A cross-cultural study of the structure of comorbidity among common psychopathological syndromes in the general health care setting

This study presents analyses of 7 common psychopathological syndromes in the World Health Organization (WHO) Collaborative Study of Psychological Problems in General Health Care (T. B. Ustun & N. Sartorius, 1995). Data on depression, somatization, hypochondriasis, neurasthenia, anxious worry, anxious arousal, and hazardous use of alcohol were analyzed for 14 countries (Ns for each country ranged from 196 to 800). Four models were evaluated: a 1-factor model; a 2-factor model in which all syndromes except hazardous use of alcohol represented internalizing problems; and two 3-factor models. The 2-factor model fit best. These results extend previous research on the 2-factor model to the current complaints of attendees of general health care clinics, to a new set of syndromes, and to a variety of both Western and non-Western countries.     

The Relevance of Discriminatory Knowledge of Content

Those interested in securing the compatibility of anti-individualism and introspective knowledge of content (henceforth 'compatibilists') typically make a distinction between knowledge of content proper (KC) and discriminatory knowledge of content (DKC). Following Falvey and Owens (1994), most compatibilists allow that anti-individualism is not compatible with introspective DKC, but maintain that nonetheless anti-individualism is compatible with introspective KC. Though I have raised doubts about the compatibility of anti-individualism and introspective KC elsewhere (Goldberg, 1997 and forthcoming), here my aim is to suggest the philosophical relevance of DKC itself. My thesis is that there are cases in which a thinker's failing to have DKC will affect the justification which she takes herself to have in drawing various inferences in the course of her reasoning, and so will affect that reasoning itself. After presenting illustrative examples and suggesting why anti-individualists themselves ought to acknowledge this point, I suggest that the examples indicate further work for anti-individualists: formulating what it takes to have DKC, and substantiating the view (widely held by anti-individualists) that anti-individualism's implication that we (often) lack such knowledge is not to be taken as an important weakness of anti-individualism itself.     

The Psychology and Epistemology of Self-Knowledge

In this paper I argue, first, that the most influential (and perhaps only acceptable) account of the epistemology of self-knowledge, developed and defended at great length in Wright (1989b) and (1989c) (among other places), leaves unanswered a question about the psychology of self-knowledge; second, that without an answer to this question about the psychology of self-knowledge, the epistemic account cannot be considered acceptable; and third, that neither Wright's own answer, nor an interpretation-based answer (based on a proposal from Jacobsen (1997)), will suffice as an acceptable answer to the psychological question. My general ambition is thus to establish that more work is needed if we are to have a full account of self-knowledge in both its epistemological and psychological aspects. I conclude by suggesting how my thesis bears on those who aim to provide an empirical account of the cognition involved in self-knowledge. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Facial Features as Personality Cues

Two studies examined the effects of the appearance of specific facial features on attributions of personality. In Study 1, photographs of men and women were computer-manipulated to have larger than average or smaller than average eye size, and wider than average or narrower than average eye spacing. In Study 2, eye size and mouth fullness were similarly altered. Although it was found that neither eye spacing nor mouth fullness had any effect on perceptions of the targets' personality or physical characteristics, eye size had strong effects in both studies. Analyses of covariance revealed that the personality trait ratings that varied with eye size were mediated primarily by perceived differences in the targets' masculinity-femininity and babyfacedness, and to a lesser extent by attractiveness.     

Organizational Conflict and Individual Creativity

A theory of the interaction of perceptions of conflict and dispositional tendencies on individual creativity is presented and tested. It is argued that there are two broad classes of people: those who are primarily socially oriented and those who are primarily instrumentally oriented. Further, on tasks that match their orientation, individuals are proposed to generally adhere to patterns and strategies that experience has taught them are most likely to work. This should mitigate against creativity. On tasks outside of their area of specialization, however, individuals are typically expected to be more random in their thinking, which should promote creativity. Perceived conflict is argued to lead to a reversal of this pattern, however. That is, perceptions of conflict were expected to promote creativity on tasks within, and reduce it on tasks outside of, individuals area of primary interest. These ideas were tested in two studies, one with university employees and one with minority students. The results of both studies generally supported the theory.     

Affectedness and direct objects: the role of lexical semantics in the acquisition of verb argument structure.

How do speakers predict the syntax of a verb from its meaning? Traditional theories posit that syntactically relevant information about semantic arguments consists of a list of thematic roles like "agent", "theme", and "goal", which are linked onto a hierarchy of grammatical positions like subject, object and oblique object. For verbs involving motion, the entity caused to move is defined as the "theme" or "patient" and linked to the object. However, this fails for many common verbs, as in fill water into the glass and cover a sheet onto the bed. In more recent theories verbs' meanings are multidimensional structures in which the motions, changes, and other events can be represented in separate but connected substructures; linking rules are sensitive to the position of an argument in a particular configuration. The verb's object would be linked not to the moving entity but to the argument specified as "affected" or caused to change as the main event in the verb's meaning. The change can either be one of location, resulting from motion in a particular manner, or of state, resulting from accommodating or reacting to a substance. For example, pour specifies how a substance moves (downward in a stream), so its substance argument is the object (pour the water/glass); fill specifies how a container changes (from not full to full), so its stationary container argument is the object (fill the glass/water). The newer theory was tested in three experiments. Children aged 3;4-9;4 and adults were taught made-up verbs, presented in a neutral syntactic context (this is mooping), referring to a transfer of items to a surface or container. Subjects were tested on their willingness to encode the moving items or the surface as the verb's object. For verbs where the items moved in a particular manner (e.g., zig-zagging), people were more likely to express the moving items as the object; for verbs where the surface changed state (e.g., shape, color, or fullness), people were more likely to express the surface as the object. This confirms that speakers are not confined to labeling moving entities as "themes" or "patients" and linking them to the grammatical object; when a stationary entity undergoes a state change as the result of a motion, it can be represented as the main affected argument and thereby linked to the grammatical object instead.     

Patients' theories of pathogenesis

Certain patients embark upon analytic treatment with well thought out theories regarding the origins of their difficulties. Although there is always some validity to such theories, they turn out to be incomplete and serve to screen painful recollections and pathogenic unconscious wishes and the defenses against them. Two cases are presented to illustrate how analysands use these theories in the service of resistance. Painstaking analytic work is required to elucidate their defensive nature. The narcissistic importance of such theories in maintaining a coherent narrative about one's life in the face of uncertainty is discussed, and technical and countertransference considerations are explored.     

A theory of emotions: Emotionality as the expression of the self's intentionality

The central theme of this article is the self's quest for personal meaning. The author contends that traditional psychotherapeutic assumptions, such as essentialistic thinking and psychological reductionism—in which clinicians and other social scientists regard the self as an essentialistic entity rather than as an intentional being—have mitigated against meaningful encounter between client and therapist. The author argues for the importance of the long neglected roles of passion, courage and commitment in psychotherapy and human development. He offers a self theory from an existential and intentional position which address these concerns. In this endeavor the author employs philosophical and literary argument, in addition to psychological evidence and clinical case study.This article is based upon a presentation made at the VII World Congress of Social Psychiatry, Lisbon, Portugal, October, 1978.