Context-specific adjustment of cognitive control: Transfer of adaptive control sets

Cognitive control protects processing of relevant information from interference by irrelevant information. The level of this processing selectivity can be flexibly adjusted to different control demands (e.g., frequency of conflict) associated with a certain context, leading to the formation of specific context–control associations. In the present study we investigated the robustness and transferability of the acquired context–control demands to new situations. In three experiments, we used a version of the context-specific proportion congruence (CSPC) paradigm, in which each context (e.g., location) is associated with a specific conflict frequency, determining high and low control demands. In a learning phase, associations between context and control demands were established. In a subsequent transfer block, stimulus–response mappings, whole task sets, or context–control demands changed. Results showed an impressive robustness of context–control associations, as context-specific adjustments of control from the learning phase were virtually unaffected by new stimuli and tasks in the transfer block. Only a change of the context–control demand eliminated the context-specific adjustment of control. These findings suggest that context–control associations that have proven to be adaptive in the past are continuously applied despite major changes in the task structure as long as the context–control associations remain the same.     

Working memory impairment in people with Williams syndrome: Effects of delay, task and stimuli

Williams syndrome (WS) is a neurodevelopmental disorder associated with impaired visuospatial representations subserved by the dorsal stream and relatively strong object recognition abilities subserved by the ventral stream. There is conflicting evidence on whether this uneven pattern in WS extends to working memory (WM). The present studies provide a new perspective, testing WM for a single stimulus using a delayed recognition paradigm in individuals with WS and typically developing children matched for mental age (MA matches). In three experiments, participants judged whether a second stimulus ‘matched’ an initial sample, either in location or identity. We first examined memory for faces, houses and locations using a 5 s delay (Experiment 1) and a 2 s delay (Experiment 2). We then tested memory for human faces, houses, cat faces, and shoes with a 2 s delay using a new set of stimuli that were better controlled for expression, hairline and orientation (Experiment 3). With the 5 s delay (Experiment 1), the WS group was impaired overall compared to MA matches. While participants with WS tended to perform more poorly than MA matches with the 2 s delay, they also exhibited an uneven profile compared to MA matches. Face recognition was relatively preserved in WS with friendly faces (Experiment 2) but not when the faces had a neutral expression and were less natural looking (Experiment 3). Experiment 3 indicated that memory for object identity was relatively stronger than memory for location in WS. These findings reveal an overall WM impairment in WS that can be overcome under some conditions. Abnormalities in the parietal lobe/dorsal stream in WS may damage not only the representation of spatial location but may also impact WM for visual stimuli more generally.     

Effects of social proximity on multiple aggressive behaviors

We systematically manipulated social proximity to examine its influence on multiple topographies of aggression. Aggression occurred at high levels during close-proximity sessions and at low levels during distant-proximity sessions even though social contact was presented continuously during both conditions. Topographies of aggression emerged sequentially across the close-proximity sessions, and all topographies were reduced to zero following extended sessions of this condition.     

Individual Differences in the Context‐Dependent Recruitment of Cognitive Control: Evidence From Action Versus State Orientation

The ability to flexibly adapt to deviations from optimal performance is an important aspect of self‐control. In the present study, the authors present first evidence that the personality trait action versus state orientation (Kuhl, 2000) modulates the ability of adaptive control adjustments in response to experienced conflicts. Sixty‐two German individuals with extreme scores on the action‐state dimension performed a response interference task, that is, 31 extreme action‐oriented individuals (30 females; M_age = 20.35 years) and 31 extreme state‐oriented individuals (20 females; M_age = 23.23 years), respectively. Action‐oriented individuals displayed a stronger conflict adaptation effect as evidenced by a stronger reduction of interference on trials following conflict. These results were further corroborated by a correlational analysis including a sample of 105 participants: the higher the score on the action‐state dimension, the lower the interference effect following conflict (i.e., stronger conflict adaptation). The results provide evidence that even low‐level, bottom‐up‐driven processes of self‐control such as conflict adaptation are systematically moderated by individual differences in control modes and provide insights into the cognitive mechanisms underlying action versus state orientation.     

Conflicts as aversive signals: Conflict priming increases negative judgments for neutral stimuli

Botvinick, Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience 7:356–366 (2007) recently suggested that competing theories of the monitoring function of the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) for cognitive control might converge on the detection of aversive signals in general, implying that response conflicts, a known trigger of ACC activation, are aversive, too. Recent evidence showing conflict priming (i.e., faster responses to negative targets after conflict primes) directly supports this notion but remains inconclusive with regard to possible confounds with processing fluency. To this end, two experiments were conducted to offer more compelling evidence for the negative valence of conflicts. Participants were primed by (conflict and nonconflict) Stroop stimuli and subsequently had to judge the valence of neutral German words (Experiment 1a) or Chinese pictographs (Experiment 1b). Results showed that conflict, as compared with nonconflict, primes led to more negative judgments of subsequently presented neutral target stimuli. The findings will be discussed in the light of existing theories of action control highlighting the role of aversive signals for sequential processing adjustments.     

Socially triggered negative affect impairs performance in simple cognitive tasks

The aim of this research was to investigate the influence of a social-evaluative context on simple cognitive tasks. While another person present in the room evaluated photographs of beautiful women or landscapes by beauty/attractiveness, female participants had to perform a combination of digit-categorization and spatial-compatibility task. There, before every trial, one of the women or landscape pictures was presented. Results showed selective performance impairments: the numerical distance effects increased on trials that followed women pictures but only, if another person concurrently evaluated these women pictures. In a second experiment, using the affective priming paradigm, the authors show that female pictures have a more negative connotation when they are concurrently evaluated by another person (social-evaluative context) than when they are not evaluated (neutral context). Together, these results suggest that the social-evaluative context triggers mild negative affective reactions to women pictures which then impair performance in an unrelated task.     

How the social-evaluative context modulates processes of cognitive control

Cognitive control enables intelligent systems to select relevant information in the face of distracting information. The aim of the research presented here was to investigate the influence of the social-evaluative context on processes of cognitive control. Female participants had to perform the Erikson flanker task with each trial being preceded by a photograph of an attractive woman or a beautiful landscape. Concurrently, another person (partner or fellow student) either evaluated the attractiveness of the pictures of the women or the beauty of the landscapes. Participants showed increased flanker interference on trials following the presentation of pictures of attractive women, but only, if these were concurrently evaluated by another person. By contrast, in the control conditions (social presence without concurrent picture evaluation, or picture evaluation without social presence) no such effect occurred. That is, the concurrent evaluation task selectively increased distractibility presumably due to the affective reaction to the social-evaluative context.     

Ignorance is no excuse: moral judgments are influenced by a genetic variation on the oxytocin receptor gene

Perspective-taking has become a main focus of studies on moral judgments. Recent fMRI studies have demonstrated that individual differences in brain activation predict moral decision making. In particular, pharmacological studies highlighted the crucial role for the neuropeptide oxytocin in social behavior and emotional perception. In the present study N=154 participants were genotyped for a functional polymorphism (rs2268498) in the promoter region of the OXTR gene. We found a significant difference between carriers and non-carriers of the C-allele in exculpating agents for accidental harms (F((1,152))=11.49, p=.001, η(2)=.07) indicating that carriers of the C-allele rated accidentally committed harm as significantly more blameworthy than non-carriers. This is the first study providing evidence for a genetic contribution to moral judgments.     

Conflicts as aversive signals

Theories of human action control deal with the question of how cognitive control is dynamically adjusted to task demands. The conflict monitoring theory of anterior cingulate (ACC) function suggests that the ACC monitors for response conflicts in the ongoing processing stream thereby triggering the mobilization of cognitive control. Alternatively, the outcome evaluation account of ACC function suggests that the ACC monitors for negative performance outcomes, an information that serves as an aversive learning signal for future action selection. Botvinick (2007) recently suggested that both theories might converge on the detection of aversive signals in general. Here, the authors provide first evidence that conflicts are registered as aversive signals. Congruent and incongruent Stroop color-words served as primes, and positive and negative stimuli as targets in an affective priming paradigm. Negative targets were evaluated faster after incongruent than after congruent Stroop primes, and positive targets were evaluated slower after incongruent than after congruent primes. The finding that conflicts are actually registered as aversive signals bridges the gap between competing theories of ACC function and has broad theoretical and behavioral implications as it makes the conflict monitoring theory applicable to a much wider range of situations and tasks.     

Between Integrity and Despair: Toward Construct Validation of Erikson’s Eighth Stage

A new measure of Erikson’s final psychosocial stage, Integrity versus Despair, is presented and validated across two studies. In the first, 97 adults (68 women and 31 men) aged 65 and older responded to this measure: the Self-Examination Interview (SEI). Responses on the SEI were treated both categorically and dimensionally (continuous scores) with respect to four integrity statuses: Integrated, Nonexploring, Pseudointegrated, and Despairing. In Study One, categorical and dimensional Integrity statuses were examined in relation to five convergent measures: the Integrity subscale of the Modified Eriksonian Psychosocial Inventory, Openness to Experience, the Competence subscale of the California Personality Inventory, the Geriatric Depression Scale, and Perceived Health. As hypothesized, Integrated respondents were socially competent and resilient; Nonexploring persons conventional; Pseudointegrated respondents immature; and Despairing persons, demoralized. A subsample of participants took a semi-structured Adult Identity Status Interview. Integrated persons were most often Identity Achieved; Pseudointegrated and Nonexploring persons were most often Foreclosed. Study Two evaluated a new sample of 70 persons (51 women and 19 men) aged 70 and older. It generally confirmed the Integrity statuses developed in Study One, extending them to variables related to complexity and maturity of sociomoral reasoning and thinking style. As expected, the Integrated status was negatively related, and the Nonexploring status positively related, to intolerance for ambiguity. The highest levels of sociomoral reasoning occurred most in the Integrated status group, as did dialectical reasoning. In contrast, the Nonexploring and Despairing statuses had more formistic-mechanistic reasoners. Pseudointegrated persons produced the highest number of invalid protocols. The importance of present findings and implications of these studies for future directions in integrity research are discussed.