Implementation intentions: a look back at fifteen years of progress

Implementation intentions are if-then plans that spell out when, where, and how a set goal has to be put into action: If situation x is encountered, then I will perform behavior y!, thereby linking a critical situation with a goal-directed behavior. Over the last fifteen years, implementation intentions, as compared to simple goal intentions (I intend to reach z!), have demonstrated their effectiveness as self-regulation strategies in promoting desired behaviors or when unpleasant actions have to be carried out. By forming implementation intentions, the control of unwanted influences (e.g., temptations, bad habits, adverse self-states) on an ongoing goal pursuit can also be facilitated. Furthermore, implementation intentions have been shown to ease goal-directed actions in critical populations such as patients with a frontal brain lesion, schizophrenic patients, and opiate addicts in withdrawal, for whom the initiation problems of the goaldirected action are more accentuated.     

Self-regulatory strategy and executive control: implementation intentions modulate task switching and Simon task performance

Two tasks where failures of cognitive control are especially prevalent are task-switching and spatial Simon task paradigms. Both tasks require considerable strategic control for the participant to avoid the costs associated with switching tasks (task-switching paradigm) and to minimize the influence of spatial location (Simon task). In the current study, we assessed whether the use of a self-regulatory strategy known as "implementation intentions" would have any beneficial effects on performance in each of these task domains. Forming an implementation intention (i.e., an if-then plan) is a self-regulatory strategy in which a mental link is created between a pre-specified future cue and a desired goal-directed response, resulting in facilitated goal attainment (Gollwitzer in European Review of Social Psychology, 4, 141-185, 1993, American Psychologist, 54, 493-503, 1999). In Experiment 1, forming implementation intentions in the context of a task-switching paradigm led to a reduction in switch costs. In Experiment 2, forming implementation intentions reduced the effects of spatial location in a Simon task for the stimulus specified in the implementation intention. Results supported the prediction that the need for high levels of cognitive control can be alleviated to some degree by making if-then plans that specify how one responds to that critical stimuli.     

Why did I do that? Explaining actions activated outside of awareness

We review the latest research investigating how people explain their own actions when they have been activated nonconsciously. We will discuss evidence that when nonconsciously activated behavior is unexpected (e.g., norm- violating, against self -standards), negative affect arises and triggers confabulations aimed to explain the behavior. Nonconsciously activated behaviors may provide a window into everyday confabulation of (erroneous) explanations for behavior, which may also affect self-knowledge. Implications for self-concept formation and intentionality are discussed.     

Perspective taking as a means to overcome motivational barriers in negotiations: when putting oneself into the opponent's shoes helps to walk toward agreements

Previous negotiation research predominantly focused on psychological factors that lead to suboptimal compromises as opposed to integrative agreements. Few studies systematically analyzed factors that impact the emergence of hurtful partial impasses (i.e., nonagreements on part of the issues). The present research investigates negotiators' egoistic motivation as a determinant for the emergence of partial impasses. In addition, the authors seek to demonstrate that perspective taking serves as a powerful tool to avoid impasses and to overcome egoistic impediments. Specifically, it was predicted that within an integrative context perspective-takers succeed to exchange concessions on low- versus high-preference issues (i.e., logroll), thereby increasing their individual profits without inflicting hurtful losses upon their counterparts. Three studies were conducted to test these predictions. Study 1 reveals that whereas negotiators' egoistic motivation increases the risk of partial impasses, perspective taking alleviates this risk. Study 2 demonstrates that this beneficial effect of a perspective-taking mindset is limited to integrative negotiations and does not emerge in a distributive context, in which negotiators are constrained to achieve selfish goals by inflicting hurtful losses on their counterparts. Study 3 confirms the assumption that in an integrative context egoistic perspective-takers overcome the risk of impasses by means of logrolling. The findings of the present studies are discussed with respect to their contribution to research on negotiations, social motivation, and perspective taking.     

Do normative transgressions affect punitive judgments? An empirical test of the psychoanalytic scapegoat hypothesis

According to psychoanalytic theory, punitiveness is based on a projection of one's own immoral desires and the moral conflict they cause (scapegoat hypothesis). This hypothesis implies that transgressors impose harsher punishment onto comparable wrongdoers. This effect should be amplified by strength of decision conflict. An alternative hypothesis based on blameavoidance motivation is derived. Participants (N = 291) were asked to indicate whether they would commit an unlawful act in a moral temptation situation and how conflicted they felt in making their decision. Later, they had to judge convicts in criminal cases that were similar to the previous temptation situations. Authoritarianism was assessed as covariate. In contrast to the scapegoat but consistent with the blame-avoidance interpretation, transgressors were more lenient than nontransgressors. Authoritarianism had main effects on punitiveness. Decision conflict was neither directly nor indirectly related to punitiveness. The findings challenge the validity of the scapegoat hypothesis.     

The projection of implicit and explicit goals

In 3 studies, the authors analyzed whether projection occurs for both conscious and nonconscious goals. In Experiment 1, participants who were predisposed to hold a learning goal over a performance goal rated others as possessing more of a learning goal. In Experiment 2, participants who were either implicitly primed with or explicitly assigned to have the goal to compete perceived others as striving for competitive goals more than control participants. In Experiment 3, the authors demonstrated that it was the actual goal to compete rather than the trait construct of competitiveness that was projected. The control of automatic goal projection effects is discussed, and interpersonal consequences of goal projection are delineated.     

Goal contagion: perceiving is for pursuing

Six studies examined the goal contagion hypothesis, which claims that individuals may automatically adopt and pursue a goal that is implied by another person's behavior. Participants were briefly exposed to behavioral information implying a specific goal and were then given the opportunity to act on the goal in a different way and context. Studies 1-3 established the goal contagion phenomenon by showing that the behavioral consequences of goal contagion possess features of goal directedness: (a) They are affected by goal strength, (b) they have the quality of goal appropriateness, and (c) they are characterized by persistence. Studies 4-6 show that people do not automatically adopt goals when the observed goal pursuit is conducted in an unacceptable manner, because the goal will then be perceived as unattractive. The results are discussed in the context of recent research on automatic goal pursuits.     

Implementation intentions: control of fear despite cognitive load

The cognitive consequences of forming implementation intentions in controlling fear were addressed in the present study. Participants with an intense fear of spiders evaluated pictures of spiders, pleasant pictures, and neutral pictures under cognitive load. Regulatory control was measured by participants' self-report ratings of the pictures on the Self-Assessment Manikins Scales. Only participants given implementation intentions reported weaker negative emotional responses to the pictures of spiders as compared to participants given a goal intention and to no-goal control participants. Thus, emotional control by implementation intentions was shown not to tax a person's cognitive resources, attesting to the automatic nature of this self-regulation strategy.     

Mindsets and pre-conscious open-mindedness to incidental information

Mindset theory (Gollwitzer, 1990) proposes that deliberative mindsets are marked by more open-minded processing of information, whereas implemental mindsets are characterized by more closed-minded processing. Accordingly, deliberative and implemental mindsets should differ in selective processing of incidental information when performing a central task. In three experiments, participants in deliberative and implemental mindsets performed a computer task while randomly presented incidental, unavoidable words. A subsequent recognition memory test assessed selective processing of these incidental words. Results revealed that deliberative mindsets led to superior recognition memory, suggesting increased open-mindedness to processing incidental information. Implications for mindset and goal theories are discussed.