How to Be a Friend of Absolute Goodness

This paper critically examines Richard Kraut’s attack on the notion of absolute value, and lays out some of the conceptual work required to defend such a notion. The view under attack claims that absolute goodness is a property that provides a reason to value what has it. Kraut’s overall challenge is that absolute goodness cannot play this role. Kraut’s own view is that goodness-for, instead, plays the reason-providing role. My targets are Kraut’s double-counting objection, and his ethical objection against absolute value. After explaining the double-counting objection, and discussing the idea of non-additive reasons, I examine and reject Kraut’s reasons for holding that nonadditivity can rescue relative value but not absolute value. I proceed then to explore a different reply to the double-counting objection by introducing a distinction between normative reasons for action and reasons that explain why a certain consideration is a reason for action. Such a distinction (hinted at by Kraut) would either help both Kraut and the friend of absolute value, or neither of them. I defend the distinction from the objection that it would make absolute value just a ‘shadow’. Finally, I reply to Kraut’s ethical objection that being motivated by absolute value is depersonalizing, on two grounds: 1) if thinking in terms of absolute value depersonalizes relationships, then we have absolute-value-given reasons not to think in those terms; 2) the distinction between normative and explanatory reasons explains why even a motivation centred on absolute value need not be depersonalizing.     

The New Explanatory Objection Against the Fitting Attitude Account of Value

Philosophia - The explanatory objection against the fitting attitude account of value states that if the properties of attitudes explain fittingness facts, but do not always explain value facts,...     

Automated gaze-contingent objects elicit orientation following in 8-month-old infants

The current study tested whether the purely amodal cue of contingency elicits orientation following behavior in 8-month-old infants. We presented 8-month-old infants with automated objects without human features that did or did not react contingently to the infants' fixations recorded by an eye tracker. We found that an object's occasional orientation toward peripheral targets was reciprocated by a congruent visual orientation following response by infants only when it had displayed gaze-contingent interactivity. Our finding demonstrates that infants' gaze-following behavior does not depend on the presence of a human being. The results are consistent with the idea that, in 8-month-old infants, the detection of contingent reactivity, like other communicative signals, can itself elicit the illusion of being addressed.     

A Geometrical Characterization of the Twin Paradox and its Variants

The aim of this paper is to provide a logic-based conceptual analysis of the twin paradox (TwP) theorem within a first-order logic framework. A geometrical characterization of TwP and its variants is given. It is shown that TwP is not logically equivalent to the assumption of the slowing down of moving clocks, and the lack of TwP is not logically equivalent to the Newtonian assumption of absolute time. The logical connection between TwP and a symmetry axiom of special relativity is also studied.     

Reapproaching Mahler: new perspectives on normal autism, symbiosis, splitting and libidinal object constancy from cognitive developmental theory

Margaret Mahler's seminal work on the psychological birth of the infant has generated more critical discussion than most other psychoanalytic theories of early development. But while the empirically, theoretically, and methodologically based criticisms of Mahler's theory are generally justified, her critics fail at times to consider some of the intriguing and creative insights that her theoretical formulations tried to capture. This paper attempts to reformulate these insights using the new conceptual tools that current cognitive developmental theory provides. Mahler's stage of normal autism is reconsidered in the light of contingency detection theory as an initial phase of primary preoccupation with self-generated perfectly response-contingent stimulation. Her concept of normal symbiosis is recast with the help of attachment theory's views on homeostatic regulation and the social biofeedback model of affect-reflective mirroring interactions with parents. Finally, her ideas about the development of splitting and libidinal object constancy are reconsidered according to recent theories of early representational development and mentalization.     

Goal attribution without agency cues: the perception of 'pure reason' in infancy.

The proper domain of naive psychological reasoning is human action and human mental states but such reasoning is frequently applied to non-human phenomena as well. The studies reported in this paper test the validity of the currently widespread belief that this tendency is rooted in the fact that naive psychological reasoning is initially restricted to, and triggered by, the perception of self-initiated movement of agents. We report three habituation experiments which examine the necessary conditions under which infants invoke a psychological principle, namely the principle of rational action, to interpret behaviour as goal directed action. Experiment 1 revealed that the principle of rational action already operates at 9 (but not yet at 6) months of age. Experiment 2 demonstrated that perceptual cues indicating agency, such as self-propulsion, are not necessary prerequisites for interpreting behaviour in terms of the principle of rational action. Experiment 3 confirmed that this effect cannot be attributed to generalisation of agentive properties from one object to another. These results suggest that the domain of naive psychology is initially defined only by the applicability of its core principles and its ontology is not restricted to (featurally identified) object kinds such as persons, animates, or agents. We argue that in its initial state naive psychological reasoning is not a cue-based but a principle-based theory.     

Predictive value of psychosocial assessment for the mortality of patients waiting for liver transplantation

Selecting suitable candidates for liver transplantation is the most challenging task of pre-transplant evaluation. In addition to somatic assessment, psychosocial evaluation has been proven important in identifying patients at high risk of potential failure. The Transplant Evaluation Rating Scale (TERS) is a widely used rating instrument for the assessment of psychosocial risk factors before liver transplantation. The aim of this study was to explore the predictive value of TERS for mortality in liver transplant patients before and after transplantation. The medical records of patients referred for psychiatric evaluation before liver transplantation between 2003 –2013 were analysed. Administering TERS was part of the pre-transplant evaluation. The TERS scores of patients who died before and after transplantation were compared with those who survived following transplantation. One hundred and sixteen patients were referred for pre-transplant psychiatric evaluation. Patients with successful liver transplants scored significantly lower on TERS than those who died before transplantation (30.65 ± 6.06 vs. 34.75 ± 8.25, p = .031). Patients who died after transplantation scored significantly better on TERS than those who died before transplantation (28.79 ± 2.81 vs. 34.75 ± 8.25, p = .003). There was no significant difference between the deceased and surviving transplanted patients’ TERS scores (28.79 ± 2.81 vs. 31.19 ± 6.66, p = .365). TERS appears to be a suitable rating instrument to help select candidates who have higher chance to survive prior to transplantation but it could not predict post-transplant mortality.     

Goal attribution to inanimate agents by 6.5-month-old infants

Human infants' tendency to attribute goals to observed actions may help us to understand where people's obsession with goals originates from. While one-year-old infants liberally interpret the behaviour of many kinds of agents as goal-directed, a recent report [Kamewari, K., Kato, M., Kanda, T., Ishiguro, H., & Hiraki, K. (2005). Six-and-a-half-month-old children positively attribute goals to human action and to humanoid-robot motion. Cognitive Development, 20, 303-320] suggested that younger infants restrict goal attribution to humans and human-like creatures. The present experiment tested whether 6.5-month-old infants would be willing to attribute a goal to a moving inanimate box if it slightly varied its goal approach within the range of the available efficient actions. The results were positive, demonstrating that featural identification of agents is not a necessary precondition of goal attribution in young infants and that the single most important behavioural cue for identifying a goal-directed agent is variability of behaviour. This result supports the view that the bias to give teleological interpretation to actions is not entirely derived from infants' experience.