The identity of Brexit: A cultural psychology analysis

In this paper, we propose a culturalist interpretation of the outcome of the Brexit referendum. This interpretation is grounded on the analysis of the U.K.'s cultural milieu, which is part of a more general study of the cultural milieus of several European countries. Specific to the United Kingdom, our analysis is based on a questionnaire carried out on a representative sample of U.K. respondents stratified by sociodemographic variables and geographic region (NUTS1). Responses to the questionnaire were subjected to multidimensional analysis—a combination of multiple correspondence analysis and cluster analysis. Findings about the multicountry analysis show how cultural milieus are characterized by five basic, embodied, affect‐laden, generalized worldviews (defined as “Symbolic Universes”). Four out of five symbolic universes consist of a way of interpreting reality by a specific anchorage (i.e., the ethical norm, the institutional order, the emotional experience interpersonal bond, and the belongingness). One symbolic universe can be viewed as the anomic reaction to the failure of those anchorages. Focusing on Brexit, by means of a discriminant analysis, it is showed how the incidence of the symbolic universes (and of the underpinning basic dimensions of meaning within the 12 U.K. macroregions') enables to identify differentially the macroregions with high proportion of “leave” at the Brexit referendum against those with low proportion. More specifically, the high “leave” macroregion are characterized by higher relevance of cultural forms anchored on local identity/belongingness. Findings are discussed within the wider aims of the project and its implications for a cultural psychology informed policymaking.     

Know yourself and you shall know the other... to a certain extent: multiple paths of influence of self-reflection on mindreading

Social and neurocognitive research suggests that thinking about one's own thinking and thinking about the thinking of others-termed 'mindreading', 'metacognition', 'social cognition' or 'mentalizing' are not identical activities. The ability though to think about thinking in the first person is nevertheless related to the ability to think about other's thoughts in the third person. Unclear is how these phenomena influence one another. In this review, we explore how self-reflection and autobiographical memory influence the capacity to think about the thoughts and emotions of others. We review studies suggesting that the more individuals are able to reflect on and retrieve episodes from their life narratives, the more they are likely to grasp others' thoughts and emotions. We discuss evidence supporting this possibility including studies of the neurocognitive bases of empathy and self-awareness and how different aspects of self-reflection may impact on mindreading. We also draw from clinical reports how improved self-reflection may result in a more nuanced mindreading, namely persons suffering from schizophrenia and narcissistic personality disorder. We finally discuss the implications for research and practice and consider whether there are conditions in which the reverse is true, where self-reflection might impair mindreading or in which mindreading may facilitate self-reflection.     

When the whole is more than the sum of the parts: Evidence from visuospatial neglect

One possible pathological mechanism underlying the rightward bisection error of right‐brain‐damaged patients with left spatial neglect is a leftward relaxation of the spatial representational medium. This view was originally based on the finding that patients with left neglect, required to extend horizontal segments, in order to double their original length, may exhibit a relative left overextension of the drawn lines ( Bisiach et al., 1994 ). We investigated this putative distortion of representational space using a 16 cm ‘line segmentation’ task (Experiment 1). Were the representation of space relaxed contralesionally, a progressive increase from right to left of the size of the drawn segments would be expected. Right‐brain‐damaged patients with left unilateral neglect (N=12) performed the segmentation task with no left versus right differences, as right‐brain‐damaged patients without neglect (N=8), and neurologically unimpaired control subjects (N=10), did. Experiments 2 and 3 explored the effects of sample length (1, 2, 4, and 8 cm), by which the 16 cm lines had to be segmented. Neglect patients produced longer left‐sided segments only for the 8 cm sample (i.e. half of the length of the segment). This set of experiments suggests an impairment in the segmentation task only with the larger (8 cm) sample, when a more global level of processing may be involved. Experiment 4 assessed this hypothesis by a ‘part/whole’ bisection task, using 8 cm lines, presented either embedded in a longer 16 cm line or in isolation. Neglect patients made a larger rightward bisection error when the segment was not embedded. The suggestion is made that the lateral distortion of the representation of space in neglect patients (i.e. a leftward relaxation of the spatial medium) concerns tasks where a more ‘global’ representation of the visual stimulus has to be set up. The different demands of the segmentation and bisection tasks are discussed.     

The layers of presence: a bio-cultural approach to understanding presence in natural and mediated environments.

This paper proposes a bio-cultural theory of presence based on four different positions related to the role and structure of presence, as follows. First, presence is a defining feature of self and it is related to the evolution of a key feature of any central nervous system: the embedding of sensory-referred properties into an internal functional space. Without the emergence of the sense of presence it is impossible for the nervous system to experience distal attribution: the referencing of our perception to an external space beyond the limits of the sensory organs themselves. Second, even if the experience of the sense of presence is a unitary feeling, conceptually it can be divided in three different layers, phylogenetically different and strictly related to the three levels of self identified by Damasio. In particular we can make conceptual distinctions between proto presence (self vs. non self), core presence (self vs. present external world), and extended presence (self relative to present external world). Third, given that each layer of presence solves a particular facet of the internal/external world separation, it is characterized by specific properties. Finally, in humans the sense of presence is a direct function of these three layers: the more they are integrated, the more we are present. In the experience of optimal presence, biologically and culturally determined cognitive processes are working in harmony--to focus all levels of the self on a significant situation in the external world, whether this is real or virtual.     

Short-term forgetting and the articulatory loop

Two experiments explored the role of subvocal articulatory rehearsal in the Peterson short-term forgetting task. In the first of these, subjects recalled consonant trigrams after an interval of 0, 5 or 15 s during which they either counted backwards in threes, suppressed articulation by continuously uttering the word “the”, or in a third control condition continuously tapped on the table. While counting backwards caused the usual dramatic forgetting, tapping caused no forgetting, and articulatory suppression only minimal forgetting at the longest delay. A second study used the same procedure but included only two conditions, articulatory suppression during the retention interval and articulatory suppression during both input and retention. Neither showed evidence of forgetting over the 15 s delay. These results suggest that covert speech is not necessary for rehearsal in short-term verbal memory. As such they call for a re-evaluation of the nature and function of rehearsal.