifically—whether cues that are relatively closer or farther differentially modulate behavior. For this purpose, participants had to identify one of two target letters in a search display. Stimulus positions were initially cued by uninformative placeholders. After half of the trials, the cue at the target position was suddenly and unexpectedly (critical trial) displayed closer to or farther from the observer. In line with previous research, both depth cues captured attention on their very first appearance. Performance in the critical trial was superior to the error rates in the trials without depth cue and was even above the performance in subsequent trials that included depth cue. This effect was only observed when the cue preceded the target by 400 ms. Using a shorter cue-stimulus interval of 100 ms, only a delayed improvement was observed, which denotes a typical feature of surprise capture. Moreover, response times were faster in trials comprising a depth cue, and this was already true for the critical trial. Apart from that, no other marked differences between near and far depth cues were observed. Therefore, the present results emphasize that surprising depth information indeed captures attention. However, in contrast to other perceptual tasks, search performance was not considerably influenced by relative position in depth.     

Holistic processing of faces is intact in adults with autism spectrum disorder

Are face recognition difficulties in Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD) related to impaired holistic processing? Gauthier et al. [Gauthier, I., Klaiman, C., &; Schultz, R. T. (2009). Face composite effects reveal abnormal face processing in Autism spectrum disorders. Vision Research, 49, 470–478. doi:10.1016/j.visres.2008.12.007] used the face composite task in adolescents with autism and found a congruency effect that was not modulated by alignment, a result which was interpreted as reflecting qualitatively different face processing mechanisms. In the present study we tested adults with ASD in a composite face task where presentation times were manipulated and further explored whether these participants were sensitive to holistic information in faces using a new version of the composite task: VHFPT 2.0 (The Vanderbilt Holistic Face Processing Test 2.0). Results suggest that adults with ASD process faces holistically and that their facial identity processing abilities are qualitatively similar and as efficient as that of typical adults. The difference between the results of Gauthier et al. (2009) with adolescents and the results with adults here reported are interpreted in terms of a developmental delay.     

Lower back pain in nurses working in home care: linked to work–family conflict,emotional dissonance,and appreciation?

In industrial countries home care services for elderly people living in the community are growing rapidly. Home care nursing is intensive and the nurses often suffer from musculoskeletal pain. Time pressure and job control are job-related factors linked to the risk of experiencing lower back pain (LBP) and LBP-related work impairment. This survey investigated whether work-family conflict (WFC), emotional dissonance and being appreciated at work have incremental predictive value. Responses were obtained from 125 home care nurses (63% response rate). Multiple linear regression showed that emotional dissonance and being appreciated at work predicted LBP intensity and LBP-related disability independently of time pressure and job control. WFC was not a predictor of LBP-related disability in multiple regression analyses despite a zero-order correlation with it. Redesigning the working pattern of home care nurses to reduce the emotional demands and improve appreciation of their work might reduce the incidence of LBP in this group.     

In Defense of Penalizing (but not Punishing) Civil Disobedience

While many contemporary political philosophers agree that citizens of a legitimate state enjoy a moral right to civil disobedience, they differ over both the grounds of that right and its content. This essay defends the view that the moral right to civil disobedience derives from (or is a facet of) a general right to political participation, and the characterization of that right as precluding the state from punishing, but not from penalizing, those who exercise it. The argument proceeds by way of rebuttals to criticisms of both claims recently advanced by Kimberley Brownlee. While in some cases those criticisms fail on their merits, in other cases the responses offered here reveal that the dispute over the ground and content of a moral right to civil disobedience reflects deeper disagreements regarding two foundational issues: first, whether moral rights are best conceived of as defeasible evaluative principles or conclusive normative ones, and second, whether principles of justice should be theorized on the basis of full or partial compliance.