Protestant Clergy and the Culture Wars: An Empirical Test of Hunter's Thesis

Examinations of culture wars typically assess the attitudes of the American public. This study instead focuses on culture wars among religious elites—clergy—and tests three aspects of the culture wars thesis: (1) whether religious elites are engaged in culture wars, (2) whether clergy attitudes are polarized on these issues, and (3) whether religious authority or religious affiliation is more salient in creating culture wars cleavages. Using data from a large random sample of Protestant clergy, we find a substantial amount of engagement in culture wars by all types of Protestant clergy. The amount of polarization is more attributable to views of religious authority (i.e., biblical inerrancy) than to religious tradition. Moreover, polarization among clergy is somewhat more evident on culture wars issues than on other social and political issues. These findings are generally supportive of the culture wars thesis and should help return examinations of culture wars back to where they were originally theorized to be waged: among elites.     

Epigenetic alterations in the lateral amygdala are required for reconsolidation of a Pavlovian fear memory

Epigenetic mechanisms have been widely implicated in synaptic plasticity and in memory consolidation, yet little is known about the role of epigenetic mechanisms in memory reconsolidation processes. In the present study, we systematically examine the role of histone acetylation and DNA methylation in the reconsolidation of an amygdala-dependent Pavlovian fear memory. We first show that the acetylation of histone 3 (H3), but not histone 4 (H4), is regulated following auditory fear memory retrieval in the lateral nucleus of the amygdala (LA). We next show that histone deacetylase (HDAC) inhibition in the LA enhances both retrieval-induced histone acetylation and reconsolidation of an auditory fear memory. Conversely, inhibition of DNA methytransferase (DNMT) activity in the LA significantly impairs both retrieval-related H3 acetylation and fear memory reconsolidation. The effects of HDAC and DNMT inhibitors on fear memory reconsolidation were observed to be time-limited and were not evident in the absence of memory reactivation. Further, memories lost following DNMT inhibition were not observed to be vulnerable to spontaneous recovery, reinstatement, or to a shift in testing context, suggesting that memory impairment was not the result of facilitated extinction. Finally, pretreatment with the HDAC inhibitor was observed to rescue the reconsolidation deficit induced by the DNMT inhibitor. These findings collectively suggest that histone acetylation and DNA methylation are critical for reconsolidation of fear memories in the LA.     

Misery loves company: mood-congruent emotional responding to music

We examined emotional responding to music after mood induction. On each trial, listeners heard a 30-s music excerpt and rated how much they liked it, whether it sounded happy or sad, and how familiar it was. When the excerpts sounded unambiguously happy or sad (Experiment 1), the typical preference for happy-sounding music was eliminated after inducing a sad mood. When the excerpts sounded ambiguous with respect to happiness and sadness (Experiment 2), listeners perceived more sadness after inducing a sad mood. Sad moods had no influence on familiarity ratings (Experiments 1 and 2). These findings imply that "misery loves company." Listeners in a sad mood fail to show the typical preference for happy-sounding music, and they perceive more sadness in music that is ambiguous with respect to mood.     

Types of body representation and the sense of embodiment

The sense of embodiment is vital for self recognition. An examination of anosognosia for hemiplegia—the inability to recognise that one is paralysed down one side of one’s body—suggests the existence of ‘online’ and ‘offline’ representations of the body. Online representations of the body are representations of the body as it is currently, are newly constructed moment by moment and are directly “plugged into” current perception of the body. In contrast, offline representations of the body are representations of what the body is usually like, are relatively stable and are constructed from online representations. This distinction is supported by an analysis of phantom limb—the feeling that an amputated limb is still present—phenomena. Initially it seems that the sense of embodiment may arise from either of these types of representation; however, an integrated representation of the body seems to be required. It is suggested information from vision and emotions is involved in generating these representations. A lack of access to online representations of the body does not necessarily lead to a loss in the sense of embodiment. An integrated offline representation of the body could account for the sense of embodiment and perform the functions attributed to this sense.     

Sleep deprivation and sustained attention performance: integrating mathematical and cognitive modeling

A long history of research has revealed many neurophysiological changes and concomitant behavioral impacts of sleep deprivation, sleep restriction, and circadian rhythms. Little research, however, has been conducted in the area of computational cognitive modeling to understand the information processing mechanisms through which neurobehavioral factors operate to produce degradations in human performance. Our approach to understanding this relationship is to link predictions of overall cognitive functioning, or alertness, from existing biomathematical models to information processing parameters in a cognitive architecture, leveraging the strengths from each to develop a more comprehensive explanation. The integration of these methodologies is used to account for changes in human performance on a sustained attention task across 88 h of total sleep deprivation. The integrated model captures changes due to time awake and circadian rhythms, and it also provides an account for underlying changes in the cognitive processes that give rise to those effects. The results show the potential for developing mechanistic accounts of how fatigue impacts cognition, and they illustrate the increased explanatory power that is possible by combining theoretical insights from multiple methodologies.     

Is cognitive therapy consistent with what we know about emotions?

The cognitive perspective has been a dominant force in psychology and psychotherapy since the 1970s. Cognitive therapies share an emphasis on the priority of changing cognition as the key to bringing about changes in patterns of dysfunctional emotional reactions and symptomatic behaviors. In this article, the author examined the basis for the assumptions of cognitive therapy in the context of recent evidence of the long-term effects of stressful experiences. This evidence contradicts the assumption of many cognitive therapists that changing cognition is prior to and necessary to changing emotional reactions. Neurobiological evidence indicates that emotions can be experienced without cortical interpretations of stimuli, and clinical evidence indicates that experiences can be stored as isolated affective fragments that function later to distort cognition. This suggests that cognitive therapies are based on a limited model of mental functions that sometimes must be supplemented by broader psychodynamic concepts if lasting changes are to occur.