Towards the knowledge democracy? Knowledge production and the civic role of the university

In this paper I ask whether the University has a special role to play in democratic societies. I argue that the modern University can no longer lay claim to a research monopoly since nowadays research is conducted in many places outside of the University. The University can, however, still lay claim to a kind of knowledge monopoly which has to with the central role Universities play in the definition of what counts as scientific knowledge. The problem is, however, that the University’s knowledge monopoly is predominantly understood in epistemological terms. This leaves only one role for the University in a democratic society, viz., that of the expert. Based on ideas from John Dewey and Bruno Latour I suggest a different way to understand the distinction between ‘scientific’ and ‘everyday’ knowledge. Against this background I argue that the University can contribute towards the democratisation of knowledge if it articulates the difference between scientific and everyday knowledge in non-epistemological terms.

Introduction: The university revisited

Although universities are asked to play a role in the European knowledge society, the precise scope and meaning of this role is still under discussion. A major issue in this debate is the trend to adapt universities to economic needs and demands of society. In view of taking a critical stance against a one-sided economic interpretation of activities and functions of universities, their so-called “public” role is increasingly stressed in the debate as a crucial responsibility of universities that should not be marginalized and therefore deserves our attention. In this paper, which is the introduction to a special issue on the public role of the university, we want to stress the importance of addressing the question of “the role of universities in the Europe of knowledge” in an open way and thus, without prejudices against or in favour of possible answers. It is our contention that a critical view of what is happening in universities today cannot simply rely on authoritative ideas or principles that are vaguely reminiscent of our university traditions. Consequently, this introductory paper pleas for a firmer argumentative and a richer empirical basis that takes account of the fact that our background (horizon) has thoroughly changed in comparison to traditions that still implicitly inform our judgement of what universities can do, should do or should not do. Finally, we will discuss the way in which the articles collected in this issue are intended stimulating and supporting the debate on the public role of the university in Europe.

Age-of-acquisition differences in young and older adults affect latencies in lexical decision and semantic categorization

An ongoing discussion about the role of age of acquisition (AoA) in word processing concerns the confound with word frequency. This study removed possible frequency confounds by comparing AoA and word familiarity differences in young (18-23 years) and older (52-56 years) adults. A first study investigated the differences in AoA and word familiarity ratings. The norms of AoA and familiarity were significantly different for young and older adults whereas these were previously considered equivalent [Morrison, C. M., Hirsh, K. W., Chappell, T., & Ellis, A. W. (2002). Age and age of acquisition: An evaluation of the cumulative frequency hypothesis. European Journal of Cognitive Psychology, 14, 435-459]. In the second study, AoA and familiarity effects were significantly different for the older and young adults in a lexical decision task. The third study replicated these findings in a semantic artifact/naturally occurring categorization experiment, thus providing further evidence for AoA-effects when word processing requires semantic mediation. Results from both studies were in line with the hypothesis that AoA effects on word processing cannot be accounted for by word frequency or other possible confounds.     

Physical,verbal, and relational forms of bullying among German students: age trends,gender differences,and correlates

A revised version of the Bully/Victim Questionnaire [Olweus, 1991] was given to 2,086 fifth–tenth grader students from schools in two German federal states. The results were analysed in terms of frequencies of self‐reports of different forms of bullying (physical, verbal, relational/indirect; for bullies and for victims), gender and grade differences. Overall, 12.1% of the students reported bullying others and 11.1% reported being bullied (victimisation). We classified 2.3% of the students as bully/victims due to their self‐report. Significantly more boys reported bullying others, regardless of bullying form, and significantly more boys than girls were classified as bully/victims. Although there was no gender difference for victimisation at all, boys reported significantly more often than girls being bullied physically. Besides, self‐reports of pure and overlapping forms of bullying behaviour (relational, verbal, physical) were analysed. With regard to age trends, students from middle grades reported the highest rates of bullying. Self‐reported rates of victimisation were higher for younger students, regardless of form of victimisation. Furthermore, class size was not linked to reports of bullying and victimisation. Results from logistic regression analyses emphasised that the variables “gender” and “grade” add significantly to the prediction of self‐reported bullying; “grade” and variables measuring impaired psychosocial “well‐being” of students at school (e.g., feeling of not being popular, negative attitude towards breaks) add significantly to the prediction of self‐reported victimisation. The results are discussed against the background of other study findings, accentuating the significance of gender‐ and age‐specific forms of bullying/victimisation. Aggr. Behav. 32:1–15, 2006. © 2006 Wiley‐Liss, Inc.     

Why ‘What Works’ Still Won’t Work: From Evidence-Based Education to Value-Based Education

The idea that professional practices such as education should be based upon or at least be informed by evidence continues to capture the imagination of many politicians, policy makers, practitioners and researchers. There is growing evidence of the influence of this line of thought. At the same time there is a growing body of work that has raised fundamental questions about the feasibility of the idea of evidence-based or evidence-informed practice. In this paper I make a further contribution to this discussion through an analysis of a number of assumptions that inform the discussion. I focus on the epistemological, ontological and praxeological dimensions of the discussion and in each domain identify a deficit. In the epistemological domain there is a knowledge deficit, in the ontological domain an effectiveness or efficacy deficit and in the practice domain an application deficit. Taken together these deficits not only raise some important questions about the very idea of evidence-based practice but also highlight the role of normativity, power and values. Against this background I outline the case for the idea of value-based education as an alternative for evidence-based education. As I am generally concerned about the expectations policy makers hold about what evidence can and should achieve in professional practices such as education, my contribution is primarily meant to provide educators and other professionals with arguments that can help them to resist unwarranted expectations about the role of evidence in their practices and even more so of unwarranted interventions in their practices.