Beliefs About the True Self Explain Asymmetries Based on Moral Judgment

Past research has identified a number of asymmetries based on moral judgments. Beliefs about (a) what a person values, (b) whether a person is happy, (c) whether a person has shown weakness of will, and (d) whether a person deserves praise or blame seem to depend critically on whether participants themselves find the agent's behavior to be morally good or bad. To date, however, the origins of these asymmetries remain unknown. The present studies examine whether beliefs about an agent's “true self” explain these observed asymmetries based on moral judgment. Using the identical materials from previous studies in this area, a series of five experiments indicate that people show a general tendency to conclude that deep inside every individual there is a “true self” calling him or her to behave in ways that are morally virtuous. In turn, this belief causes people to hold different intuitions about what the agent values, whether the agent is happy, whether he or she has shown weakness of will, and whether he or she deserves praise or blame. These results not only help to answer important questions about how people attribute various mental states to others; they also contribute to important theoretical debates regarding how moral values may shape our beliefs about phenomena that, on the surface, appear to be decidedly non‐moral in nature.     

An Indecent Proposal: The Dual Functions of Indirect Speech

People often use indirect speech, for example, when trying to bribe a police officer by asking whether there might be “a way to take care of things without all the paperwork.” Recent game theoretic accounts suggest that a speaker uses indirect speech to reduce public accountability for socially risky behaviors. The present studies examine a secondary function of indirect speech use: increasing the perceived moral permissibility of an action. Participants report that indirect speech is associated with reduced accountability for unethical behavior, as well as increased moral permissibility and increased likelihood of unethical behavior. Importantly, moral permissibility was a stronger mediator of the effect of indirect speech on likelihood of action, for judgments of one's own versus others' unethical action. In sum, the motorist who bribes the police officer with winks and nudges may not only avoid public punishment but also maintain the sense that his actions are morally permissible.     

Epigenetics and Child Psychiatry: Ethical and Legal Issues

Epigenetics has the potential to revolutionize diagnosis and treatment in psychiatry, especially child psychiatry, as it may offer the opportunity for early detection and prevention, as well as development of new treatments. As with the previous introduction of genetic research in psychiatry, there is also the problem of unrealistic expectations and new legal and ethical problems. This article reviews the potential contributions and problems of epigenetic research in child psychiatry. Previous legal and ethical issues in genetic research serve as a guide to those in epigenetic research. Recommendations for safeguards and guidelines on the use of epigenetics with children and adolescents are outlined based on the identified issues. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

What Goes Up Apparently Needn't Come Down: Asymmetric Predictions of Ascent and Descent in Rankings

In eight studies, we document an upward mobility bias, or a tendency to predict that a rise in rankings is more likely than a decline. This asymmetry was observed in predictions of classroom performance, NBA and NFL standings, business school rankings, and employee performance rankings. The bias was found for entities people care about and want to see improve their standing, as well as entities in which people are not invested. It appears to result from people's tendency to give considerable weight to a focal agent's intentions and motivation, but to give less weight to the intentions of competitors and other factors that would thwart the focal agent's improvement. We show that this bias is most pronounced for implicit incremental theorists, who believe that performance is malleable (and hence assign more weight to intentions and effort). We discuss implications of this asymmetry for decision making and for an understanding of the underdog bias. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Keeping It Going: Evidence of Long-Term Improvements After Implementation of the 1-2-3 Magic Parenting Program

This study builds upon a pilot evaluation of the 1-2-3 Magic Program (Bailey, van der Zwan, Phelan, &; Brooks, 2012 Bailey, E. L., van der Zwan, R., Phelan, T. W., &; Brooks, A. (2012). The 1–2-3 Magic Program: Implementation outcomes of an Australian pilot evaluation with school-aged children. Child &; Family Behavior Therapy, 34(1), 53–69. doi:10.1080/07317107.2012.654455[Taylor &; Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]), by investigating its long-term efficacy as a brief parenting intervention for families with a school-aged child. Twelve Australian families participated in a randomized controlled trial, assigned either to a wait-listed control group or to one that received immediate training. Consistent with the pilot evaluation, only families who had received training reported significant improvement in child and parenting behavior at an 8-week follow-up assessment. These improvements were maintained for 12-month posttraining, supporting the long-term efficacy of the 1-2-3 Magic Program for Australian families.     

Realization and Multiple Realization,Chicken and Egg

A common view is that the truth of multiple realization—e.g., about psychological states—entails the truth of functionalism. This is supposed to follow because what is multiply realized is eo ipso realized. I argue that view is mistaken by demonstrating how it misrepresents arguments from multiple realization. In particular, it undermines the empirical component of the arguments, and renders the multiplicity of the realization irrelevant. I suggest an alternative reading of multiple realizability arguments, particularly in philosophy of psychology. And I explain the proper way to understand the relation between realization and multiple realization.