Intact and impaired mechanisms of action understanding in autism

Typically developing children understand and predict others' behavior by extracting and processing relevant information such as the logic of their actions within the situational constraints and the intentions conveyed by their gaze direction and emotional expressions. Children with autism have difficulties understanding and predicting others' actions. With the use of eye tracking and behavioral measures, we investigated action understanding mechanisms used by 18 children with autism and a well-matched group of 18 typically developing children. Results showed that children with autism (a) consider situational constraints in order to understand the logic of an agent's action and (b) show typical usage of the agent's emotional expressions to infer his or her intentions. We found (c) subtle atypicalities in the way children with autism respond to an agent's direct gaze and (d) marked impairments in their ability to attend to and interpret referential cues such as a head turn for understanding an agent's intentions.     

A Rational Way of Playing: Revision Theory for Strategic Interaction

Gupta (2011) has proposed a definition of strategic rationality cast in the framework of his revision theory of truth. His analysis, relative to a class of normal form games in which all players have a strict best reply to all other players’ strategy profiles, shows that game-theoretic concepts (e.g. Nash equilibrium) have revision-theoretic counterparts. We extend Gupta’s approach to deal with normal form games in which players’ may have weak best replies. We do so by adapting intuitions relative to Nash equilibrium refinements (in particular, trembling-hand perfection and properness) to the revision-theoretic framework. We prove that there is a precise equivalence between trembling-hand perfect equilibria in two-player normal games and a revision-theoretic property. We then introduce lexicographic choice of action as a way to represent players’ expectations, which allows our analysis to reach full generality. Finally, we provide an example of the versatility of revision theory as applied to strategic interaction by formalizing a risk-and-compensation procedure of strategic choice in the revision-theoretic framework.     

A Simple Modal Logic for Belief Revision

We propose a modal logic based on three operators, representing intial beliefs, information and revised beliefs. Three simple axioms are used to provide a sound and complete axiomatization of the qualitative part of Bayes’ rule. Some theorems of this logic are derived concerning the interaction between current beliefs and future beliefs. Information flows and iterated revision are also discussed. Giacomo Bonanno: I am grateful to two anonymous reviewers for helpful and constructive comments. A first draft of this paper was presented at the Sixth Conference on Logic and the Foundations of Game and Decision Theory (LOFT6), Leipzig, July 2004.     

Contingency,arbitrariness, and the basis of moral equality

Hardly anyone denies that (nearly) all human beings have equal moral status and therefore should be considered and treated as equals. Yet, if humans possess the property that confers moral status upon them to an unequal degree, how come they should be considered and treated as equals? It has been argued that this is because the variations in the degree to which the status-conferring property is held above a relevant threshold are contingencies that do not generate differences in degrees of moral status. Call this the contingency argument for the basis of moral equality. In this paper, I reject the contingency argument. Instead, I develop an attitude-based account of the basis of moral equality: according to this account, the basis of moral equality lies in a fitting, basic, and independent moral attitude which is owed to human beings qua moral status-holders, and provides a coherent and plausible explanation for why the variations above the threshold for moral status do not matter.     

Degrading situations,affiliation and social dependency

Research is reported which shows that degrading situations (e.g. a failure on a test) increase affiliative propensity. Four studies demonstrated that this affiliative tendency of degraded subjects is independent of the potential partner's performance and independent of his/her characteristics. The partners appeared to be equally attractive whether or not they witnessed subject's failure, and whether they were individuals or a group. On the other hand, the affiliative desires of praised subjects seem to be oriented rather towards those who benefit from a similar situation. The motivation underlying affiliative behaviour is discussed with regard to social psychological literature. It is suggested that degraded subjects' affiliative behaviour arises from a search for support and that a socially degrading situation places the subject in a state of emotional dependency which is expressed by a non-directional affiliative tendency and vulnerability to social influence. ©1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Temporal Interaction of Information and Belief

The temporal updating of an agent’s beliefs in response to a flow of information is modeled in a simple modal logic that, for every date t, contains a normal belief operator B _t and a non-normal information operator I _t which is analogous to the ‘only knowing’ operator discussed in the computer science literature. Soundness and completeness of the logic are proved and the relationship between the proposed logic, the AGM theory of belief revision and the notion of plausibility is discussed. A first draft of this paper was presented at the Workshop on Belief Change in Rational Agents: Perspectives from Artificial Intelligence, Philosophy and Economics, Dagstuhl (Germany), August 2005. Special Issue Formal Epistemology II. Edited by Branden Fitelson     

Rumination, emotion, and forgiveness: three longitudinal studies

In 3 studies, the authors investigated whether within-persons increases in rumination about an interpersonal transgression were associated with within-persons reductions in forgiveness. Results supported this hypothesis. The association of transient increases in rumination with transient reductions in forgiveness appeared to be mediated by anger, but not fear, toward the transgressor. The association of rumination and forgiveness was not confounded by daily fluctuations in positive affect and negative affect, and it was not moderated by trait levels of positive affectivity, negative affectivity, or perceived hurtfulness of the transgression. Cross-lagged associations of rumination and forgiveness in Study 3 more consistently supported the proposition that increased rumination precedes reductions in forgiveness than the proposition that increased forgiveness precedes reductions in rumination.     

Response inhibition and adaptations to response conflict in 6- to 8-year-old children: Evidence from the Simon effect

Several studies have shown that the Simon effect, which is the advantage of spatial correspondence between stimulus and response locations when the stimulus location is task-irrelevant, decreases with increasing response times and is affected by preceding-trial correspondence. These modulations suggest the existence of control mechanisms that adapt our behavior to current goals by responding to the conflict experienced within a trial and by preventing the recurrence of a conflict in the subsequent trial. The aim of the present study was to assess whether these control mechanisms, which are well consolidated in adults and in children older than 8 years of age, are present in children between 6 and 8 years old. To this end, we tested 32 first-grade (6–7 years) and 34 second-grade (7–8 years) children on a Simon task in which correspondence sequence was manipulated on a trial-by-trial basis. The Simon effect was larger for first- than for second-graders and decreased with increasing response times only in second-graders. Crucially, for both groups, the effect was reduced when the preceding trial was noncorresponding, and the reductions were comparable for the two groups, indicating that trial-by-trial control mechanisms are already present in first-grade children and may be dissociated from within-trial control adjustments.