Toward a Critical Race Psychology

Critical Race Theory (CRT) emerged as an identity‐conscious intervention within critical legal studies and has subsequently developed an interdisciplinary presence. We draw upon CRT perspectives to articulate five core ideas for a Critical Race Psychology (CRP). CRT perspectives (1) approach racism as a systemic force embedded in everyday society (rather than a problem of individual bias); (2) illuminate how ideologies of neoliberal individualism (e.g., merit, choice) often reflect and reproduce racial domination; (3) identify interest convergence as the typical source of broad‐based support for reparative action; (4) emphasize possessive investment in privileged identities and identity‐infused realities that reproduce racial domination; and (5) propose practices of counter‐storytelling to reveal and contest identity‐infused bases of everyday society. In summary, we propose a CRP that consider race not as one domain (among many) for psychological investigation but instead as a conceptual lens through which to analyze all of psychological science.     

We think you agree: The detrimental impact of the false consensus effect on behavior

Two studies were designed to examine the impact of the false consensus effect on behavior (FCE; Ross, Greene, & House, 1977). False consensus is a form of social projection whereby individuals overestimate the degree to which others share their characteristics or beliefs. In a modified test of the theory of reasoned action, Study 1 demonstrated that the FCE independently predicts behavioral intentions regarding important social issues in a sample comprised of 205 college students. Further, results indicated that self-monitoring moderates the extent to which the FCE predicts behavioral intentions (specifically, as hypothesized, the FCE is a stronger predictor of behavior for high self-monitors). Because of the prevalence of the FCE among college students regarding potentially harmful social behaviors, Study 2 was designed to eliminate the FCE by differentially presenting students (N = 280) with alternative viewpoints regarding various issues. Presenting both sides of an argument using video-based stimuli effectively reduced the FCE. Recommendations for interventions that effectively promote beneficial social norms are discussed.     

Emergent Individuals

We explain the thesis that human mental states are ontologically emergent aspects of a fundamentally biological organism. We then explore the consequences of this thesis for the identity of a human person over time. As these consequences are not obviously independent of one's general ontology of objects and their properties, we consider four such accounts: transcendent universals, kind-Aristotelianism, immanent universals, and tropes. We suggest there are reasons for emergentists to favour the latter two accounts. We then argue that within such ontologies, emergentism about properties pushes one to the stronger claim that there are emergent individuals, though not individuals which are dual to person's bodies — substance emergentism, but not substance dualism.     

Religiosity and Mental Health: A Meta–Analysis of Recent Studies

A meta–analysis was performed in an attempt to clarify the proposed relationship between religiosity and psychological adjustment. Specific focus was given to the issue of definition, namely, whether differences in researchers' conceptualizations of religiosity and mental health could account for the various contradictory findings by psychologists of religion. Analysis of 34 studies conducted during the past 12 years revealed that the definitions of religiosity and mental health utilized by psychologists in this field were indeed associated with different types and strengths of the correlations between religiosity and mental health. Discussion of results assesses the fit between relevant theory and the pattern of change in effect size across categories of religion and adjustment, and concludes with implications for therapeutic uses of religious involvement.     

Self‐Priming in Production: Evidence for a Hybrid Model of Syntactic Priming

Syntactic priming in language production is the increased likelihood of using a recently encountered syntactic structure. In this paper, we examine two theories of why speakers can be primed: error‐driven learning accounts (Bock, Dell, Chang, & Onishi, 2007; Chang, Dell, & Bock, 2006) and activation‐based accounts (Pickering & Branigan, 1999; Reitter, Keller, & Moore, 2011). Both theories predict that speakers should be primed by the syntactic choices of others, but only activation‐based accounts predict that speakers should be able to prime themselves. Here we test whether speakers can be primed by their own productions in three behavioral experiments and find evidence of structural persistence following both comprehension and speakers’ own productions. We also find that comprehension‐based priming effects are larger for rarer syntactic structures than for more common ones, which is most consistent with error‐driven accounts. Because neither error‐driven accounts nor activation‐based accounts fully explain the data, we propose a hybrid model.