Mispredicting the hedonic benefits of segregated gains

The hedonic benefit of a gain (e.g., receiving $100) may be increased by segregating it into smaller units that are distributed over time (e.g., receiving $50 on each of 2 days). However, if these units are too small (e.g., receiving 1 cent on each of 10,000 days), they may fall beneath the person's hedonic limen and have no hedonic benefit at all. Do people know where their limens lie? In 6 experiments, participants predicted that the hedonic benefit of a large gain would be increased by segregating it into smaller units, and they were right; but participants also predicted that the hedonic benefit of a small gain would be increased by segregating it into smaller units, and they were wrong. Segregation of small gains decreased rather than increased hedonic benefit. These experiments suggest that people may underestimate the value of the hedonic limen and thus may oversegregate small gains.     

Effects of retention intervals on receiver operating characteristics in artificial grammar learning

Current theories of memory suggest that recognition is composed of separate processes of familiarity and recollection (e.g. [Yonelinas, A. P. (2002). The nature of recollection and familiarity: a review of 30 years of research. Journal of Memory and Language, 46, 441-517]). A key feature of these two processes is that they decay, or are forgotten at different rates. The dual-process model has also been useful in understanding artificial grammar learning. We obtained evidence for recollection and familiarity in artificial grammar learning by analyses of receiver operating characteristics (ROC). Furthermore we found that these were dissociated by retention intervals of 14 days. The slope of the zROC curves deviated reliably from 1 immediately after study and increased towards 1 suggesting that recollection contributed to recognition decisions but declined over the 14-day period leaving familiarity as the only basis for recognition. These data show similar patterns to those observed in word-recognition [Gardiner, J. M., & Java, R. I. (1991). Forgetting in recognition memory with and without recollective experience. Memory &Cognition, 19, 617-623; Tunney, R. J. (submitted for publication). Changes in the subjective experience of recognition over time suggest independent processes] and confirm the view that recollection and familiarity are implicated in artificial grammar learning. Moreover, the data confirm the finding that recollection and familiarity-based memory show different patterns of forgetting.     

Social anxiety and the shame of psychosis: a study in first episode psychosis

Social anxiety disorder (SaD) or social phobia is a co-morbid affective disorder in schizophrenia, present in up to one in three individuals. We employ 'social rank' theory to predict that one pathway to social anxiety in schizophrenia is triggered by the anticipation of a catastrophic loss of social status that the stigma of schizophrenia can entail. A group of 79 people with a first episode of psychosis were assessed for social anxiety: hypotheses were tested comparing 23 socially anxious and 56 non-anxious patients on measures of cognitive appraisals of shame/stigma of psychosis and perceived social status, controlling for depression, psychotic symptoms and general psychopathology. Participants with social anxiety experienced greater shame attached to their diagnosis and felt that the diagnosis placed them apart from others, i.e., socially marginalised them and incurred low social status. We propose a stigma model of social anxiety that makes testable predictions about how the shame beliefs may contaminate social interaction and thereby exacerbate and maintain social phobia.     

The ontology of intentionality I: the dependence ontological account of order: mediate and immediate moments and pieces of dependent and independent objects

This is the first of three essays which use Edmund Husserl's dependence ontology to formulate a non-Diodorean and non-Kantian temporal semantics for two-valued, first-order predicate modal languages suitable for expressing ontologies of experience (like physics and cognitive science). This essay's primary desideratum is to formulate an adequate dependence-ontological account of order. To do so it uses primitive (proper) part and (weak) foundation relations to formulate seven axioms and 28 definitions as a basis for Husserl's dependence ontological theory of relating moments. The essay distinguishes between dependence v. independence, pieces v. moments, mediate v. immediate pieces and moments, maximal v. non-maximal pieces, founded v. unfounded qualities, integrative v. disintegrative dependence, and defines the concepts of the completion of an object, the adumbrational equivalence relation of objects, moments of unity which unify objects, and relating moments which relate objects. The eight theorems [CUT90]-[CUT97] show that relating moments of unity provide an adequate account of order in terms of primitive (proper) part and (weak) foundation relations.     

Regulatory focus as a predictor of omission bias in moral judgment: Mediating role of anticipated regrets

Omission bias occurs when people are more reluctant to accept negative consequences caused by their actions than by their inaction. Recent research on omission bias in decision‐making has found evidence for individual differences, thus indicating that some people are more likely to show omission inclination than others. The present research aims to explore the role of regulatory focus as individual difference variables in omission bias. Moreover, we examine whether anticipated regret mediates the relationship between regulatory focus and moral judgement. Moral judgement tasks utilized include: (i) moral dilemma scenarios (Study 1); and (ii) ethical scenarios embracing apparent legal rule violations (Study 2). The results of both studies show that only prevention focus is significantly related to omission bias in moral judgement. Specifically, this relationship holds regardless of the nature of the ‘omission’ (whether they are deontological or utilitarian). In addition, anticipated regret/guilt for action was found to mediate the relationship between prevention focus and omission bias. Implications and limitations are discussed based on the results of the current study.     

Children's Attitudes towards Peers with Disabilities: Associations with Personal and Parental Factors

The purpose of this study was to investigate the following: (i) associations among children's prior contact with people with disabilities and the three dimensions of children's attitudes towards people with disabilities: children's understanding of and their feelings about people with disabilities and their behavioural intentions to make inclusion decisions; (ii) the relation between children's behavioural intentions to make inclusion decisions and the demands of activity contexts and the types of disabilities; and (iii) the association between parents' attitudes and children's attitudes. Participants included 94 typically developing four‐ and five‐year‐old preschoolers. Children's understanding of disabilities and their prior contact with people with disabilities were found to be positively related to their feelings about people with disabilities; children's understanding of disabilities was a significant moderator of the relation between their behavioural intentions and activity contexts or types of disabilities. The hypothesized association between parents' attitudes and children's attitudes was not significant. Preschoolers may benefit from having more regular contact with people with disabilities to develop positive feelings towards their peers with disabilities, which is also related to their understanding of disabilities. Children's behavioural intentions to make inclusion decisions need to be understood in relation to their understanding of disabilities, the demand of activity contexts, and types of disabilities. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Is There a Moral Obligation to Develop Brain Implants Involving NanoBionic Technologies? Ethical Issues for Clinical Trials

In their article published in Nanoethics, “Ethical, Legal and Social Aspects of Brain-Implants Using Nano-Scale Materials and Techniques”, Berger et al. suggest that there may be a prima facie moral obligation to improve neuro implants with nanotechnology given their possible therapeutic advantages for patients [Nanoethics, 2:241–249]. Although we agree with Berger et al. that developments in nanomedicine hold the potential to render brain implant technologies less invasive and to better target neural stimulation to respond to brain impairments in the near future, we argue against presenting the development of nanobionic clinical devices in terms of a moral obligation to conduct this research. In the first part of the paper, we consider what a duty to pursue new technologies might mean, and in the second we explore some of the negative consequences of defending such development as a moral obligation based on potential benefit. We argue that promoting the advances available to brain implants through developments in nanotechnology and bionics could contribute to medical rhetoric that indirectly increases the risk of exposing patients to harm when participating in clinical trials. We argue that rather than there being a moral obligation to improve nanobionics implants because of their potential benefit, the pursuit of improved neuro implants must be balanced against the prima facie obligations to protect patients against harm and to promote and protect patient autonomy.