Ginet on the Problem of Action Externalization

Two questions have been discussed within the context of the action individuation debate. First, the question of action individuation proper - how many actions have been performed when one kills someone by shooting, for example. Second, the question of action externalization - what are the spatial and temporal boundaries of the killing and of the shooting. The internalists (Davidson, Hornsby) argue that the boundaries of actions do not reach beyond the skin of the individual. The externalists (e.g. Ginet) argue that the boundaries of actions do extend beyond the individual. The main problem for the externalists is to explain why so conceived actions are actions. In the paper I evaluate Ginet??s response to this question but find it ultimately unsatisfactory.     

Cognitive Consistency Theory in Social Psychology: A Paradigm Reconsidered

Abstract

From the 1950s onward, psychologists have generally assumed that people possess a general need for cognitive consistency, whose frustration by an inconsistency elicits negative affect. We offer a novel perspective on this issue by introducing the distinction between epistemic and motivational impact of consistent and inconsistent cognitions. The epistemic aspect is represented by the updated expectancy of the outcome addressed in such cognitions. The motivational aspect stems from value (desirability) of that outcome. We show that neither the outcome’s value nor its updated expectancy is systematically related to cognitive consistency or inconsistency. Consequently, we question consistency’s role in the driving of affective responses and the related presumption of a universal human need for cognitive consistency.     

Psychological aspects of the transformations in poland: Changes in the sense of participation in the life of a plant

Abstract

In order to promote innovation, most theorists agree, high levels of participation by all employees in an organization is required. In Eastern Europe nation-wide interventions are underway in some countries to promote participation across all organizations. This article describes one study of this phenomenon.     

Health performance of individuals within the Campbell paradigm

In this paper, we developed a comprehensive health performance measure that formally links individual health attitudes with the likelihood of engaging in a wide variety of health‐related behaviours from various domains such as sustenance, hygiene, and physical exercise. Within what Kaiser, Byrka, and Hartig (2010) call the Campbell paradigm, we equated general health attitude with what a person does to retain or promote his or her health. Thus, health behaviours, on one hand, were expected to form a homogeneous, transitively ordered class of behaviours. On the other hand, the very behavioural class was in turn thought to be the basis from which an individual's health attitude could be directly assessed. A sample of 391 adults provided us with survey data containing different sets of health behaviours as well as variables and personality measures that had been corroborated as health‐behaviour relevant in previous research. We found that self‐reports of 50 behaviours and expressions of appreciation for 20 of these behaviours from various domains formed a transitively ordered class of activities. In contrast to the conventional view in health psychology, in which attitudes are regarded as a psychological cause behind individual behaviour, and in contrast to conventional findings in health psychology, where behaviours appear to fall into numerous sets of more or less distinct domains of health‐enhancing activities (e.g., exercising or avoiding risks), our findings speak of the psychological and formal unity of health behaviour. Inevitably, attitude measures grounded in the Campbell paradigm gauge individual attitudes, and just as much, they measure the health performance of individuals.     

The dud-alternative effect in memory for associations: Putting confidence into local context

When participants are asked to provide confidence judgments for each provided alternative in a multiple-choice memory task, such judgments are inflated if the assessed alternatives are accompanied by an implausible (dud) alternative. This finding, termed the dud-alternative effect, has been recently documented in a memory setting with a lineup procedure (Charman, Wells, & Joy, Law & Human Behavior 35:479–500 2011). In the present study, we developed a novel paradigm to investigate the dud-alternative effect in memory. The paradigm utilizes a multiple-choice associative recognition task in which dud alternatives can be rejected on the basis of their unfamiliarity. In two experiments, we demonstrated a reliable dud-alternative effect with our novel procedure. The results demonstrated that the dud-alternative effect in episodic memory is not limited to tasks based on perceptual factors, but is a general phenomenon concerning confidence judgments.     

Feeling of knowing and restudy choices

Feeling-of-knowing judgments (FOK-Js) reflect people’s confidence that they would be able to recognize a currently unrecallable item. Although much research has been devoted to the factors determining the magnitude and accuracy of FOK-Js, much less work has addressed the issue of whether FOK-Js are related to any form of metacognitive control over memory processes. In the present study, we tested the hypothesis that FOK-Js are related to participants’ choices of which unrecallable items should be restudied. In three experiments, we showed that participants tend to choose for restudy items with high FOK-Js, both when they are explicitly asked to choose for restudy items that can be mastered in the restudy session (Exps. 1a and 2) and when such specific instructions are omitted (Exp. 1b). The study further demonstrated that increasing FOK-Js via priming cues affects restudy choices, even though it does not affect recall directly. Finally, Experiment 2 showed the strategy of restudying unrecalled items with high FOK-Js to be adaptive, because the efficacy of restudy is greater for these items than for items with low FOK-Js. Altogether, the present findings underscore an important role of FOK-Js for the metacognitive control of study operations.     

On a Neg‐Raising Fallacy in Determining Enthymematicity: If She Did not Believe or Want …

Many arguments that show p to be enthymematic (in an argument for q) rely on claims like “if one did not believe that p, one would not have a reason for believing that q.” Such arguments are susceptible to the neg‐raising fallacy. We tend to interpret claims like “X does not believe that p” as statements of disbelief (X's belief that not‐p) rather than as statements of withholding the belief that p. This article argues that there is a tendency to equivocate in arguments for the enthymematicity of arguments (e.g., Lewis Carroll's paradox, Hume's problem) as well as in arguments for the enthymematicity of action explanations (e.g., arguments for psychologism and for explanatory individualism). The article concludes with a warning, because the equivocation is often helpful in teaching and because neg‐raising verbs include philosophically vital verbs: desire, want, intend, think, suppose, imagine, expect, feel, seem, appear.