Inducing and reducing false memories: a Swedish version of the Deese-Roediger-McDermott paradigm

Participants tend to falsely remember a nonpresented critical word after having studied a list of the word's primary associates. We present here a Swedish version of the Deese-Roediger-McDermott paradigm, which provides a tractable method of experimentally inducing and investigating such illusory memories. In Experiment 1 it was demonstrated that the constructed stimulus material induced highly reliable false-recall and false-recognition effects, and, moreover, that veridical and false memories were associated with a similar phenomenological experience of remembering. The results from Experiment 2 indicated that the susceptibility to false recognition can be substantially reduced when participants are explicitly required to monitor the sources of their memories. These findings are consistent with predictions derived from the source-monitoring framework.     

Anxiety sensitivity in six countries

In the present study, the Anxiety Sensitivity Index-Revised (ASI-R; ) was administered to a large sample of persons (n=2786) from different cultures represented in six different countries: Canada, France, Mexico, The Netherlands, Spain, and the United States. We sought to (a) determine the factor structure and internal consistency of the ASI-R and (b) examine the correlations of the measure with psychiatric symptoms and personality dimensions in a single European non-English speaking country (The Netherlands). Partially consistent with the original hypothesis, the underlying structure of the anxiety sensitivity construct was generally similar across countries, tapping fear about the negative consequences of anxiety-related physical and social-cognitive sensations. Lower-order factors were moderately to strongly correlated with one another and showed good internal consistency. The observed lower-order ASI-R factors correlated with established psychiatric symptoms and with the personality trait of neuroticism. Partial correlations indicated that both factors are useful in accounting for variance in symptom measures. We discuss the results of this investigation in relation to the cross-cultural assessment of the anxiety sensitivity construct.     

Hippocampal Activations during Repetitive Learning and Recall of Geometric Patterns

Hippocampal activation is required for episodic memory. Encoding and retrieval of novel and memorable items have been related to different locations in the hippocampus; however, the data remain ambiguous. The application of a newly designed keyboard allowed investigation of brain activation during encoding and free immediate and delayed recall with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in young healthy controls (n=12). Because of the repetitive learning and recall conditions, an individual learning gradient was used to contrast neural activity at different individual levels of novelty. During learning, subjects were asked to memorize 10 geometric patterns requiring the establishment of intra-item associations for memorization. After learning, subjects were asked to recall the items actively via the keyboard. Learning and recall were alternated five times. Delayed recall was scanned about 15 min after the fifth immediate recall condition without subjects having seen the items again. Left-sided anterior hippocampal activity was observed during conditions of initial learning as well as maximum recall. Neural activity during delayed recall did not reveal hippocampal responses and was characterized by a transition of neural activity from occipitoparietal regions to bilateral temporal cortices. We conclude that both lateralization and segregation depend on the specific relational characteristics of the stimuli requiring establishment of intra-item associations for encoding as well as retrieval. The absence of hippocampal activation during delayed recall together with the increase of lateral temporal involvement possibly corresponds with an emerging transition from episodic to long-term memory.     

Subtle discrimination: do stereotypes among teachers trigger bias in their expectations and widen ethnic achievement gaps?

Social Psychology of Education - Ethnic and racial disparities in educational outcomes, such as test scores, are a core issue of educational research. While the role of student and family factors...     

Testing the Four Main Predictions of the Interpersonal–Psychological Theory of Suicidal Behavior in an Inpatient Sample Admitted Due to Severe Suicidality

This study aimed to evaluate four main predictions of the Interpersonal Psychological Theory of Suicide (IPTS): the importance of perceived burdensomeness (PB), thwarted belongingness (TB), hopelessness (H), and capability for suicide (CS) for (passive/active) suicide ideation, suicide intent and suicide attempts. N = 308 psychiatric inpatients admitted due to severe suicidality (53.6% female: n = 165; age: M = 36.82, SD = 14.30, range: 18–81) completed self-report measures of TB, PB, H, CS and suicide ideation as well as interviews on suicide intent and suicide attempts. TB and PB were associated with (passive/active) suicidal ideation, whereas the three-way interaction PB, TB, and H was not associated with active suicide ideation. Fearlessness about death in conjunction with active suicidal ideation was not associated with suicide intent and the interaction of PB, TB, and CS was neither predictive of recent suicide attempt status nor lifetime number of suicide attempts. Given the cross-sectional nature of the data, conclusions on causality should be handled carefully. The results challenge the theoretical validity of the IPTS and its clinical utility—at least within the methodological limitations of the current study. Yet, findings underscore the importance of PB in understanding suicidality.     

Normative Objectivity Without Ontological Commitments?

Several non-naturalist philosophers look for ways to maintain the objectivity of morals without making any (robust) ontological commitments. Recently Derek Parfit proposed an account of non-ontologically existing irreducible moral properties. My first aim in this paper is to outline that such an account is doomed to fail. My second aim in this paper is to argue that irreducible moral properties can be integrated with adaptions into an ontological framework such as E.J. Lowe’s four-category ontology. If it can be shown that irreducible moral properties have a proper place in such an ontology, then there is no need to distinguish between an ontological and non-ontological mode of existence, which, in turn helps to eschew the obscurities that this distinction brings in its wake.     

Work-Life Boundaries and Well-Being: Does Work-to-Life Integration Impair Well-Being through Lack of Recovery?

Against the backdrop of increasingly blurred boundaries between work and nonwork, the purpose of this study was to investigate the implications of employees’ work-to-life boundary enactment for well-being. Using border/boundary theory (as reported by Ashforth, Kreiner, & Fugate (Academy of Management Review 25(3):472–491, 2000) and Clark (Human Relations 54(6):747–770, 2000)) and the effort-recovery model (as reported by Meijman & Mulder (Handbook of work and organizational psychology vol. 2 55–53, 1998)), we developed a research model that links work-to-life integration enactment to exhaustion and impaired work-life balance via lack of recovery activities (as reported by Sonnentag, Journal of Applied Psychology 88(3):518–528, 2003). The model was tested using structural equation modeling. Our sample consisted of N = 1916 employees who were recruited via an online panel service. Results showed that employees who scored high on work-to-life integration enactment reported less recovery activities and in turn were more exhausted and experienced less work-life balance. Our study contributes to the existing literature on boundary management by investigating the well-being implications of work-to-life boundary enactment and by suggesting and testing recovery as an underlying mechanism. In doing so, we link boundary enactment with existing theory of the work-life interface. Based on our review of existent research on boundary management and well-being, we disentangle previous contradictory findings. Understanding of the well-being implications of boundary enactment and underlying mechanisms can help human resource professionals and practitioners to devise and implement organizational policies and interventions that enable employees to develop boundary management strategies that are sustainable in that they do not impair employees’ well-being.     

Neuroscience and Whitehead II: Process-Based Ontology of Brain

While neuroscience has made enormous progress in understanding the brain, the implications of these empirical findings for ontological questions in philosophy including the mind–body problem remain yet unclear. In the first paper, I discussed the model of brain that as implied and supported by the empirical data. This leads me now to the question of an empirically plausible ontology of brain. Therefore, the aim in this second paper is the ontological characterization of the brain in terms of a process-based ontology that avoids what Whitehead described as “simple location” and “fallacy of misplaced concreteness”. The discussion of the model of the brain is complemented by developing a process-based ontological characterization of the brain. Specifically, as based on Whitehead, I argue that “simple location” of the brain as thing or object in time and space amounts to nothing but an abstraction rendering what Whitehead described as “fallacy of misplaced concreteness”. Instead of describing the brain as static, non-temporal and isolated thing or object, I characterize the brain ontologically by dynamic, temporal, and relational processes. This leads me to a process-based ontology of brain which may be specified in spatiotemporal terms. Since the world’s larger spatiotemporal range or scale contains, e.g., nests, the smaller one of the brain, I characterize their ontological relationship by “spatiotemporal nestedness” and “spatiotemporal directedness”. Such spatiotemporal relationship between world and brain precludes the confusion between the world as whole and the brain as part, e.g., “mereological confusion”. I conclude that process-based or better, more specifically, spatiotemporal ontology of the brain and its relationship to the world may offer novel views on the question for the ontological relationship between mind and brain, e.g., the mind–brain problem, by converting or reformulating it as “world-brain problem”.