When sentimental rules collide: "norms with feelings" in the dilemmatic context

According to a recently prominent account of moral judgment, genuine moral disapprobation is a product of two convergent vectors of normative influence: a strong negative affect that arises from the mere consideration of a given piece of human conduct and a (socially acquired) belief that this conduct is wrong (Nichols, 2002). The existing evidence in favor of this “norms with feelings” proposal is rather mixed, with no obvious route to an empirical resolution. To help shed further light on the situation, we test a previously unexamined prediction that this account logically yields in a novel dilemmatic context: when individuals are faced with a moral dilemma that pits two or more “affectively-charged” moral norms against each other, the norm underwritten by the strongest feeling ought to determine the content of dilemmatic resolution. Across three studies, we find evidence that directly challenges this prediction, offering support for a Kolhberg-style “rationalist” alternative instead. More specifically, we find that it is not the participants’ degree of norm-congruent emotion (whether situationally or dispositionally assessed) or its correlates, but rather their appraisal of the relative costs associated with various alternative courses of action that appears to be most predictive of how they resolve the experimentally induced moral conflict. We conclude by situating our studies within an overarching typology of moral encounters, which, we believe, can help guide future research as well as shed light on some current controversies within this literature.     

Trends and developments in community and applied social psychology: JCASP 1991–2010

This paper looks back on the trends and developments in and of the Journal of Community and Applied Social Psychology since its inception twenty years ago. We review to what extent the aims that were originally set for JCASP have been fulfilled. The trends in nationality of authors, themes of publications and their methodology are discussed. Possible implications of these trends and developments for JCASP and its future are pointed at. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The random effects prep continues to mispredict the probability of replication

In their reply, Lecoutre and Killeen (2010) argue for a random effects version of p_rep, in which the observed effect from one experiment is used to predict the probability that an effect from a different but related experiment will have the same sign. They present a figure giving the impression that this version of p_rep accurately predicts the probability of replication. We show that their results are incorrect and conceptually limited, even when corrected. We then present a meaningful evaluation of the random effects p_rep as a predictor and find that, as with the fixed effects p_rep, it performs very poorly.     

Putting Values into Practice: Public Policy and the Future of Mental Health Consumer-run Organizations

The purpose of the paper is to reflect on value dilemmas in mental health consumer-run organizations and to discuss implications for research, policy, and practice. We review the roots of consumer-run organizations in the self-help movement and the psychiatric survivor liberation movement, focusing on the distinctive values espoused by consumer-run organizations. We also discuss evidence-based and value-based approaches to mental health policy formulation and mental health reform, noting the particular importance of value-based approaches and the role that consumer-run organizations can play in mental health reform. Based on our experiences conducting a participatory action research study of four mental health consumer-run organizations, we identify and examine several value dilemmas, discuss the lessons that we learned about these value dilemmas, and note their implications for future directions in research, policy, and practice.     

The psychology of meta-ethics: exploring objectivism

How do lay individuals think about the objectivity of their ethical beliefs? Do they regard them as factual and objective, or as more subjective and opinion-based, and what might predict such differences? In three experiments, we set out a methodology for assessing the perceived objectivity of ethical beliefs, and use it to document several novel findings. Experiment 1 showed that individuals tend to regard ethical statements as clearly more objective than social conventions and tastes, and almost as objective as scientific facts. Yet, there was considerable variation in objectivism, both across different ethical statements, and across individuals. The extent to which individuals treat ethical beliefs as objective was predicted by the way they grounded their ethical systems. Groundings which emphasize the religious, pragmatic, and self-identity underpinnings of ethical belief each independently predicted greater ethical objectivity. Experiment 2 replicated and extended these findings with a refined measure of ethical objectivism. Experiment 3 demonstrated the robustness of the religious grounding of ethics, and differentiates it from mere religious belief and from political orientation. The results shed light on the nature of ethical belief, and have implications for the resolution of ethical disputes.     

the promise of quality of life

Little has been written in the career development literature about quality of life, even though this concept is implied in all counselor interventions. In this article, the author suggests that the broad and subjective nature of quality of life, rather than a liability, is its very strength. Quality of life is presented as an important holistic concept that emphasizes a multidimensional awareness of the web of relationships within which career development is performed. The practical implications of quality of life for career development are discussed.     

Cold and lonely: does social exclusion literally feel cold?

Metaphors such as icy stare depict social exclusion using cold-related concepts; they are not to be taken literally and certainly do not imply reduced temperature. Two experiments, however, revealed that social exclusion literally feels cold. Experiment 1 found that participants who recalled a social exclusion experience gave lower estimates of room temperature than did participants who recalled an inclusion experience. In Experiment 2, social exclusion was directly induced through an on-line virtual interaction, and participants who were excluded reported greater desire for warm food and drink than did participants who were included. These findings are consistent with the embodied view of cognition and support the notion that social perception involves physical and perceptual content. The psychological experience of coldness not only aids understanding of social interaction, but also is an integral part of the experience of social exclusion.     

Selective storage and maintenance of an object’s features in visual working memory

It has been shown that we have a highly capacity-limited representational space with which to store objects in visual working memory. However, most objects are composed of multiple feature attributes, and it is unknown whether observers can voluntarily store a single attribute of an object without necessarily storing all of its remaining features. In this study, we used a masking paradigm to measure the efficiency of encoding, and neurophysiological recordings to directly measure visual working memory maintenance while subjects viewed multifeature objects and were required to remember only a single feature or all of the features of the objects. We found that measures of both encoding and maintenance varied systematically as a function of which object features were task relevant. These experiments show that individuals can control which features of an object are selectively stored in working memory.     

Dialogues on prediction errors

The recognition that computational ideas from reinforcement learning are relevant to the study of neural circuits has taken the cognitive neuroscience community by storm. A central tenet of these models is that discrepancies between actual and expected outcomes can be used for learning. Neural correlates of such prediction-error signals have been observed now in midbrain dopaminergic neurons, striatum, amygdala and even prefrontal cortex, and models incorporating prediction errors have been invoked to explain complex phenomena such as the transition from goal-directed to habitual behavior. Yet, like any revolution, the fast-paced progress has left an uneven understanding in its wake. Here, we provide answers to ten simple questions about prediction errors, with the aim of exposing both the strengths and the limitations of this active area of neuroscience research.