Traditional response interference effects from anticipated action outcomes: a response-effect compatibility paradigm

An act as simple as pressing a button involves various stages of processing. Each stage of action production is susceptible to interference from competing representations/processes. For example, in the Simon Effect, interference arises from an incongruence between incidental spatial information and the spatial properties of intended action; in the flanker task, interference arises when visual targets and distracters are associated with different responses (response interference [RI]). Less interference arises in the flanker task when targets and distracters are different in appearance but associated with the same response (perceptual interference [PI]). Interference also stems from the automatic activation of representations associated with the anticipated effects of an action, response-effect (R–E) compatibility (e.g., the presence of a left-pointing arrow after one presses a button on the right will increase interference in future trials). This has been explained by ideomotor theory—that the mental representation of anticipated action-effects are activated automatically by voluntary action and that such representations can cause facilitation or interference by automatically priming their associated action plans. To illuminate the nature of action production and provide additional support for ideomotor theory, we examined for the first time the effects of PI and RI in a new R–E compatibility paradigm.     

The function of phenomenal states: is there progress for the "softer problem" of consciousness?

The function of phenomenal states remains a mystery, primarily because of the prevalent, a priori view that these states serve no functional role. This note is a call to arms against this uncorroborated and counterproductive view, which continues to stifle research on the topic. It is proposed that, given what we know and can accomplish with the tools at hand, discovering the function of phenomenal states has become a tractable problem, easier than that of discovering the neural basis of these states--the "hard problem" of consciousness. A simple method that may unveil the function of phenomenal states is presented. It involves contrasting the task demands of conscious and unconscious processes.     

Religiosity/Spirituality and Mental Health and Quality of Life of Early Pregnant Women

Journal of Religion and Health - The present study aims to investigate how religious/spiritual (R/S) beliefs are associated with depressive, anxious and stress symptoms and quality of life (QOL) of...     

Sociality and the life–mind continuity thesis

The life–mind continuity thesis holds that mind is prefigured in life and that mind belongs to life. The biggest challenge faced by proponents of this thesis is to show how an explanatory framework that accounts for basic biological processes can be systematically extended to incorporate the highest reaches of human cognition. We suggest that this apparent ‘cognitive gap’ between minimal and human forms of life appears insurmountable largely because of the methodological individualism that is prevalent in cognitive science. Accordingly, a twofold strategy is used to show how a consideration of sociality can address both sides of the cognitive gap: (1) it is argued from a systemic perspective that inter-agent interactions can extend the behavioral domain of even the simplest agents and (2) it is argued from a phenomenological perspective that the cognitive attitude characteristic of adult human beings is essentially intersubjectively constituted, in particular with respect to the possibility of perceiving objects as detached from our own immediate concerns. These two complementary considerations of the constitutive role of inter-agent interactions for mind and cognition indicate that sociality is an indispensable element of the life–mind continuity thesis and of cognitive science more generally.     

Public reason as a social basis of self-respect

The idea of public reason was traditionally explained in terms of the need to justify the exercise of coercive power to reasonable people who do not agree on the truth of any particular conception of the good. In this paper, I show why this traditional, coercion-based, view is problematic, and offer a different account of public reason: the “self-respect account.” In addition, I argue that this account is capable of informing recent, nontraditional, accounts of public reason. The conclusion is that public reason can be conceptualized as a social basis of self-respect.     

Mind control? Creating illusory intentions through a phony brain–computer interface

Can one be fooled into believing that one intended an action that one in fact did not intend? Past experimental paradigms have demonstrated that participants, when provided with false perceptual feedback about their actions, can be fooled into misperceiving the nature of their intended motor act. However, because veridical proprioceptive/perceptual feedback limits the extent to which participants can be fooled, few studies have been able to answer our question and induce the illusion to intend. In a novel paradigm addressing this question, participants were instructed to move a line on the computer screen by use of a phony brain–computer interface. Line movements were actually controlled by computer program. Demonstrating the illusion to intend, participants reported more intentions to move the line when it moved frequently than when it moved infrequently. Consistent with ideomotor theory, the finding illuminates the intimate liaisons among ideomotor processing, the sense of agency, and action production.     

Decision making cognition in primary progressive aphasia

We sought to investigate the decision making profile of Primary Progressive Aphasia (PPA) by assessing patients diagnosed with this disease (n = 10), patients diagnosed with behavioral variant frontotemporal dementia (bvFTD, n = 35), and matched controls (n = 14) using the Iowa Gambling Task, a widely used test that mimics real-life decision making. Participants were also evaluated with a complete neuropsychological battery. Patients with PPA were unable to adopt an advantageous strategy on the IGT, which resulted in a flat performance, different to that exhibited by both controls (who showed advantageous decision making) and bvFTD patients (who showed risk-appetitive behavior). The decision making profile of PPA patients was not associated with performance on language tasks and did not differ between sub-variants of the disease (namely, semantic dementia and progressive nonfluent aphasia). Investigating decision making in PPA is crucial both from a theoretical perspective, as it can shed light about the way in which language interacts with other cognitive functions, as well as a clinical standpoint, as it could lead to a more objective detection of impairments of decision making deficits in this condition.     

Representations in working memory yield interference effects found with externally-triggered representations

An act as simple as flicking a switch involves various stages of processing. Each stage is susceptible to interference from competing representations/processes. Interference at different stages of processing (e.g., perceptual stages versus response selection stages) leads to distinct behavioral, neural, and subjective effects. In the flanker task, for instance, one responds to a visual target and disregards flanking ‘distractors.’ Theoretically-predicted interference (increased response times, error rates, and subjective ‘urges to err’) is stronger when distractors and targets are associated with different actions (response interference) than when they look different but are associated with the same action (perceptual interference). Extant versions of the task tax working memory (WM) minimally, but many everyday actions (e.g., searching for keys or holding one's breath) require more WM-based control. To illuminate this uncharted area, we examined the nature of interference in delayed action tasks, which rely on WM. We found that systematic interference arises even when action-related representations are, not triggered solely by external stimuli, but actively held in WM. We discuss these findings with increased emphasis on the under-explored subjective effects of different kinds of interference. The implications of these findings for the study of action production, WM, and conscious processing are entertained.     

Subjective aspects of cognitive control at different stages of processing

Although research on cognitive control has addressed the effects that different forms of cognitive interference have on behavior and the activities of certain brain regions, until recently, the effects of interference on subjective experience have not been addressed. We demonstrate that, at the level of the individual trial, participants can reliably introspect the subjective aspects (e.g., perceptions of difficulty, competition, and control) of responding in interference paradigms. Similar subjective effects were obtained for both expressed and unexpressed (subvocalized) actions. Few participants discerned the source of these effects. These basic findings illuminate aspects of cognitive control and cognitive effort. In addition, these data have implications for the study of response interference in affect and self-control, and they begin to address theories regarding the function of consciousness.