Does the brain calculate value?

How do people choose between options? At one extreme, the 'value-first' view is that the brain computes the value of different options and simply favours options with higher values. An intermediate position, taken by many psychological models of judgment and decision making, is that values are computed but that the resulting choices depend heavily on the context of available options. At the other extreme, the 'comparison-only' view argues that choice depends directly on comparisons, with or even without any intermediate computation of value. In this paper, we place past and current psychological and neuroscientific theories on this spectrum, and review empirical data that have led to an increasing focus on comparison rather than value as the driver of choice.     

Stoicism and Sensation Seeking: Male Vulnerabilities for the Acquired Capability for Suicide

Our aim was to investigate two personality traits (i.e., stoicism and sensation seeking) that may account for well-established gender differences in suicide, within the framework of the interpersonal theory of suicide. This theory proposes that acquired capability for suicide, a construct comprised of pain insensitivity and fearlessness about death, explains gender differences in suicide. Across two samples of undergraduates (N = 185 and N = 363), men demonstrated significantly greater levels of both facets of acquired capability than women. Further, we found that stoicism accounted for the relationship between gender and pain insensitivity, and sensation seeking accounted for the relationship between gender and fearlessness about death. Thus, personality may be one psychological mechanism accounting for gender differences in suicidal behavior.     

Post-stop-signal slowing: strategies dominate reflexes and implicit learning

Control adjustments are necessary to balance competing cognitive demands. One task that is well-suited to explore control adjustments is the stop-signal paradigm, in which subjects must balance initiation and inhibition. One common adjustment in the stop-signal paradigm is post-stop-signal slowing. Existing models of sequential adjustments in the stop-signal paradigm suggest that post-stop-signal slowing may be based solely on the events of the previous trial, suggesting that post-stop-signal slowing is a reflexive byproduct of a stop signal. Alternatively, post-stop-signal slowing could be the result of implicit learning or strategic adjustment. The authors report three experiments that manipulated the probability of stop trial repetition and found that these contingencies eliminate, reverse, or greatly increase post-stop-signal slowing. When the contingency was not instructed or cued, modest adjustments of post-stop-signal slowing occurred, suggesting implicit learning. When the contingency was cued, performance adjustments occurred on the next trial, suggesting that strategies dominated post-stop-signal slowing. These results show that post-stop-signal slowing is not a reflexive byproduct of the stop signal. The large changes in strategy accompany large changes in task factors, suggesting that the modest post-stop-signal slowing usually observed may be a result of the relatively static task environment that does not encourage large strategic changes.     

Post-stop-signal adjustments: inhibition improves subsequent inhibition

Performance in the stop-signal paradigm involves a balance between going and stopping, and one way that this balance is struck is through shifting priority away from the go task, slowing responses after a stop signal, and improving the probability of inhibition. In 6 experiments, the authors tested whether there is a corresponding shift in priority toward the stop task, speeding reaction time to the stop signal. Consistent with this hypothesis, stop-signal reaction time (SSRT) decreased on the trial immediately following a stop signal in each experiment. Experiments 2-4 used 2 very different stop signals within a modality, and stopping improved when the stop stimulus repeated and alternated. Experiments 5 and 6 presented stop signals in different modalities and showed that SSRT improved only when the stop stimulus repeated within a modality. These results demonstrate within-modality post-stop-signal speeding of response inhibition.     

Body Dissatisfaction and Disordered Eating in Three Cultures: Argentina, Brazil, and the U.S.

Body dissatisfaction and associated attitudes were studied in 18–24?years old women from universities in Rosario, Santa Fe, Argentina (N?=?118), Jo?o Pessoa, Paraíba, Brazil (N?=?81), and mid-Atlantic U.S. (N?=?102). Based on anecdotal reports, theoretical concerns, and empirical studies, we expected greater body dissatisfaction and negative body attitudes in our Argentine and Brazilian samples than in the U.S. sample. Body dissatisfaction was a significant problem in all samples, but we found few differences in levels of body dissatisfaction. The Argentine and Brazilian samples scored lower than the U.S. sample on measures associated with disordered eating, experienced less pressure to be thin, and were less likely to internalize the thin body ideal. Body shame was highest in the Brazilian sample and lowest in the Argentine sample. Cultural features in Argentina and Brazil that may offer some level of protection against the thin body ideal were discussed.     

Bright minds and dark attitudes: lower cognitive ability predicts greater prejudice through right-wing ideology and low intergroup contact

Despite their important implications for interpersonal behaviors and relations, cognitive abilities have been largely ignored as explanations of prejudice. We proposed and tested mediation models in which lower cognitive ability predicts greater prejudice, an effect mediated through the endorsement of right-wing ideologies (social conservatism, right-wing authoritarianism) and low levels of contact with out-groups. In an analysis of two large-scale, nationally representative United Kingdom data sets (N = 15,874), we found that lower general intelligence (g) in childhood predicts greater racism in adulthood, and this effect was largely mediated via conservative ideology. A secondary analysis of a U.S. data set confirmed a predictive effect of poor abstract-reasoning skills on antihomosexual prejudice, a relation partially mediated by both authoritarianism and low levels of intergroup contact. All analyses controlled for education and socioeconomic status. Our results suggest that cognitive abilities play a critical, albeit underappreciated, role in prejudice. Consequently, we recommend a heightened focus on cognitive ability in research on prejudice and a better integration of cognitive ability into prejudice models.     

Analytic cognitive style predicts religious and paranormal belief

An analytic cognitive style denotes a propensity to set aside highly salient intuitions when engaging in problem solving. We assess the hypothesis that an analytic cognitive style is associated with a history of questioning, altering, and rejecting (i.e., unbelieving) supernatural claims, both religious and paranormal. In two studies, we examined associations of God beliefs, religious engagement (attendance at religious services, praying, etc.), conventional religious beliefs (heaven, miracles, etc.) and paranormal beliefs (extrasensory perception, levitation, etc.) with performance measures of cognitive ability and analytic cognitive style. An analytic cognitive style negatively predicted both religious and paranormal beliefs when controlling for cognitive ability as well as religious engagement, sex, age, political ideology, and education. Participants more willing to engage in analytic reasoning were less likely to endorse supernatural beliefs. Further, an association between analytic cognitive style and religious engagement was mediated by religious beliefs, suggesting that an analytic cognitive style negatively affects religious engagement via lower acceptance of conventional religious beliefs. Results for types of God belief indicate that the association between an analytic cognitive style and God beliefs is more nuanced than mere acceptance and rejection, but also includes adopting less conventional God beliefs, such as Pantheism or Deism. Our data are consistent with the idea that two people who share the same cognitive ability, education, political ideology, sex, age and level of religious engagement can acquire very different sets of beliefs about the world if they differ in their propensity to think analytically.