Spatial reference in multiple object tracking

Spatial reference in multiple object tracking is available from configurations of dynamic objects and static reference objects. In three experiments, we studied the use of spatial reference in tracking and in relocating targets after abrupt scene rotations. Observers tracked 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6 targets in 3D scenes, in which white balls moved on a square floor plane. The floor plane was either visible thus providing static spatial reference or it was invisible. Without scene rotations, the configuration of dynamic objects provided sufficient spatial reference and static spatial reference was not advantageous. In contrast, with abrupt scene rotations of 20°, static spatial reference supported in relocating targets. A wireframe floor plane lacking local visual detail was as effective as a checkerboard. Individually colored geometric forms as static reference objects provided no additional benefit either, even if targets were centered on these forms at the abrupt scene rotation. Individualizing the dynamic objects themselves by color for a brief interval around the abrupt scene rotation, however, did improve performance. We conclude that attentional tracking of moving targets proceeds within dynamic configurations but detached from static local background.     

Brain activation during spatial updating and attentive tracking of moving targets

Keeping aware of the locations of objects while one is moving requires the updating of spatial representations. As long as the objects are visible, attentional tracking is sufficient, but knowing where objects out of view went in relation to one's own body involves an updating of spatial working memory. Here, multiple object tracking was employed to study spatial updating and its neural correlates. In a dynamic 3D-scene, targets moved among visually indistinguishable distractors. The targets and distractors either stayed visible during continuous viewpoint changes or they turned invisible. The parametric variation of tracking load revealed load-dependent activations of the intraparietal sulcus, the superior parietal lobule, and the lateral occipital cortex in response to the attentive tracking task. Viewpoint changes with invisible objects that demanded retention and updating produced load-dependent activation only in the precuneus in line with its presumed involvement in updating spatial working memory.     

How Does Neurobiological Research Influence Psychoanalytic Treatments?—Clinical Observations and Reflections From a Study on the Interface of Clinical Psychoanalysis and Neuroscience

One of the counterarguments against empirical research in psychoanalysis is that research negatively influences the treatment situation. In this paper, the impact of a neurobiological study on psychoanalytically oriented treatments is presented from three different perspectives: patients' views, a study group of participating psychoanalysts and a clinical case example. Twenty chronically depressed patients, 20 healthy controls and 16 psychoanalysts participated in the project on research. Results show a clear influence of the neurobiological study on the course of treatments. Patients consistently reported that study participation had a positive impact on their treatment experiences. However, study participation was conflictual for the psychoanalysts and forced them to carefully reflect on their unconscious and conscious involvement to establish a psychoanalytic stance independent from empirical research.     

Towards a Conflict Theory of Recognition: On the Constitution of Relations of Recognition in Conflict

In this paper, we develop an understanding of recognition in terms of individuals’ capacity for conflict. Our goal is to overcome various shortcomings that can be found in both the positive and negative conceptions of recognition. We start by analyzing paradigmatic instances of such conceptions—namely, those put forward by Axel Honneth and Judith Butler. We do so in order to show how both positions are inadequate in their elaborations of recognition in an analogous way: Both fail to make intelligible the fundamental nexus between relations of recognition and individuals’ capacity for conflict. We then move on to reconsider aspects of Hegel's view of recognition—ones that, from our viewpoint, have been unjustly neglected in the debate about recognition: his focus on the constitution of relations of recognition in conflict and on the status of being an author of acts of recognition. On this basis, we then spell out in a more systematic way what we take to be a more convincing conception of recognition. This puts us in the position to gesture at some consequences of this conception in practical contexts, above all with regard to the justification, role and structure of political institutions..     

First-Person Neuroscience: A new methodological approach for linking mental and neuronal states

Though the brain and its neuronal states have been investigated extensively, the neural correlates of mental states remain to be determined. Since mental states are experienced in first-person perspective and neuronal states are observed in third-person perspective, a special method must be developed for linking both states and their respective perspectives. We suggest that such method is provided by First-Person Neuroscience. What is First-Person Neuroscience? We define First-Person Neuroscience as investigation of neuronal states under guidance of and on orientation to mental states. An empirical example of such methodological approach is demonstrated by an fMRI study on emotions. It is shown that third- and first-person analysis of data yield different results. First-person analysis reveals neural activity in cortical midline structures during subjective emotional experience. Based on these and other results neural processing in cortical midline structures is hypothesized to be crucially involved in generating mental states. Such direct linkage between first- and third-person approaches to analysis of neural data allows insight into the "point of view from within the brain", that is what we call the First-Brain Perspective. In conclusion, First-Person Neuroscience and First-Brain Perspective provide valuable methodological tools for revealing the neuronal correlate of mental states.     

Panta Rei--Re-Thinking Science,Re-Thinking Society

In the Chinks of the World Machine: Feminism and Science Fiction, by Sarah Lefanu, London: Women's Press, 1988, 288 pages, pb £5.95.     

Postpartale psychische Störungen

Any postpartum mental disorder in a mother can influence the mother-child relationship and communication and lead to the development of psychosomatic disorders or disorders of behavioral regulation with diagnostic status. These can have a long-term impact on the mother-child relationship and the child’s mental development. Based on research findings on mother-child interaction, the authors expound why including the child in treatment is crucial. Accordingly, possible contraindications for mother-infant treatment are described. Clinical parent-infant treatment practice is reviewed as an interdisciplinary and multiprofessional challenge and the necessity of adhering to minimum standards, beside adult psychiatric skills, of child psychiatric and developmental expertise in diagnostics and intervention for quality assurance.     

The precuneus and the insula in self-attributional processes

Attributions are constantly assigned in everyday life. A well-known phenomenon is the self-serving bias: that is, people’s tendency to attribute positive events to internal causes (themselves) and negative events to external causes (other persons/circumstances). Here, we investigated the neural correlates of the cognitive processes implicated in self-serving attributions using social situations that differed in their emotional saliences. We administered an attributional bias task during fMRI scanning in a large sample of healthy subjects (n = 71). Eighty sentences describing positive or negative social situations were presented, and subjects decided via buttonpress whether the situation had been caused by themselves or by the other person involved. Comparing positive with negative sentences revealed activations of the bilateral posterior cingulate cortex (PCC). Self-attribution correlated with activation of the posterior portion of the precuneus. However, self-attributed positive versus negative sentences showed activation of the anterior portion of the precuneus, and self-attributed negative versus positive sentences demonstrated activation of the bilateral insular cortex. All significant activations were reported with a statistical threshold of p ≤ .001, uncorrected. In addition, a comparison of our fMRI task with data from the Internal, Personal and Situational Attributions Questionnaire, Revised German Version, demonstrated convergent validity. Our findings suggest that the precuneus and the PCC are involved in the evaluation of social events with particular regional specificities: The PCC is activated during emotional evaluation, the posterior precuneus during attributional evaluation, and the anterior precuneus during self-serving processes. Furthermore, we assume that insula activation is a correlate of awareness of personal agency in negative situations.