Inferring causal networks from observations and interventions

Information about the structure of a causal system can come in the form of observational data—random samples of the system's autonomous behavior—or interventional data—samples conditioned on the particular values of one or more variables that have been experimentally manipulated. Here we study people's ability to infer causal structure from both observation and intervention, and to choose informative interventions on the basis of observational data. In three causal inference tasks, participants were to some degree capable of distinguishing between competing causal hypotheses on the basis of purely observational data. Performance improved substantially when participants were allowed to observe the effects of interventions that they performed on the systems. We develop computational models of how people infer causal structure from data and how they plan intervention experiments, based on the representational framework of causal graphical models and the inferential principles of optimal Bayesian decision‐making and maximizing expected information gain. These analyses suggest that people can make rational causal inferences, subject to psychologically reasonable representational assumptions and computationally reasonable processing constraints.     

Telling stories: Gender differences in peers’ emotion talk and communication style

Eighty girls and 64 boys (M= 6 years; 8 months, SD= .65) narrated a wordless picture book in mixed‐ or same‐gender dyads. In mixed‐gender as well as same‐gender dyads, girls used more emotion explanations than did boys. Combined across dyad type, girls used more emotion labels than did boys. Girls used a higher proportion of collaborative speech acts than did boys in same‐gender dyads, but girls and boys used the same amount in mixed‐gender dyads. Whereas girls used a higher proportion of informing acts in mixed‐gender dyads than did boys, boys used more than did girls in same‐gender dyads. The findings support contextual models of gender and suggest that speaker as well as partner gender influence emotion expression and conversational style.     

Increasing seat belt use in service vehicle drivers with a gearshift delay

This study evaluated a device that prevents drivers from shifting vehicles into gear for up to 8 s unless seat belts are buckled. Participants were 101 commercial drivers who operated vans, pickups, or other light trucks from the U.S. and Canada. The driver could escape or avoid the delay by fastening his or her seat belt before shifting out of park. Unbelted participants experienced either a constant delay (8 s) or a variable delay (M = 8 s). A 16‐s delay was introduced for those U.S. drivers who did not show significant improvement. Seat belt use increased from 48% to 67% (a 40% increase) for U.S. drivers and from 54% to 74% (a 37% increase) for Canadian drivers. The fixed delay was more effective for U.S. drivers than the variable delay, but there was no difference between these two delay schedules for Canadian drivers. After the driver fastened his or her seat belt, it tended to remain fastened for the duration of the trip.     

R. ARELEH ROTH'S PRISTINE FAITH

Areleh Roth responded to the Holocaust by labouring to have Jews actualize pristine faith. As the slaughter in Europe mended the sinful universe prior to the advent of the Messiah, the living were enjoined to bring to bear the faith which was experienced by Abraham and which the people of Israel inherited over the ages. This meant struggling against the forces of Amalek who clouded the perception of God's presence amid the tragedy. Under divine aegis, Amalek brought suffering to induce repentance, he tested the people in order to activate free will, and clouded the perception of God's presence amid catastrophe. The struggle centred on annulling one's personality entirely, enabling God to enter the heart so completely as to totally replace the ego. This was the experience of pristine faith, and with it one related to God, through Abraham, and gained the strength to endure the tragedy. Even more, one's soul could join the ascent of those sparks which were dispersed upon the cosmic catastrophe (described by Isaac Luria) and thereby contribute to, and participate in, the rise of Israel to the spiritual redemption of the Sabbath before Adam's sin. Roth's response to the catastrophe was not of theological exposition (for example, why the pious suffered) but of practical means to survive and thrive on the level of spirit.     

Surprise! Infants consider possible bases of generalization for a single input example

Infants have been shown to generalize from a small number of input examples. However, existing studies allow two possible means of generalization. One is via a process of noting similarities shared by several examples. Alternatively, generalization may reflect an implicit desire to explain the input. The latter view suggests that generalization might occur when even a single input example is surprising, given the learner's current model of the domain. To test the possibility that infants are able to generalize based on a single example, we familiarized 9‐month‐olds with a single three‐syllable input example that contained either one surprising feature (syllable repetition, Experiment 1) or two features (repetition and a rare syllable, Experiment 2). In both experiments, infants generalized only to new strings that maintained all of the surprising features from familiarization. This research suggests that surprise can promote very rapid generalization.     

Reconsidering Intentions

This paper argues that the principles of instrumental rationality apply primarily to extended action through time. Most philosophers assume that rational requirements and principles govern in the first instance momentary mental states, as opposed to governing extended intentional actions directly. In the case of instrumental rationality, the relevant mental states or attitudes would typically be preferences, decisions, or intentions. In fact, even those who recognize the extended nature of our agency still assume that rational requirements apply primarily to mental states at a moment in time. Such views try to do justice to the extended nature of our agency by postulating rational requirements that apply in the first instance to plans, policies, and intentions more generally. The paper focuses on the central case of requirements and reasons governing the reconsideration of intentions and argues that these requirements or reasons are either superfluous or invalid. I argue that a proper conception of instrumental reasoning that applies directly to actions turn out to have surprising consequences. In fact, this conception allows us to see that policies, projects and the like are best understood as instances of extended actions, and that the instrumental requirements that apply to projects and policies are exactly the same as the instrumental requirements that apply to ordinary extended actions. Finally, I argue that the resulting theory of instrumental rationality is a significant improvement over theories that rely on principles governing intentions.     

Are There Gender Differences in Emotion Comprehension? Analysis of the Test of Emotion Comprehension

This article examines whether there are gender differences in understanding the emotions evaluated by the Test of Emotion Comprehension (TEC). The TEC provides a global index of emotion comprehension in children 3–11 years of age, which is the sum of the nine components that constitute emotion comprehension: (1) recognition of facial expressions, (2) understanding of external causes of emotions, (3) understanding of desire-based emotions, (4) understanding of belief-based emotions, (5) understanding of the influence of a reminder on present emotional states, (6) understanding of the possibility to regulate emotional states, (7) understanding of the possibility of hiding emotional states, (8) understanding of mixed emotions, and (9) understanding of moral emotions. We used the answers to the TEC given by 172 English girls and 181 boys from 3 to 8 years of age. First, the nine components into which the TEC is subdivided were analysed for differential item functioning (DIF), taking gender as the grouping variable. To evaluate DIF, the Mantel–Haenszel method and logistic regression analysis were used applying the Educational Testing Service DIF classification criteria. The results show that the TEC did not display gender DIF. Second, when absence of DIF had been corroborated, it was analysed for differences between boys and girls in the total TEC score and its components controlling for age. Our data are compatible with the hypothesis of independence between gender and level of comprehension in 8 of the 9 components of the TEC. Several hypotheses are discussed that could explain the differences found between boys and girls in the belief component. Given that the Belief component is basically a false belief task, the differences found seem to support findings in the literature indicating that girls perform better on this task     

Changing minds: Children's inferences about third party belief revision

By the age of 5, children explicitly represent that agents can have both true and false beliefs based on epistemic access to information (e.g., Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). Children also begin to understand that agents can view identical evidence and draw different inferences from it (e.g., Carpendale & Chandler, 1996). However, much less is known about when, and under what conditions, children expect other agents to change their minds. Here, inspired by formal ideal observer models of learning, we investigate children's expectations of the dynamics that underlie third parties’ belief revision. We introduce an agent who has prior beliefs about the location of a population of toys and then observes evidence that, from an ideal observer perspective, either does, or does not justify revising those beliefs. We show that children's inferences on behalf of third parties are consistent with the ideal observer perspective, but not with a number of alternative possibilities, including that children expect other agents to be influenced only by their prior beliefs, only by the sampling process, or only by the observed data. Rather, children integrate all three factors in determining how and when agents will update their beliefs from evidence.