The Concept of <Emphasis Type="Italic">Krisis</Emphasis> in Husserl’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology</Emphasis>

In The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, Husserl argues that the only way to respond to the scientific Krisis of which he speaks is with phenomenological reflections on the history, method, and task of philosophy. On the assumption that an accurate diagnosis of a malady is a necessary condition for an effective remedy, this paper aims to formulate a precise concept of the Krisis of the European sciences with which Husserl operates in this work. Thus it seeks an answer to the question: What exactly, according to Husserl, is “the ‘crisis’ [Krisis] of the European sciences”? There are two different tendencies in the literature on this question. According to the traditional interpretation, the Krisis of the European sciences lies not in the inadequacy of their scientificity but in the loss of their meaningfulness for life. According to an innovative suggestion, the Krisis lies not in the loss of their meaningfulness for life but in the inadequacy of their scientificity. These readings are mutually exclusive because each claims that the other misidentifies the Krisis as something that it is not. The argument of this paper, however, is that, given the many different senses of Krisis in The Crisis, an adequate understanding of the Krisis that Husserl identifies requires not a disjunctive but an inclusive approach. Therefore the paper proposes that Husserl’s Krisis of the European sciences is both a crisis of their scientificity and a crisis of their meaningfulness for life. The relevance of this result to Husserl’s philosophical and historical sense-investigations in The Crisis—as well as to the present critical situation of philosophy—is self-evident.     

Evaluation of the William S. Hall Psychiatric Institute Clinical Psychology Internship: a replication and extension

This study extends three earlier investigations involving participants who completed their predoctoral clinical psychology internship at the William S. Hall Psychiatric Institute. Intern graduates (N = 37) evaluated how effectively their internship training prepared them for seven aspects of their current work as practicing psychologists. Participants also rated the relevancy of 24 different internship training experiences to their current work and how much these experiences contributed to their development as clinical psychologists. The present study, in conjunction with the three previous studies, covers most of the 40-year period since the inception of the internship program. Analysis of the current data indicates the internship has improved over time and was deemed an exceptional training experience by its graduates. Findings may be of particular interest to internship directors and faculty interested in improving their training program and those who plan to conduct a self-study to maintain their accreditation for clinical psychology internship.     

On the Proof-Theory of two Formalisations of Modal First-Order Logic

We introduce a Gentzen-style modal predicate logic and prove the cut-elimination theorem for it. This sequent calculus of cut-free proofs is chosen as a proxy to develop the proof-theory of the logics introduced in [14, 15, 4]. We present syntactic proofs for all the metatheoretical results that were proved model-theoretically in loc. cit. and moreover prove that the form of weak reflection proved in these papers is as strong as possible.     

The grammar of approximating number pairs

In the present article, we studied approximating pairs of numbers (a, b) that were used to estimate quantity in a single phrase (“two, three years ago”). Pollmann and Jansen (1996) found that only a few of the many possible pairs are actually used, suggesting an interaction between the ways in which people estimate quantity and their use of quantitative phrases in colloquial speech. They proposed a set of rules that describe which approximating pairs are used in Dutch phrases. We revisited this issue in an analysis of Swedish and American language corpora and in a series of three experiments in which Swedish and American adults rated the acceptability of various approximating pairs and created approximating pairs of their own in response to various estimation tasks. We found evidence for Pollmann and Jansen’s rules in both Swedish and English phrases, but we also identified additional rules and substantial individual and cross-language variation. We will discuss implications for the origin of this loose “grammar” of approximating pairs.     

Development of infant prehension handedness: A longitudinal analysis during the 6- to 14-month age period

Handedness is a developmental phenomenon that becomes distinctively identifiable during infancy. Although infant hand-use preferences sometimes have been reported as unstable, other evidence demonstrates that infant hand-use preference for apprehending objects can be reliably assessed during the second half of the infant's first year of life. The current study provides further insight into the stability of prehension preferences. We modeled individual and group level patterns of prehension handedness during the period from 6 to 14 months of age. We examined the developmental trajectories for prehension handedness in relation to the sampling rate at which preferences are assessed. The results revealed interesting developmental changes in prehension handedness that can only be identified when using monthly sampling intervals. We conclude that using non-linear multilevel models of infant handedness with monthly sampling intervals permit us to accurately capture the developmental changes in manual skills that occur during this period of infancy.     

Head-body ratio as a visual cue for stature in people and sculptural art

Body size is crucial for determining the outcome of competition for resources and mates. Many species use acoustic cues to measure caller body size. Vision is the pre-eminent sense for humans, but visual depth cues are of limited utility in judgments of absolute body size. The reliability of internal body proportion as a potential cue to stature was assessed with a large sample of anthropometric data, and the ratio of head height to body height (HBR) was found to be highly correlated with stature. A psychophysical experiment was carried out to investigate whether the cue actually influences stature judgments. Participants were shown pairs of photographs of human figures in which HBR had been manipulated systematically, and asked to select the figure that appeared taller. Results showed that figures with a relatively small HBR were consistently perceived as taller than figures with a relatively large HBR. Many classical statues such as Michelangelo's David depart from the classical proportions defined in Leonardo's Vitruvian Man. A supplementary experiment showed that perceived stature in classical statues also depends on HBR. Michelangelo's David was created with the HBR of a man 165 cm (5 ft 5 in) tall.     

“End-of-life” biases in moral evaluations of others

When evaluating the moral character of others, people show a strong bias to more heavily weigh behaviors at the end of an individual’s life, even if those behaviors arise in light of an overwhelmingly longer duration of contradictory behavior. Across four experiments, we find that this “end-of-life” bias uniquely applies to intentional changes in behavior that immediately precede death, and appears to result from the inference that the behavioral change reflects the emergence of the individual’s “true self”.     

The cost of being watched: Stroop interference increases under concomitant eye contact

Current models in social neuroscience advance that eye contact may automatically recruit cognitive resources. Here, we directly tested this hypothesis by evaluating the distracting strength of eye contact on concurrent visual processing in the well-known Stroop’s paradigm. As expected, participants showed stronger Stroop interference under concomitant eye contact as compared to closed eyes. Two control experiments allowed ruling out low-level account of this effect as well as non-specific effect of the presence of open eyes. This suggests that refraining from processing eye contact is actually as difficult as refraining from word reading in the Stroop task. Crucially, the eye contact effect was obtained while gaze was not under the direct focus of attention and the participants were faced with another powerful distracter (the incongruent word) in the task at hand. Thus, there is a cost of being watched even in circumstances where the processing of direct gaze is strongly disfavored. The present results emphasize the crucial status of eye contact in human cognition.