You can do it if you really try: The effects of motivation on thinking for pleasure

People find it difficult to enjoy their own thoughts when asked to do so, but what happens when they are asked to think about whatever they want? Do they find thinking more or less enjoyable? In the present studies, we show that people are more successful in enjoying their thoughts when instructed to do so. We present evidence in support of four reasons why this is: without instructions people do not realize how enjoyable it will be to think for pleasure, they do not realize how personally meaningful it will be to do so, they believe that thinking for pleasure will be effortful, and they believe it would be more worthwhile to engage in planning than to try to enjoy their thoughts. We discuss the practical implications of thinking for pleasure for promoting alternatives to the use of technology.     

Pro Patria: An Essay on Patriotism

This essay focuses on what patriotism is, as opposed to the value of patriotism. It focuses further on the basic patriotic motive: one acts with this motive if one acts on behalf of one’s country as such. I first argue that pre-theoretically the basic patriotic motive is sufficient to make an act patriotic from a motivational point of view. In particular the agent need not ascribe virtues or achievements to his country nor need he feel towards it the emotions characteristic of love. Why should one ever act on behalf of one’s country as such, if one does not particularly admire it or feel a special affection for it? In answer to this question I offer a further articulation of the basic patriotic motive, invoking a particular understanding of what it is to be the member of a political society. Building on this articulation I then consider how one might characterize a patriotic act, a patriotic person, and the relationship of patriotism and pride.     

Therapeutic factors in a systemic multi-family group treatment for major depression: patients' and partners' perspectives

This study investigated helpful and disturbing factors in multi-family groups with hospitalized, depressed patients and their family members. Both patients and their partners reported the occurrence of different therapeutic factors such as the cohesion of the group, different observational processes, and guidance from the therapist. The frequency of the therapeutic factors seemed to increase for both the patients and their partners as the group sessions progressed and several differences in reported therapeutic factors were found between the patients and their partners. A number of therapeutic factors such as modelling and guidance from the therapist were found to be related with improvement of depressive symptoms of the patient. The results help to provide some insight into which processes are important in multi-family group therapy for depression.     

Field on the Normative Role of Logic

Harman (1986) asserts that logic is neither a normative nor a psychological theory and, although immediate implication and inconsistency may play a role in reasoning, there is nothing special about logic in this connection. Field (2009) purports to reject these claims but actually accepts them and concludes that, because of the semantic paradoxes, logic is 'somehow connected to norms of thought'. A real non sequitur!     

Age-related changes in contextual associative learning

The hippocampus plays a critical role in processing contextual information. Although age-related changes in the hippocampus are well documented in humans, nonhuman primates, and rodents, few studies have examined contextual learning deficits in old rats. The present study investigated age-related differences in contextual associative learning in young (6 mo) and old (24 mo) rats using olfactory stimuli. Stimuli consisted of common odors mixed in sand and placed in clear plastic cups. Testing was conducted in two boxes that represented two different contexts (Context 1 and Context 2). The contexts varied based on environmental features of the box such as color (black vs. white), visual cues on the walls of the box, and flooring texture. Each rat was simultaneously presented with two cups, one filled with Odor A and one filled with Odor B in each context. In Context 1, the rat received a food reward for digging in the cup containing Odor A, but did not receive a food reward for digging in the cup containing Odor B. In Context 2, the rat was rewarded for digging in the cup containing Odor B, but did receive a reward for digging in the cup containing Odor A. Therefore, the rat learned to associate Context 1 with Odor A and Context 2 with Odor B. The rat was tested for eight days using the same odor problem throughout all days of testing. The results showed no significant difference between young and old rats on the first two days of testing; however, young rats significantly outperformed old rats on Day 3. Young rats continued to maintain superior performance compared to old rats on Days 4-8. The results suggest that aging results in functional impairments in brain regions that support memory for associations between specific cues and their respective context.     

The gateway hypothesis of rostral prefrontal cortex (area 10) function

Rostral prefrontal cortex (PFC) is a large brain region, and is unusually large in humans. Therefore, it seems likely that it might support functions that are central to cognition. However, until recently, almost nothing was known about what these functions might be. The 'gateway hypothesis' places these abilities at the centre of human mental processing. It maintains that rostral PFC supports mechanisms that enable us to attend, to a novel degree, either to environmental stimuli, or by contrast, to self-generated or maintained representations (i.e. the 'thoughts in our head'). In this way, investigations into the functions of rostral PFC will reveal key new insights into how human and non-human mental abilities differ.     

Neurocognitive Functioning in AD/HD,Predominantly Inattentive and Combined Subtypes

The Predominantly Inattentive (PI) and Combined (CB) subtypes of AD/HD differ in cognitive tempo, age of onset, gender ratio, and comorbidity, yet a differentiating endophenotype has not been identified. The aim of this study was to test rigorously diagnosed PI, CB, and typical children on measures selected for their potential to reveal hypothesized differences between the subtypes in specific neurocognitive systems (anterior vs. posterior attentional systems) and processes (arousal vs. activation). Thirty-four CB and 26 PI children meeting full DSM-IV criteria for subtype both in school and at home, without confounding reading disability or emotional disorder, were enrolled along with 20 typically developing children. Neurocognitive functions measured included attention, inhibitory control, working memory, learning, and executive functions. Tasks included the Stroop, Wisconsin Card Sorting Test, Continuous Performance Test (CPT). Buschke Selective Reminding Test, ad the Tower of London (TOL), as well as instruments developed by Posner and Sternberg, and tasks assessing the impact on reaction time of [corrected] varying preparatory intervals and stimulus/response complexity. After co-varying for IQ, subtypes differed primarily on measures of impulsivity during tests of vigilance (CPT) and executive function (TOL), with the CB group showing greater impulsivity than both other groups. In addition, the PI group showed worse performance than CB and control groups on the WISC-III Processing Speed Index. Whether analyzed with or without an IQ co-variate, there was no support in the data for hypothesized differences between subtypes in functioning of the anterior vs. posterior attentional systems, nor in involvement of arousal vs. activation processes. The results indicate that the PI and CB subtypes are best differentiated by ratings, observations and tests of cognitive tempo and behavioral impulsivity. Neuropsychological methods have yet to identify critical neuropsychological [corrected] substrates of these differences.     

The ontology of intentionality II: dependence ontology as prolegomenon to noetic modal semantics

This is the second in a sequence of three essays which axiomatize and apply Edmund Husserl's dependence ontology of parts and wholes as a non-Diodorean, non-Kantian temporal semantics for first-order predicate modal languages. The Ontology of Intentionality I introduced enough of Husserl's dependence-ontology of parts and wholes to formulate his account of order as effected by relating moments of unity, and The Ontology of Intentionality II extends that axiomatic dependence-ontology far enough to enable its semantic application. Formalizing the compatibility [Vereinbarkeit] relation implicated in Husserl's notorious doctrine of impossible meanings, the essay introduces a compatibility restriction on relations to formulate Husserl's distinction between singular [einheitliche] and plural [mehrheitliche] objects, using plural relating moments to define first-order versions of Husserl's notions of relation complexes (i.e. Sachverhalte), abstracta of n-ary relation complexes, categorial relations, abstract eide as unifications of categorial relations, semantic domains as completions of abstract eide, and material regions as semantic domains which are compatibility upper bounds of categorial relations. These concepts will enable the formal dependence-ontological noetic semantics for two-valued, first-order modal languages introduced in the sequel Two-Valued Logics of Intentionality, the third essay in the sequence.     

Scientific Meeting of the American Institute for Psychoanalysis

The American Journal of Psychoanalysis -