An integrated account of generalization across objects and features

Humans routinely make inductive generalizations about unobserved features of objects. Previous accounts of inductive reasoning often focus on inferences about a single object or feature: accounts of causal reasoning often focus on a single object with one or more unobserved features, and accounts of property induction often focus on a single feature that is unobserved for one or more objects. We explore problems where people must make inferences about multiple objects and features, and propose that people solve these problems by integrating knowledge about features with knowledge about objects. We evaluate three computational methods for integrating multiple systems of knowledge: the output combination approach combines the outputs produced by these systems, the distribution combination approach combines the probability distributions captured by these systems, and the structure combination approach combines a graph structure over features with a graph structure over objects. Three experiments explore problems where participants make inferences that draw on causal relationships between features and taxonomic relationships between animals, and we find that the structure combination approach provides the best account of our data.     

The Guise of the Guise of the Bad

It is undeniable that human agents sometimes act badly, and it seems that they sometimes pursue bad things simply because they are bad. This latter phenomenon has often been taken to provide counterexamples to views according to which we always act under the guise of the good (GG). This paper identifies several distinct arguments in favour of the possibility that one can act under the guise of the bad. GG seems to face more serious difficulties when trying to answer three different, but related, arguments for the possibility of acting under the guise of the bad. The main strategies available to answer these objections end up either undermining the motivation for GG or failing to do full justice to the nature of perverse motivation. However, these difficulties turn out to be generated by focusing on a particular version of GG, what I call the “content version”. But we have independent reasons to prefer a different version of GG; namely, the “attitude version”. The attitude version allows for a much richer understanding of the possibility of acting on what we conceive to be bad. Drawing on an analogy with theoretical akrasia and theoretical perversion, I try to show how the attitude version can provide a compelling account of perverse actions.     

Reconsidering Intentions

This paper argues that the principles of instrumental rationality apply primarily to extended action through time. Most philosophers assume that rational requirements and principles govern in the first instance momentary mental states, as opposed to governing extended intentional actions directly. In the case of instrumental rationality, the relevant mental states or attitudes would typically be preferences, decisions, or intentions. In fact, even those who recognize the extended nature of our agency still assume that rational requirements apply primarily to mental states at a moment in time. Such views try to do justice to the extended nature of our agency by postulating rational requirements that apply in the first instance to plans, policies, and intentions more generally. The paper focuses on the central case of requirements and reasons governing the reconsideration of intentions and argues that these requirements or reasons are either superfluous or invalid. I argue that a proper conception of instrumental reasoning that applies directly to actions turn out to have surprising consequences. In fact, this conception allows us to see that policies, projects and the like are best understood as instances of extended actions, and that the instrumental requirements that apply to projects and policies are exactly the same as the instrumental requirements that apply to ordinary extended actions. Finally, I argue that the resulting theory of instrumental rationality is a significant improvement over theories that rely on principles governing intentions.     

Attention allocation under varied workload and effort perception in rowers

ObjectivesTenenbaum's effort-related model has proposed that as physical workload increases, attention allocation shifts from dissociation to association. Owing to equivocal research results regarding gender and experience differences in attention and perceived exertion reports, this study was designed to examine whether attention allocation varied as a function of perceived effort manipulated by physical workload, and whether gender and experience differences would emerge in regards to attention use.DesignA within-subjects study design was employed using measures of attention, perceived exertion, heart rate, and power output.MethodsSixty high school and collegiate rowers were recruited, and were divided into 30 experienced (15 men and 15 women) and 30 novice rowers (15 men and 15 women). After establishing a maximal power output value for each rower using the rowing ergometer, participants were asked to row at 30%, 50%, and 75% relative workload intensities for 10 min in a counterbalanced order. At each minute, measures of heart rate, attention, and perceived exertion were taken. Participants also recorded their thoughts during the session after each task.ResultsResults demonstrated that attention significantly (p<.01) shifted from dissociation to association as workload increased. The workload increase also resulted in elevated perceived exertion and heart rate. Similarly, thought classifications validated attention shift as workload increased. Experience and gender were not found to be discriminatory factors for attention allocation.ConclusionsAttention shifted from dissociation to association as workload increased; as environmental demands increase, physiological sensations dominate the individual's attention. Attention is forced to shift internally and narrow (i.e., associative) to adapt to these demands. During low or moderate workload, attention can be more flexible and voluntarily shift between associative and dissociative modes because the task demands are not overwhelming.     

A probabilistic model of theory formation

Concept learning is challenging in part because the meanings of many concepts depend on their relationships to other concepts. Learning these concepts in isolation can be difficult, but we present a model that discovers entire systems of related concepts. These systems can be viewed as simple theories that specify the concepts that exist in a domain, and the laws or principles that relate these concepts. We apply our model to several real-world problems, including learning the structure of kinship systems and learning ontologies. We also compare its predictions to data collected in two behavioral experiments. Experiment 1 shows that our model helps to explain how simple theories are acquired and used for inductive inference. Experiment 2 suggests that our model provides a better account of theory discovery than a more traditional alternative that focuses on features rather than relations.     

Does a Woman’s Marital Surname Choice Influence Perceptions of Her Husband? An Analysis Focusing on Gender-Typed Traits and Relationship Power Dynamics

Within Western cultures, most women in heterosexual relationships adopt their husbands’ surnames after marriage. In attempting to explain the enduring nature of this practice, researchers have noted that women tend to encounter stereotypes when they break with tradition by retaining their own surnames after marriage. A complementary possibility is that stereotypes are also directed toward men whose wives violate the surname tradition. The current research provides initial insight into this possibility through three studies that were conducted in the United States and United Kingdom with undergraduate and community samples (total N = 355; 254 women and 101 men). Study 1 revealed that participants predominantly referenced expressive traits when describing a man whose wife retained her surname. Study 2 built on these findings with an experimental design. Relative to a man whose wife adhered to the surname tradition, a man whose wife retained her surname was rated as less instrumental, more expressive, and as holding less power in the relationship. In Study 3, participants high in hostile sexism were particularly likely to rate a man as lower in power when his wife retained her surname. Collectively, findings provide insight into attitudes that may help to explain the longevity of the marital surname tradition. Findings also join with prior research in revealing links between commonplace marriage traditions and gendered power dynamics.