Testing the validity of conflict drift-diffusion models for use in estimating cognitive processes: A parameter-recovery study

Researchers and clinicians are interested in estimating individual differences in the ability to process conflicting information. Conflict processing is typically assessed by comparing behavioral measures like RTs or error rates from conflict tasks. However, these measures are hard to interpret because they can be influenced by additional processes like response caution or bias. This limitation can be circumvented by employing cognitive models to decompose behavioral data into components of underlying decision processes, providing better specificity for investigating individual differences. A new class of drift-diffusion models has been developed for conflict tasks, presenting a potential tool to improve analysis of individual differences in conflict processing. However, measures from these models have not been validated for use in experiments with limited data collection. The present study assessed the validity of these models with a parameter-recovery study to determine whether and under what circumstances the models provide valid measures of cognitive processing. Three models were tested: the dual-stage two-phase model (Hübner, Steinhauser, & Lehle, Psychological Review, 117(3), 759–784, 2010), the shrinking spotlight model (White, Ratcliff, & Starns, Cognitive Psychology, 63(4), 210–238, 2011), and the diffusion model for conflict tasks (Ulrich, Schröter, Leuthold, & Birngruber, Cogntive Psychology, 78, 148–174, 2015). The validity of the model parameters was assessed using different methods of fitting the data and different numbers of trials. The results show that each model has limitations in recovering valid parameters, but they can be mitigated by adding constraints to the model. Practical recommendations are provided for when and how each model can be used to analyze data and provide measures of processing in conflict tasks.     

Being transformed: Delivering a psychotherapeutic group intervention targeting repeat suicide attempts

Clients who make repeat suicide attempts have complex needs, are at high risk of completed suicide and pose a range of challenges for clinicians. Targeted interventions are required. Acceptability, the perceived appropriateness of an intervention, is associated with successful implementation, engagement and effectiveness of interventions. Despite the advantages of group interventions, there is limited research into the acceptability of groups with this population. Using Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis, this paper reports on facilitators’ experiences (n = 9) of the acceptability of a therapeutic group intervention (PISA – a Psychoeducational/psychosocial Intervention for persons who make recurrent Suicide Attempts). Analysis of focus group data revealed how involvement with the intervention profoundly influenced facilitators’ perceptions of and approach to their work with this client group. They embraced the model, developed a deeper appreciation of clients’ resources and became unburdened from sole responsibility for the clients, the therapeutic process and outcomes. PISA provided a model that helped facilitators to work in a focused, compassionate and creative manner as they addressed the central concern of these clients, their suicidal desire, with newly found confidence and eagerness. PISA was experienced as acceptable to facilitators as it was useful to them and deemed appropriate and beneficial to the target population.     

The cognitive reflection test is robust to multiple exposures

The cognitive reflection test (CRT) is a widely used measure of the propensity to engage in analytic or deliberative reasoning in lieu of gut feelings or intuitions. CRT problems are unique because they reliably cue intuitive but incorrect responses and, therefore, appear simple among those who do poorly. By virtue of being composed of so-called “trick problems” that, in theory, could be discovered as such, it is commonly held that the predictive validity of the CRT is undermined by prior experience with the task. Indeed, recent studies have shown that people who have had previous experience with the CRT score higher on the test. Naturally, however, it is not obvious that this actually undermines the predictive validity of the test. Across six studies with ~ 2,500 participants and 17 variables of interest (e.g., religious belief, bullshit receptivity, smartphone usage, susceptibility to heuristics and biases, and numeracy), we did not find a single case in which the predictive power of the CRT was significantly undermined by repeated exposure. This occurred despite the fact that we replicated the previously reported increase in accuracy among individuals who reported previous experience with the CRT. We speculate that the CRT remains robust after multiple exposures because less reflective (more intuitive) individuals fail to realize that being presented with apparently easy problems more than once confers information about the task’s actual difficulty.     

Mental models and omissive causation

Some causal relations refer to causation by commission (e.g., “A gunshot causes death”), and others refer to causation by omission (e.g., “Not breathing causes death”). We describe a theory of the representation of omissive causation based on the assumption that people mentally simulate sets of possibilities—mental models—that represent causes, enabling conditions, and preventions (Goldvarg & Johnson-Laird, 2001). The theory holds that omissive causes, enabling conditions, and preventions each refer to distinct sets of possibilities. For any such causal relation, reasoners typically simulate one initial possibility, but they are able to consider alternative possibilities through deliberation. These alternative possibilities allow them to deliberate over finer-grained distinctions when reasoning about causes and effects. Hence, reasoners should be able to distinguish between omissive causes and omissive enabling conditions. Four experiments corroborated the predictions of the theory. We describe them and contrast the results with the predictions of alternative accounts of causal representation and inference.     

SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY PHILOSOPHY

Knowledge and Faith in Thomas Aquinas. John I. Jenkins. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997. pp. 267. £35.00 hb. ISBN 0–521–58126–5. The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas. Norman Kretzmann and Eleonore Stump. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993. pp. 302. £12.95 pb. ISBN 0–521–43769–5. The Metaphysics of Theism: Aquinas's Natural Theology in the Summa Contra Gentiles I. Norman Kretzmann. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997. pp. 302. £35.00 hb. ISBN 0–19–823660–3. Thomas Aquinas: God and Explanations. C. F. J. Martin. Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 1997. pp. 212. £40.00 hb. ISBN 0–7486–0901–6. Theories of Cognition in the Later Middle Ages. Robert Pasnau. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997. pp. 330. £37.00 hb. ISBN 0–521–58368–3.     

Industrial meanings

Industrial Society and its Museums 1890–1990: Social Aspirations and Cultural Politics, by Brigitte Schroeder‐Gudehus, ed., Newark, NJ: Harwood Academic Publs, Gordon & Breach Science Publs, 1993, hb, $48.00; UK: Chur & Reading, hb £30.00.     

Children's memory for complex autobiographical events: Does spacing of repeated instances matter?

Often, when children testify in court they do so as victims of a repeated offence and must report details of an instance of the offence. One factor that may influence children's ability to succeed in this task concerns the temporal distance between presentations of the repeated event. Indeed, there is a substantial amount of literature on the “spacing effect” that suggests this may be the case. In the current research, we examined the effect of temporal spacing on memory reports for complex autobiographical events. Children participated in one or four play sessions presented at different intervals. Later, children were suggestively questioned, and then participated in a memory test. Superior recall of distributed events (a spacing effect) was found when the delay to test was 1?day (Experiment 1) but there was little evidence for a spacing effect when the delay was 1 week (Experiment 2). Implications for understanding children's recall of repeated autobiographical events are discussed.