The Enlightenment That Won't Go Away: Modernity's Crux

The Critical Process unleashed by the Enlightenment and endlessly resharpening itself to this day has mortally wounded the God of Deism, maybe also of theism, even of Christianity. A temptation of Christian theology is to retreat in denial into an updated version of Deism, seemingly granting full license to modern science but only so long as it does not impugn God's love. The alternative here proposed is to ride out The Critical Process, in fact to encourage it, all the way into modernity's crux: How can a design that is not benign still be divine? The Christian reply is: through a real death of God and of ourselves as well, and through resurrections beginning now, thus freeing The Critical Process from the illusion of insuring our survival and, instead, for the honest Enlightenment task of merely telling the truth.     

I like you,I like you not: Understanding the formation of context-dependent automatic attitudes

Previous research has shown that automatic evaluations can be highly context dependent. Expanding on past research demonstrating context effects for existing attitudes toward familiar objects, the present research examined basic principles that guide the formation of context-dependent versus context-independent automatic attitudes. Results from four experiments showed that: (a) newly formed attitudes generalised to novel contexts when prior experiences with the attitude object were evaluatively homogeneous; (b) when prior experiences were evaluatively heterogeneous, automatic evaluations became context sensitive, such that they reflected the contingency between the valence of prior experiences and the context in which these experiences occurred; and (c) when prior experiences were evaluatively heterogeneous across different contexts, novel contexts elicited automatic evaluations that reflected the valence of first experiences with the attitude object. Implications for research on automatic evaluation and attitude change are discussed.     

(Emotion-centered) problem-solving therapy: An update

Problem-solving therapy (PST) is a psychosocial intervention, typically considered to be a member of the cognitive and behaviour therapies family, and is based on a biopsychosocial, diathesis-stress model of psychopathology. The overarching goal of this approach is to promote the successful adoption of adaptive problem-solving attitudes and the effective implementation of certain behaviours as a means of coping with life stressors in order to attenuate the negative effects of such events on physical and mental well-being. Over the past several decades, in addition to accumulating strong support for its efficacy as a clinical intervention, similar to many other forms of psychotherapy, PST has undergone various evolutionary changes. Developed primarily as a more cognitive-based approach, due to the large body of literature in the field of affective neuroscience that underscores the importance of the impact of affect on problem solving, PST has evolved into emotion-centered problem-solving therapy (EC-PST). This article provides for a brief excursion into the historical roots of PST and why it has evolved into EC-PST, as well as providing support for its characterisation as a transdiagnostic approach. In addition, several meta-analyses that underscore its efficacy are described, as well as the most recent clinical guidelines that comprise EC-PST.     

A behavior-based circuit model of how outcome expectations organize learned behavior in larval Drosophila

Drosophila larvae combine a numerically simple brain, a correspondingly moderate behavioral complexity, and the availability of a rich toolbox for transgenic manipulation. This makes them attractive as a study case when trying to achieve a circuit-level understanding of behavior organization. From a series of behavioral experiments, we suggest a circuitry of chemosensory processing, odor-tastant memory trace formation, and the "decision" process to behaviorally express these memory traces--or not. The model incorporates statements about the neuronal organization of innate vs. conditioned chemosensory behavior, and the types of interaction between olfactory and gustatory pathways during the establishment as well as the behavioral expression of odor-tastant memory traces. It in particular suggests that innate olfactory behavior is responsive in nature, whereas conditioned olfactory behavior is captured better when seen as an action in pursuit of its outcome. It incorporates the available neuroanatomical and behavioral data and thus should be useful as scaffold for the ongoing investigations of the chemo-behavioral system in larval Drosophila.     

Motivated Compliance With Bases of Social Power

This contribution examines the degree of compliance with hard and soft power bases ( Raven, Schwarzwald, & Koslowsky, 1998 ) as a function of target motivational and personal orientations. Four field studies were conducted in different European organizations where intrinsic–extrinsic motivational orientations, desire for control, self-presentational styles, and self-esteem were respectively considered as antecedents of employees' compliance with their supervisors' power strategies. Results show that compliance with soft power strategies is positively related to intrinsic motivation, desire for control, "getting-ahead" style, and self-esteem; and negatively related to the "getting-along" style. Compliance with hard power strategies is positively related to extrinsic motivation and to the getting-along style, but negatively related to intrinsic motivation, desire for control, and self-esteem.     

Understanding patterns of attitude change: When implicit measures show change, but explicit measures do not

A common assumption in research on attitudes is that indirect measures assess relatively stable implicit attitudes, whereas traditional self-report measures assess more recently acquired explicit attitudes that coexist with old, presumably stable implicit attitudes. This assumption seems difficult to reconcile with research showing experimentally induced changes on implicit but not explicit measures. The present research tested a process-account of such asymmetrical patterns. Specifically, we argue that implicit measures show experimental effects that do not emerge on explicit measures when (a) the pairing of an attitude object with positive or negative valence creates new automatic associations in memory, and, at the same time, (b) the consideration of additional information about the attitude object eliminates the impact of automatic associations on self-reported evaluative judgments. Results from three studies support these predictions. Implications for research on attitude change are discussed.