The Performance of Hamsters in the Maze Situation Utilizing Gravitation and the Vestibular Sense as Motivation

The hypotheses of this study of sex differences on a measure of self-esteem are as follows: 1) the scales good, nice, generous, pleasant, dependable, honest, and active will group together to form the outer esteem dimension of the semantic differential; 2) the scales strong, leader, powerful, confident, curious, inventive, sharp, and active will group together to form the inner esteem dimension of the semantic differential; 3) males will score significantly higher than females on the inner esteem dimension of the semantic differential; 4) females will score significantly higher than males on the outer esteem dimension of the semantic differential; 5) there will be a significant difference between the scoring patterns of males and females on the two dimensions of the semantic differential after controlling for the effects of race and social desirability. The sample of 442 sixth through eighth grade students consisted of two subsamples made heterogeneous on race, geographic location, and type of school. The Franks-Marolla Self-Esteem Semantic Differential and the Lunneborg and Lunneborg Child's Social Desirability Scale were administered. The findings support each of the hypotheses and indicate that there is a significant difference between the sexes on the Franks-Marolla Semantic Differential Measure of Self-Esteem. It is concluded that additional research in self-esteem might specify the meaning of sex differences in esteem by measuring esteem relative to an individual's structural social positions rather than measuring esteem in the general and environmentally nonspecific contexts as advocated by some.     

Toward a Critical Race Psychology

Critical Race Theory (CRT) emerged as an identity‐conscious intervention within critical legal studies and has subsequently developed an interdisciplinary presence. We draw upon CRT perspectives to articulate five core ideas for a Critical Race Psychology (CRP). CRT perspectives (1) approach racism as a systemic force embedded in everyday society (rather than a problem of individual bias); (2) illuminate how ideologies of neoliberal individualism (e.g., merit, choice) often reflect and reproduce racial domination; (3) identify interest convergence as the typical source of broad‐based support for reparative action; (4) emphasize possessive investment in privileged identities and identity‐infused realities that reproduce racial domination; and (5) propose practices of counter‐storytelling to reveal and contest identity‐infused bases of everyday society. In summary, we propose a CRP that consider race not as one domain (among many) for psychological investigation but instead as a conceptual lens through which to analyze all of psychological science.     

Differentiation Between School Attendance Problems: Why and How?

School attendance problems (SAPs) are heterogeneous with respect to etiology and presentation. The long history of conceptualizing SAPs has led to a vast array of terms and definitions as well as different perspectives on the most helpful approach to classification. For educators, practitioners, researchers, and policymakers, this presents a challenge in understanding, assessing, and intervening with SAPs. This paper outlines evolution in the conceptualization of SAPs, focusing on two contemporary approaches to differentiating between them. One approach draws on the longstanding differentiation between SAP types labeled school refusal, truancy, and school withdrawal. A fourth type of SAP, labeled school exclusion, is also considered. The other approach focuses on the function of absenteeism, measured via the School Refusal Assessment Scale (SRAS). Anecdotal and scientific support for the SAP typology is presented, along with the benefits and shortcomings of the SRAS approach to differentiation. The paper offers suggestions for how to differentiate between SAPs and introduces the SNACK, a brief screening measure that permits differentiation by SAP type.     

Why Doomsday Arguments are Better than Simulation Arguments

Inspired by anthropic reasoning behind Doomsday arguments, Nick Bostrom's Simulation Argument says: people who think advanced civilisations would run many fully‐conscious simulated minds should also think they're probably simulated minds themselves. However, Bostrom's conclusions can (and should) be resisted, especially by sympathisers with Doomsday or anthropic reasoning. This paper initially offers a posterior‐probabilistic ‘Doomsday lottery’ argument against Bostrom's conclusions. Suggestions are then offered for deriving anti‐simulation conclusions using weaker assumptions. Anti‐simulation arguments herein use more (epistemically and metaphysically) robust reference classes than Bostrom's argument, require no Principles of Indifference, abide better by the total evidence requirement, and yet use empirically plausible priors and likelihoods. However, while Doomsday arguments are probabilistically, epistemically and metaphysically stronger than the Simulation Argument, anthropic reasoning can (and should) refrain from embracing either.     

Beware of friends: The cultural psychology of relational mobility and cautious intimacy

Previous research has contrasted patterns of cautious or prevention‐oriented relationality in various West African settings with patterns of growth or promotion‐oriented relationality in many North American settings. The present research draws upon the concept of relational mobility to test the hypothesis that different patterns of relationality have their source in respective affordances for embedded interdependence or abstracted independence. Study 1 investigated the relationship between cautious intimacy and perception of relational mobility among a sample of Hong Kong students. Study 2 compared students in Hong Kong and North American settings to test whether differences in perception of relational mobility mediated the hypothesized differences in caution about friends. Study 3 used an experimental manipulation among a sample of Hong Kong students to test the hypothesis that increased perception of relational mobility reduces caution about friends. Results reveal broad support for the hypotheses. Whether as a measured variable or as an experimental treatment, the perception of relational mobility was negatively related to caution about friends. Moreover, this relationship mediated hypothesized cross‐national differences in caution about friendship. A discussion of the results considers intersections of cultural and ecological approaches to psychology and implications for theoretical conceptions of interdependence.     

A Social Learning Perspective on Childhood Trauma and Same‐Sex Intimate Partner Violence

The family violence and childhood trauma literature has suggested that early adverse experiences create risk factors for intimate partner violence (IPV). Thus, this study used a sample of lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB) college students (N = 266) to explore differences among childhood trauma, same‐sex IPV, and IPV acceptance. The authors used survey methodology and multivariate analysis of variance. Results indicated that LGB individuals reporting childhood trauma also reported higher rates of IPV, suggesting implications for research and practice.     

Response to Ranganathan

This essay responds to Bharat Ranganathan's “Comment” on my essay, “The Concept of Dignity in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights” (2011). Addressing key criticisms in this “Comment,” I make the following points. First, neither the idea of inherent dignity being “imparted” to humans, nor the Universal Declaration's implication—through its use of terms such as “inherent” and “inalienable”—that humans participate in transcendent reality, necessarily presuppose a Christian metaphysics. Second, a concept such as “inherent dignity” must be affirmed to be intrinsically heuristic unless we are to assume that its meaning can be completely known within the conditions of existence; but this affirmation does not render such concepts “indeterminate of sense.” Finally, Ranganathan's distinction between“weak” and “strong” senses of transcendence is untenable. If human truths beyond all contingencies are knowable (“weak” transcendence), then there must be a real dimension of meaning that transcends all contingencies (“strong” transcendence).