Rape myth acceptance and judgments of vulnerability to sexual assault: an Internet experiment

Processing strategies in risk assessment were studied in an Internet experiment. Women (N = 399) who were either low or high in rape myth acceptance (RMA) were asked to recall either two or six behaviors that either increase or decrease the risk of being sexually assaulted. Later they judged their personal vulnerability to sexual assault under either no time pressure (no response deadline) or time pressure (response deadline of 5 s). Without time pressure, the results were opposite to previous research: Women low in RMA relied on ease of recall and reported higher vulnerability after recalling few rather than many risk increasing behaviors, or many rather than few risk-decreasing behaviors; women high in RMA relied on the amount of information recalled, which resulted in an opposite pattern of vulnerability judgments. No influences of ease of recall or amount recalled on vulnerability judgments were detected under time pressure.     

Rape myths as neutralizing cognitions: evidence for a causal impact of anti-victim attitudes on men's self-reported likelihood of raping

Men's rape myth acceptance (RMA; prejudiced beliefs that serve to exonerate the rapist and blame the victim) has been shown to correlate positively with self-reported rape proclivity (RP). To explore the causal pathway underlying this correlation, two experiments were conducted in which the relative cognitive accessibility of RMA and RP was varied. Male students were asked to report their RP in the context of a scale assessing attraction toward sexual aggression (Experiment 1) or in response to five realistic date-rape scenarios (Experiment 2), either before or after they filled out a 20-item RMA scale. In both studies, the correlation of RMA and RP was significantly greater in the after than in the before condition, suggesting that the belief in rape myths has a causal influence on men's proclivity to rape. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Learning to learn during visual discrimination in group housed dwarf goats (Capra hircus)

Using an automated learning device, we investigated "learning to learn" by dwarf goats (Capra hircus) in what was for them a familiar environment and normal social settings. Nine problems, each consisting of four discriminable black symbols, each with one S-super+ and three different S-super(-), were presented on a computer screen. Mean daily learning success improved over the course of the first four problems, and the improvement was maintained throughout the remaining five problems. The number of trials to reach the learning criterion decreased significantly beginning with problem four. Such results may be interpreted as evidence that the goats were developing a learning set. In the present case, the learning set appeared to have two components. One involved gaining familiarity and apparent understanding of the learning device and the basic requirements of the discrimination task. The second component involved learning potential error factors to be ignored, as well as learning commonalities that carried over from one problem to the next. Among the error factors, evidence of apparent preferences for specific symbols was seen, which had a predictable effect on performances.     

Max Weber as outsider: His nominal influence on German sociology in the twenties

An assessment of the influence which Max Weber's writings had on the growth of German sociology after World War I. The author isolates those themes which were of major importance during the Weimar Republic: the concern with social integration; the shattered faith in reason; and the attempt to create a uniquely “German” sociology. It becomes clear that neither Weber's conception of sociology nor his methodological formulations had much impact on the next generation. These findings can be accounted for in three different ways: (1) that he died too early; (2) that German sociology lacked the necessary institutionalization; or (3) that there was a reorientation in scholarship following World War I, which Weber's opus could not bridge.     

研究人类使用启发式之五原则(英文)

快速节俭启发式框架假定人们使用一套简捷的决策策略——启发式——进行推理、选择、评价及其他决策。这些启发式策略能顺应任务情境结构中的规律, 利用人类的基本认知能力。正基于此, 启发式成就了适应性行为。本文拟对启发式框架进行回顾, 并简要陈述引导研究者研究人类适应性工具箱的五条原则。我们强调, 启发式模型应(ⅰ)精确界定(ⅱ)对照检验(ⅲ)与策略选择理论相符(ⅳ)能评估其对新资料的预测力(ⅴ)能既在实验室又在现实世界中得以检验。     

From recognition to decisions: Extending and testing recognition-based models for multialternative inference

The recognition heuristic is a noncompensatory strategy for inferring which of two alternatives, one recognized and the other not, scores higher on a criterion. According to it, such inferences are based solely on recognition. We generalize this heuristic to tasks with multiple alternatives, proposing a model of how people identify the consideration sets from which they make their final decisions. In doing so, we address concerns about the heuristic’s adequacy as a model of behavior: Past experiments have led several authors to conclude that there is no evidence for a noncompensatory use of recognition but clear evidence that recognition is integrated with other information. Surprisingly, however, in no study was this competing hypothesis—the compensatory integration of recognition—formally specified as a computational model. In four studies, we specify five competing models, conducting eight model comparisons. In these model comparisons, the recognition heuristic emerges as the best predictor of people’s inferences.     

System‐perpetuating asymmetries between explicit and implicit intergroup attitudes among indigenous and non‐indigenous Chileans

The present research demonstrates a dissociation between explicit and implicit intergroup evaluation in the reciprocal attitudes between indigenous (Mapuche) and non‐indigenous Chileans. In both social groups, the explicit measures of attitudes towards the respective in‐group and out‐group were compared with the Implicit Association Test scores. The results indicate that the members of the low‐status minority might explicitly express a moderate evaluative preference for their in‐group but might implicitly devalue it. Conversely, the members of the high‐status majority might implicitly devalue their out‐group but might explicitly express no bias. These results are theoretically framed in terms of system justification, conventional stereotypes and motivated correction processes.     

Good judgments do not require complex cognition

What cognitive capabilities allow Homo sapiens to successfully bet on the stock market, to catch balls in baseball games, to accurately predict the outcomes of political elections, or to correctly decide whether a patient needs to be allocated to the coronary care unit? It is a widespread belief in psychology and beyond that complex judgment tasks require complex solutions. Countering this common intuition, in this article, we argue that in an uncertain world actually the opposite is true: Humans do not need complex cognitive strategies to make good inferences, estimations, and other judgments; rather, it is the very simplicity and robustness of our cognitive repertoire that makes Homo sapiens a capable decision maker.