Flashbulb memories: Conceptual and methodological issues

Abstract

Although flashbulb memory research is now well established, it is still not clear exactly what researchers are referring to as flashbulbs, and what is the best way to address the phenomenon. There are at least two ways in which the term “flashbulbs” is used, and at least two conceptual approaches that can be used to research them. The first usage corresponds to the bold theoretical conjectures put forward by Brown and Kulik (1977). The second results from empirical classification and intuitively lacks the essence conveyed by the first meaning. The two approaches concentrate on the cognitive and societal aspects, respectively. Although these are not incompatible, they make different assumptions and use different methodologies. We argue that research should be directed towards more unified theorising, and we describe methodologies appropriate for this approach.     

Against One Form of Judgment-Determinism

Taking 'rationalized judgments' to be those formed by inference from other judgments, I argue against 'Extreme Determinism': the thesis that theoretical rationalization just is a kind of predetermination of 'conclusion-judgments' by 'premise-judgments'. The argument rests upon two key lemmas: firstly, that a deliberator - in this case, his/her assent to some proposition - to be predetermined (I call this the 'Openness Requirement'): secondly, that a subject's logical insight into his/her premise-judgments must enter into the explanation of any judgment s/he forms that is rationalized by those judgments. My contention is that, given the Openness Requirement, no version of Extreme Determinsim can allow for the role played by logical insight in the rationalization of judgment. I end by indicating briefly how this result might figure in a wider argument against any form of determinism about rationalized judgment, and by explaining why I have focused specifically upon rebutting a deterministic view of theoretical as opposed to 'practical' rationalization.     

Right and Wrong Reasons in Folk‐Psychological Explanation

Abstract

Davidson argued that the fact we can have a reason for acting, and yet not be the reason why we act, requires explanation of action in terms of the agent's reasons to be causal. The present paper agrees with Dickenson (Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 2007) in taking this argument to be an inference to the best explanation. However, its target phenomenon is the very existence of a case in which an agent has more than one reason, but acts exclusively becaue of one reason. Folk psychology appears to allow for this phenomenon. However, appreciation of ‘rationalization’ as a form of contrastive explanation reveals the existence of the Davidsonian possibility to the problematic. Claims that ‘I did it because of R₁, not because of R₂’ are entertained in folk psychology, and may be sincere or insincere. But as reports of conscious practical reasoning, even when sincere, they are not authoritative about the mechanism of motivation.     

Team Mental Models,Team Goal Orientations,and Information Elaboration,Predicting Team Creative Performance

This study aimed to enhance understanding of team creativity by investigating the type of team mental models that team members develop during their work on a creative problem solving task. We hypothesized that teams that develop dissimilar team mental models, compared to similar and complementary team mental models, will achieve a higher information elaboration. This effect will be moderated by the development of a high learning-performance team goal orientation. Information elaboration in turn was hypothesized to predict team creative performance. In a 3 (similar/dissimilar/complementary team mental models) × 3 (learning/performance/learning-performance goal orientation) experimental study on a sample of 33 teams (N = 98) we found that teams that developed more dissimilar team mental models and experienced a learning-performance goal orientation intervention engaged in more information elaboration. Information elaboration, in turn, mediated the relationship between the interaction between team mental models and team goal orientations and team creative performance. Implications for research on team mental models and team creativity are discussed.     

Synesthesia and creativity in fine arts students: An Empirical Look

Abstract:

A survey of 358 fine arts students at three large universities indicated that 23% (84) experienced synesthesia in a spontaneous and consistent manner, and 49% (175) reported no such experience. From this subject pool, 61 synesthetes and 61 controls, equated on gender, major, year in school, and verbal intelligence, received a battery of four creativity measures. The synesthetes scored significantly higher than controls on all four creativity measures; and their self‐rated frequency and vividness of synesthesia though significantly intercorrelated, correlated marginally with the measures of creativity. The results are consistent with anecdotal reports that synesthetes are often involved in musical and artistic fields, and possessive of a high degree of creativity.     

Musical Probabilities,Abductive Reasoning,and Brain Mechanisms: Extended Perspective of A Priori Listening to Music Within the Creative Cognition Approach

A theory of listening to music is proposed. It suggests that, for listeners, the process of prediction is the starting point to experiencing music. This implies that perception of music starts through both a predisposed and an experience-based extrapolation into the future (this is labeled a priori listening). Indications for this proposal are discussed and defined using perspectives from the cognitive sciences, neuroscience, philosophy, and experimental psychology. Of most importance in this theory is that listening to music constantly interacts with the creative processes.     

Solving and Creating Raven Progressive Matrices: Reasoning in Well- and Ill-Defined Problem Spaces

We studied the development of creative cognition in children ranging from nursery school to Grade 6 (4–12 yr old, N = 511), performing a problem generation task. The task involved inventing a novel item for a classical problem solving task they had completed beforehand: the Raven Progressive Matrices (RPM). This task and the generating task both comprise matrixes of components, to which a set of transformational relations are applied; only in the first case these are inferred to solve a puzzle, but in the second they are invented to create one. We analyzed the matrixes invented in the generation task and compared them to those of the original solving task. We observed that (a) both in solving and generation, the ability to combine more than 1 relation increased with grade level, (b) within all 8 grades, except Grades 3 and 6, performance was uncorrelated between both tasks, (c) relations that were applied in the generation task often did feature in the solving task, and (d) relations occurring in both tasks were applied with different frequencies. Overall, we conclude that standard problem solving ability is not a precondition for creative reasoning and that the comprehension of relations between components featured in solving task differs from that applied in generation.     

Assessment of creativity with the ACL: An empirical comparison of four scales

Several scales have been developed from the Adjective Check List to assess creativity, with almost no comparative data to evaluate them. In this study, two samples, one of research scientists and one of advanced architecture students, were assessed using the A CL scored for the Domino, Gough, Schaefer, and Yarnell scales of creativity. The results indicated a fair amount of equivalence among the four scales, with a tendency for the Domino and the Gough scales to have better convergent and discriminant validity.     

Control of a Virtual Avatar Influences Postural Activity and Motion Sickness

The influence of vehicular control on motion sickness has implications for theories of motion sickness etiology. We asked whether motion sickness susceptibility might also be related to the control of non-vehicular locomotion. Participants were exposed to a console video game that featured ambulatory locomotion of a virtual avatar. In a yoked control design, individuals either played the game (players) or watched another participant's recorded game play (viewers). Viewers were more likely than players to report motion sickness. During exposure to the video game players moved more than viewers, and the movement of players was more predictable or self-similar than the movement of viewers. Coupling of movement within player-viewer pairs was greater for pairs in which the viewer later reported motion sickness than for pairs in which both participants stated that they were not motion sick. The results reveal that motion sickness incidence can be influenced by the control of stimulus motion, in general, and is not limited to control of vehicular motion. We discuss implications of these findings for theories of motion sickness etiology.     

On the Physical Origins of Inverted Optic Images

In the behavioral sciences, discussions of vision often carry an implicit assumption that the formation of inverted optic images is a result of human technology (i.e., cameras) or biological mechanisms (i.e., the chambered eye). If this assumption were true, then inverted images would be—in effect—an invention of living things, which, in turn, would have important consequences for our understanding of the evolution and psychology of vision. In this article, I briefly review the history of ideas relating vision and optics to the formation of inverted optic images. I then evaluate the necessary and sufficient conditions for the formation of inverted images. I demonstrate that inverted optic images (including inverted optic flow) can and do form in the absence of any biology and that sufficient conditions for inverted image formation predate the origins of life. Inverted images are not an invention of biological systems; rather, biological systems and human technologies exploit preexisting facts of physical optics. This conclusion is consistent with the ecological premise that life is coherent with physical law.