Making Sense of Dynamic Systems: How Our Understanding of Stocks and Flows Depends on a Global Perspective

Stocks and flows (SF) are building blocks of dynamic systems: Stocks change through inflows and outflows, such as our bank balance changing with withdrawals and deposits, or atmospheric CO₂ with absorptions and emissions. However, people make systematic errors when trying to infer the behavior of dynamic systems, termed SF failure, whose cognitive explanations are yet unknown. We argue that SF failure appears when people focus on specific system elements (local processing), rather than on the system structure and gestalt (global processing). Using a standard SF task (n = 148), SF failure decreased by (a) a global as opposed to local task format; (b) individual global as opposed to local processing styles; and (c) global as opposed to local perceptual priming. These results converge toward local processing as an explanation for SF failure. We discuss theoretical and practical implications on the connections between the scope of attention and understanding of dynamic systems.     

ASSESSING WOMEN'S FEMINIST IDENTITY DEVELOPMENT Studies of Convergent, Discriminant, and Structural Validity

Researchers have called for increasing sophistication in the assessment of women's feminist identity development (Enns & Hackett, 1990; Hackett, Enns, & Zetzer, 1992) to understand important psychological processes. This series of studies examined recent efforts to operationalize Downing and Roush's (1985) model of feminist identity development. Specifically, the psychometric properties of two existing measures—the Feminist Identity Development Scale (Bargad & Hyde, 1991) and the Feminist Identity Scale (Rickard, 1987)—were examined in two studies with separate samples of women (total N = 486). Results of Study 1 indicated the strengths and significant limitations associated with each scale (e.g., low internal consistency for some subscales, item-subscale inconsistency). A composite measure (derived from these scales) with better overall psychometric properties is described. In Study 2, we found good support for the composite instrument's internal consistency, as well as convergent, discriminant, and factorial validity in a sample that included a wide age range and nonstudent community residents.     

The psychology of anxiety: A phenomenological description

Abstract

The psychology of anxiety continues to be debated by researchers, as well as therapists. By investigating it with phenomenological methods, I have been able to determine its three existential preconditions; the way in which an anxious situation announces a crisis of one's efforts to surpass one's unacceptable incompleteness; being anxious as being impeded, if not fundamentally blocked, and moving beyond being anxious as either ambivalently reaffirming the viability of the projects and relations in which one was already invested, or as transformatively accepting those projects and relations as fundamentally uncertain and hence, as open to future determination.     

Hysteria and psychosis

The relationship between endogenous-psychotic and hysterical behavior is presented in this paper on the basis of typical patients' accounts. Various patterns of behavior are revealed: chronic hysterical psychotic syndromes, acute hysterical psychotic syndromes, hysterical exalted psychotic episodes, simulated hysterical psychotic syndromes, hysterical behavior in the attempt to cope with psychosis, and pseudohysterical behavior in endogenous psychoses. The specific aspects of the doctor-patient relationship in the case of these patients are described.     

Moral Responsibility and the Metaphysics of Free Will: Reply to van Inwagen

In The Philosophical Quarterly , 47 (1997), pp. 373–81, van Inwagen argues in a critical notice of my book The Metaphysics of Free Will that the impression that Frankfurt-type examples show that moral responsibility need not require alternative possibilities results from insufficient analytical precision. He suggests various precise principles which imply that moral responsibility requires alternative possibilities. In reply, I seek to defend the conclusion I have drawn from Frankfurt-type examples: moral responsibility need not require alternative possibilities. I contend that van Inwagen's principles — the principle of possible prevention and the no-matter-what principle — are invalid, and I suggest that their plausibility comes from thinking about a proper subset of the relevant cases.     

Embodied emotion concepts: How generating words about pride and disappointment influences posture

Embodiment theories predict that activating conceptual knowledge about emotions can be accompanied by re‐experiencing bodily states, since simulations of sensory, motor, and introspective experiences form the foundation of conceptual representations of emotion. In the present study, we examine whether the activation of the specific emotion concepts of pride and disappointment are embodied in the sense that they are accompanied by changes in posture. Participants generated words associated with pride and disappointment while posture height was measured. Results show that during the generation of disappointment words participants decreased their posture height more than when participants generated pride words. This finding suggests that the activation of conceptual knowledge about disappointment can lead to a spontaneous expression of the associated body posture. In contrast to posture changes along the vertical axis, movement along the horizontal axis was not influenced by concept activation. In addition to bodily simulation the data also indicated introspective simulation, since feelings of disappointment increased after generating disappointment words. The current study provides the first evidence for the claim that the activation of conceptual knowledge about emotion can instantiate spontaneous simulations at a behavioral level. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.