Autobiographical memory and perceptual learning: A developmental study using picture recognition,naming latency,and perceptual identification

Memory &; Cognition - In this paper, we report four experiments aimed at extending the distinction between recognition memory and perceptual memory introduced by Jacoby and Dallas (1981). In...     

Inferences from counterfactual threats and promises

We examine how people understand and reason from counterfactual threats, for example, "if you had hit your sister, I would have grounded you" and counterfactual promises, for example, "if you had tidied your room, I would have given you ice-cream." The first experiment shows that people consider counterfactual threats, but not counterfactual promises, to have the illocutionary force of an inducement. They also make the immediate inference that the action mentioned in the "if" part of the counterfactual threat and promise did not occur. The second experiment shows that people make more negative inferences (modus tollens and denial of the antecedent) than affirmative inferences (modus ponens and affirmation of the consequent) from counterfactual threats and promises, unlike indicative threats and promises. We discuss the implications of the results for theories of the mental representations and cognitive processes that underlie conditional inducements.     

The consistency of disjunctive assertions

In two experiments, we established a new phenomenon in reasoning from disjunctions of the grammatical form either A or else B, where A and B are clauses. When individuals have to assess whether pairs of assertions can be true at the same time, they tend to focus on the truth of each clause of an exclusive disjunction (and ignore the concurrent falsity of the other clause). Hence, they succumb to illusions of consistency and of inconsistency with pairs consisting of a disjunction and a conjunction (Experiment 1), and with simpler problems consisting of pairs of disjunctions, such as eIther there is a pie or else there is a cake and Either there isn't a pie or else there is a cake (Experiment 2), that appear to be consistent with one another, but in fact are not. These results corroborate the theory that reasoning depends on envisaging models of possibilities.     

Varying cautionary instructions, monetary incentives, and comorbid diagnostic training in malingered psychopathology research

In this article, we combine two analogue experiments in which we empirically examined three malingering methodological issues in individuals trained and instructed to simulate posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) on the Trauma Symptom Inventory (TSI; Briere, 1995). In Experiment 1, we examined TSI scale effects of the following manipulations using a 2 x 2 design with 330 college students: (a) inclusion or exclusion of cautionary instructions regarding believability of participants' simulation and (b) different financial incentive levels. In Experiment 2, we examined comorbid psychiatric diagnostic training with 180 college students who were either trained to simulate PTSD and comorbid major depressive disorder or trained to simulate only PTSD. Caution main effects were significant for all but two TSI Clinical Scales, incentive main effects and interactions were only significant for one Clinical scale each, and the comorbidity manipulation did not yield any scale differences. We discuss malingering research design implications regarding the use of cautionary instructions, financial incentive levels, and comorbid training.     

Mental maps in chacma baboons (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Papio ursinus</Emphasis>): using inter-group encounters as a natural experiment

Encounters between groups of wild chacma baboons (Papio ursinus) can be viewed as a natural experiment to investigate the nature of these primates’ mental representations of large-scale space. During a 16-month field study in a high population density habitat we recorded the foraging routes and the most important resources of a group of 25 individuals. Also, we estimated the locations of additional baboon groups relative to the study group. Routes were less linear, travel speed was higher, and inter-resource distances were larger when other groups were present within 500 m of the focal group; thus, the study group avoided others by taking detours. We predicted that evasive manoeuvres would be characteristic of different possible orientation mechanisms, and compared them with our observations. We analysed 34 evasive manoeuvres in detail. In an area that lacked prominent landmarks, detours were small; larger detours occurred when resources were directly visible, or in the vicinity of a hill offering conspicuous landmarks. In areas without prominent landmarks, detours were along familiar routes and waiting bouts of up to 60 min occurred; on one occasion the study group aborted their entire day’s journey. We discuss these findings in the light of time and energy costs and suggest that the baboons lack the ability to compute Euclidean relations among locations, but use network maps to find their way to out-of-sight locations. This contribution is part of the Special Issue “A Socioecological Perspective on Primate Cognition” (Cunningham and Janson 2007a).     

Dichotic listening following idiopathic precocious puberty: Speech processing capacity and temporal efficiency

Eleven right-handed adolescent females with a history of idiopathic precocious puberty (IPP) were compared to 11 pair-matched normal controls of similar maturational status. They were tested on a dichotic consonant-vowel (CV) discrimination task in which syllables were presented simultaneously to the two ears or with an interaural delay of 30 or 60 msec. The IPP and control groups did not differ: (1) in right-ear advantages; (2) in double-correct or total correct measures of accuracy; or (3) in "lag effects." The findings provide further evidence that timing of puberty--maturation rate--is not related to verbal ability or lateralization in adolescent females.