On the relation between moral, legal and evaluative justifications of pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD)

In Germany the question whether to uphold or repeal the judicial prohibition on Pre-implantation Genetic Diagnosis (PGD) is being debated from quite different standpoints. This paper differentiates the major arguments according to their reasons as a) moral, b) evaluative (i.e. cultural/religious), and c) legal. The arguments for and against PGD can be divided by content into three groups: arguments relating to the status of the embryo, focusing on individual actions in the implementation of PGD, and relating to the foreseeable or probable consequences of PGD. In Germany, from a legal perspective, the status of the embryo does not permit the intervention of PGD; from a purely moral perspective, a prohibition on PGD does not appear defensible. It remains an open question, however, whether the moral argument permitting PGD should be restricted for evaluative (cultural) reasons. The paper discusses the species-ethical reasons, for which Jurgen Habermas sees worrisome consequences in the wake of PGD to the extent that we comprehend it as the forerunner of a 'positive eugenics'. It would so disrupt the natural preconditions of our universal morality. The question of whether to prohibit or allow PGD is not merely a question of simple moral and/or legal arguments, but demands a choice between evaluative, moral and (still to be specified) species-ethical arguments, and the question remains open.     

Predictors of Self-Reported Anxiety and Panic Symptoms: An Evaluation of Anxiety Sensitivity, Suffocation Fear, Heart-Focused Anxiety, and Breath-Holding Duration

The purpose of this study was to examine the extent to which anxiety-related individual difference variables predict anxious responding when individuals experience aversive bodily sensations. Thus, we explore several psychological and behavioral predictors of response to a single 25-sec inhalation of 20% carbon dioxide-enriched air in 70 nonclinical participants. Predictor variables included anxiety sensitivity, suffocation fear, heart-focused anxiety, and breath-holding duration. Multiple regression analyses indicated that only anxiety sensitivity significantly predicted postchallenge panic symptoms, whereas both anxiety sensitivity and suffocation fear predicted postchallenge anxiety. These data are in accord with current models of panic disorder that emphasize the role of fear of fear in producing heightened anxiety and panic symptoms and help clarify specific predictors of anxiety-related responding to biological challenge.     

Spatial reference in multiple object tracking

Spatial reference in multiple object tracking is available from configurations of dynamic objects and static reference objects. In three experiments, we studied the use of spatial reference in tracking and in relocating targets after abrupt scene rotations. Observers tracked 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6 targets in 3D scenes, in which white balls moved on a square floor plane. The floor plane was either visible thus providing static spatial reference or it was invisible. Without scene rotations, the configuration of dynamic objects provided sufficient spatial reference and static spatial reference was not advantageous. In contrast, with abrupt scene rotations of 20°, static spatial reference supported in relocating targets. A wireframe floor plane lacking local visual detail was as effective as a checkerboard. Individually colored geometric forms as static reference objects provided no additional benefit either, even if targets were centered on these forms at the abrupt scene rotation. Individualizing the dynamic objects themselves by color for a brief interval around the abrupt scene rotation, however, did improve performance. We conclude that attentional tracking of moving targets proceeds within dynamic configurations but detached from static local background.     

Brain activation during spatial updating and attentive tracking of moving targets

Keeping aware of the locations of objects while one is moving requires the updating of spatial representations. As long as the objects are visible, attentional tracking is sufficient, but knowing where objects out of view went in relation to one's own body involves an updating of spatial working memory. Here, multiple object tracking was employed to study spatial updating and its neural correlates. In a dynamic 3D-scene, targets moved among visually indistinguishable distractors. The targets and distractors either stayed visible during continuous viewpoint changes or they turned invisible. The parametric variation of tracking load revealed load-dependent activations of the intraparietal sulcus, the superior parietal lobule, and the lateral occipital cortex in response to the attentive tracking task. Viewpoint changes with invisible objects that demanded retention and updating produced load-dependent activation only in the precuneus in line with its presumed involvement in updating spatial working memory.     

How Does Neurobiological Research Influence Psychoanalytic Treatments?—Clinical Observations and Reflections From a Study on the Interface of Clinical Psychoanalysis and Neuroscience

One of the counterarguments against empirical research in psychoanalysis is that research negatively influences the treatment situation. In this paper, the impact of a neurobiological study on psychoanalytically oriented treatments is presented from three different perspectives: patients' views, a study group of participating psychoanalysts and a clinical case example. Twenty chronically depressed patients, 20 healthy controls and 16 psychoanalysts participated in the project on research. Results show a clear influence of the neurobiological study on the course of treatments. Patients consistently reported that study participation had a positive impact on their treatment experiences. However, study participation was conflictual for the psychoanalysts and forced them to carefully reflect on their unconscious and conscious involvement to establish a psychoanalytic stance independent from empirical research.     

Towards a Conflict Theory of Recognition: On the Constitution of Relations of Recognition in Conflict

In this paper, we develop an understanding of recognition in terms of individuals’ capacity for conflict. Our goal is to overcome various shortcomings that can be found in both the positive and negative conceptions of recognition. We start by analyzing paradigmatic instances of such conceptions—namely, those put forward by Axel Honneth and Judith Butler. We do so in order to show how both positions are inadequate in their elaborations of recognition in an analogous way: Both fail to make intelligible the fundamental nexus between relations of recognition and individuals’ capacity for conflict. We then move on to reconsider aspects of Hegel's view of recognition—ones that, from our viewpoint, have been unjustly neglected in the debate about recognition: his focus on the constitution of relations of recognition in conflict and on the status of being an author of acts of recognition. On this basis, we then spell out in a more systematic way what we take to be a more convincing conception of recognition. This puts us in the position to gesture at some consequences of this conception in practical contexts, above all with regard to the justification, role and structure of political institutions..     

First-Person Neuroscience: A new methodological approach for linking mental and neuronal states

Though the brain and its neuronal states have been investigated extensively, the neural correlates of mental states remain to be determined. Since mental states are experienced in first-person perspective and neuronal states are observed in third-person perspective, a special method must be developed for linking both states and their respective perspectives. We suggest that such method is provided by First-Person Neuroscience. What is First-Person Neuroscience? We define First-Person Neuroscience as investigation of neuronal states under guidance of and on orientation to mental states. An empirical example of such methodological approach is demonstrated by an fMRI study on emotions. It is shown that third- and first-person analysis of data yield different results. First-person analysis reveals neural activity in cortical midline structures during subjective emotional experience. Based on these and other results neural processing in cortical midline structures is hypothesized to be crucially involved in generating mental states. Such direct linkage between first- and third-person approaches to analysis of neural data allows insight into the "point of view from within the brain", that is what we call the First-Brain Perspective. In conclusion, First-Person Neuroscience and First-Brain Perspective provide valuable methodological tools for revealing the neuronal correlate of mental states.     

Panta Rei--Re-Thinking Science,Re-Thinking Society

In the Chinks of the World Machine: Feminism and Science Fiction, by Sarah Lefanu, London: Women's Press, 1988, 288 pages, pb £5.95.