What sense does it make to teach the aesthetics of music today? The discussion begins with the illusion of identifying music and language, by regarding language as communication. We use words and propositions in thinking about music, but music is “something other” than words. An analysis of Cook’s conception of a musicographic network leads to thinking about the non-verbal existence of musical works and musical experience. 相似文献
This paper offers a conceptual framework which (re)integrates goal-directed control, motivational processes, and executive
functions, and suggests a developmental pathway from situated action to higher level cognition. We first illustrate a basic
computational (control-theoretic) model of goal-directed action that makes use of internal modeling. We then show that by adding the problem of selection among multiple action alternatives motivation enters the scene, and
that the basic mechanisms of executive functions such as inhibition, the monitoring of progresses, and working memory, are
required for this system to work. Further, we elaborate on the idea that the off-line re-enactment of anticipatory mechanisms
used for action control gives rise to (embodied) mental simulations, and propose that thinking consists essentially in controlling
mental simulations rather than directly controlling behavior and perceptions. We conclude by sketching an evolutionary perspective
of this process, proposing that anticipation leveraged cognition, and by highlighting specific predictions of our model.
The concept of simultaneous masking in visual field is discussed, in the light of classical examples, of the various kinds of the phenomenon, of a modal completion, of the figure/ground phenomenon, of ambiguous and reversible figures, of mimicry and camouflage and eventually of the complexity of the stimulus. There is some reference to masking in auditory field. The “reality” of the masked configuration is discussed, drawing the conclusion that it is perceptually unreal. The fact that the masking phenomenon cannot take place without comparison between two perceptual acts – what we see at one moment and what we see a moment after LATER – and the fact that the masked configuration pops out with some surprise, lead to the conclusion that simultaneous masking in visual field is not a bare perceptual phenomenon, but a psychological process not unlike insight 相似文献
In my recent article, I addressed the question of whether a potential categorical exclusion of decisionally impaired patients
from non-therapeutic medical research would be inaccordance with the Principle of Justice as Fairness. I came to the conclusion
that a categorical exclusion of decisionally impaired persons from relevant research projects may collide with Rawls’s understanding
of Justice as Fairness. Derek Bell has criticized my paper by denying that it is legitimate to apply Rawls to this bioethical
problem. In my restatement I try to show that an extrapolation of John Rawls’s thought to such bioethical cases is possible,
because Rawls himself has written that his orientation towards decisionally non-impaired persons is an idealized situation
that allows extrapolations. In a second part I try to show that Bell hasroughly misunderstood my concept of “presumed consent”
which I make a prerequisite for the legitimisation of research on decisionally impaired persons. In using advance consent
as a proposal for resolving the problem, Bell has indirectly confirmed my approach because he is using a similar construct
of consent, which operates with similar hypotheses and probabilities of error. I see here no categorical difference between
Bell’s conclusion and my discussion. Thus, Bell’s reply does not represent a refutation of my thoughts, but rather it is a
para phrased confirmation of my central theses. I conclude by showing the relevance of Rawls, pointing out that the discussion
between Bell and me illustrates how Rawls’s concept of reflective equilibrium is an appropriate approach to finding a solution
to this bioethical problem.
This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
C. Ghez, J. Gordon, and M. R Ghilardi (1995; J. Gordon, M. R Ghilardi, & C. Ghez, 1995; R. L. Sainburg, M. R Ghilardi, H. Poizner, & C. Ghez, 1995) have found that proprio-ceptive deafferentation impairs feedforward and feedback mechanisms that control reaching movements. In the present study, the authors found immobilization-induced changes in limb kinematics, including joint motion, in 32 healthy participants who performed out-and-back movements before and after 0, 6, or 12 hr of immobilization of the left arm. Control participants did not undergo the arm immobilization procedure. Immobilization for 12 hr, but not 6 hr, caused trajectories with increased hand-path areas and altered interjoint coordination. The abnormalities were smaller in amplitude but similar in quality to those reported in deafferented patients (R. L. Sainburg et al.). In addition, movement onset point significantly drifted after immobilization. Thus, short-term limb disuse can affect interjoint coordination by acting on feedforward mechanisms. These behavioral alterations are potentially related to cortical plastic changes. 相似文献
Awareness of illness in schizophrenia reflects complex storied understanding of the impact of the disorder upon one’s life. Individuals may be aware of their illness in different ways and this may be related to their functioning. A total of 76 adults with schizophrenia were assessed for their awareness of illness, neurocognition, social cognition, and social function concurrently and social function was also assessed at three later time points. A cluster analysis revealed 3 groups: generally full awareness, generally limited awareness, and superficial awareness. Comparisons between these profiles revealed the superficial group had poorer executive function, emotion recognition ability, and capacity for social relationships than the full awareness group, yet had better verbal memory and more social contacts than the limited awareness group. These results suggest assessing the narrative qualities of awareness of illness may reveal unique links with cognition and function, and this may have implications for interventions. 相似文献
Previously, we found that in the lateral amygdala (LA) of the mouse, WIN55,212-2 decreases both glutamatergic and GABAergic synaptic transmission via activation of the cannabinoid receptor type 1 (CB1), yet produces an overall reduction of neuronal excitability. This suggests that the effects on excitatory transmission override those on inhibitory transmission. Here we show that CB1 activation by WIN55,212-2 and Delta(9)-THC inhibits long-term depression (LTD) of basal synaptic transmission in the LA, induced by low-frequency stimulation (LFS; 900 pulses/1 Hz). The CB1 agonist WIN55,212-2 blocked LTD via G(i/o) proteins, activation of inwardly rectifying K+ channels (K(ir)s), inhibition of the adenylate cyclase-protein kinase A (PKA) pathway, and PKA-dependent inhibition of voltage-gated N-type Ca2+ channels (N-type VGCCs). Interestingly, WIN55,212-2 effects on LTD were abolished in CB1 knock-out mice (CB1-KO), and in conditional mutants lacking CB1 expression only in GABAergic interneurons, but were still present in mutants lacking CB1 in principal forebrain neurons. LTD induction per se was unaffected by the CB1 antagonist SR141716A and was normally expressed in CB1-KO as well as in both conditional CB1 mutants. Our data demonstrate that activation of CB1 specifically located on GABAergic interneurons inhibits LTD in the LA. These findings suggest that CB1 expressed on either glutamatergic or GABAergic neurons play a differential role in the control of synaptic transmission and plasticity. 相似文献
Rational beliefs and actions are typically evaluated against certain benchmarks, e.g., those of classical logic or probability theory. Rationality therefore is traditionally taken to involve some sort of reasoning, which in turn implies contentful cognition. Radically Enactive (and Embodied) views of Cognition (REC), on the other hand, claim that not all cognition is contentful. In order to show that rationality does not need to lie outside of REC’s scope of radicalizing cognition, I develop a Radically Enactive notion of Rationality (RER), according to which rationality is embodied, situated and contentless. For RER, an organism acts rationally insofar as it sustains a proficient interaction with its environment, which in turn requires the coordination of cognitive abilities in accordance with environmental constraints. Rationality is thus distinguished from reasoning, for reasoning is understood as a capacity to coordinate representational cognitive abilities.
Recognition memory can be supported by both the assessment of the familiarity of an item and by the recollection of the context in which an item was encountered. The neural substrates of these memory processes are controversial. To address these issues we applied repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) over the right and left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) of healthy subjects performing a remember/know task. rTMS disrupted familiarity judgments when applied before encoding of stimuli over both right and left DLPFC. rTMS disrupted recollection when applied before encoding of stimuli over the right DLPFC. These findings suggest that the DLPFC plays a critical role in recognition memory based on familiarity as well as recollection. 相似文献