Predicting Short‐Term Remembering as Boundedly Optimal Strategy Choice

It is known that, on average, people adapt their choice of memory strategy to the subjective utility of interaction. What is not known is whether an individual's choices are boundedly optimal. Two experiments are reported that test the hypothesis that an individual's decisions about the distribution of remembering between internal and external resources are boundedly optimal where optimality is defined relative to experience, cognitive constraints, and reward. The theory makes predictions that are tested against data, not fitted to it. The experiments use a no‐choice/choice utility learning paradigm where the no‐choice phase is used to elicit a profile of each participant's performance across the strategy space and the choice phase is used to test predicted choices within this space. They show that the majority of individuals select strategies that are boundedly optimal. Further, individual differences in what people choose to do are successfully predicted by the analysis. Two issues are discussed: (a) the performance of the minority of participants who did not find boundedly optimal adaptations, and (b) the possibility that individuals anticipate what, with practice, will become a bounded optimal strategy, rather than what is boundedly optimal during training.     

On Taking Back Forgiveness

I argue that the effectiveness of forgiveness in the healing of relationships is dependent on both the givers and recipients of forgiveness understanding that once it has been granted, forgiveness is not normally able to be retracted. When we forgive, we make a firm commitment not to return to our former state of moral resentment against the offender, replacing it by good-will. This commitment can be broken only where the forgiving party makes some significant cognitive adjustment to her appraisal of either the offender or the offence, believing that her original forgiveness was granted in error. I reject the view (defended, for example, by Anthony Bash) that forgiveness can lapse or be withdrawn on the basis of a return of hurt or disappointed feelings, arguing that these do not amount to a restoration of the resentment that is extinguished when forgiveness is granted. I contend that a person who ‘forgives’ and later takes back that ‘forgiveness’ because certain negative feelings have returned either did not genuinely forgive in the first place or shows that she has not fully grasped the nature of forgiveness.     

Capturing system level activities and impacts of mental health consumer-run organizations

Since the 1970s mental health consumer-run organizations have come to offer not only mutual support, but they have also adopted agendas for broader social change. Despite an awareness of the need for system level efforts that create supportive environments for their members, there has been limited research demonstrating how their system level activities can be documented or their impacts evaluated. The purpose of this paper is to feature a method of evaluating systems change activities and impacts. The paper is based on a longitudinal study evaluating four mental health consumer-run organizations in Ontario, Canada. The study tracked system level activities and impacts using both qualitative and quantitative methodologies. The article begins by describing the development and implementation of these methods. Next it offers a critical analysis of the methods used. It concludes by reflecting on three lessons learned about capturing system level activities and impacts of mental health consumer-run organizations.     

Moral worry and religiosity in US and Canadian college samples

The objective of this study was to investigate the presence of worry about personal moral attitudes and behaviors in two college samples, and to check associations with religiosity, age, gender, personality traits, and geographic region. The study sample was drawn from college students in Minneapolis, Minnesota (N?=?333) and Sydney, Nova Scotia (N?=?137). Instruments consisted of moral worry and religiosity questionnaires, and the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire. Principal-components analysis was used to develop components for the worry and religiosity scales, and MANOVA for correlations between variables. Moral worry emerged as a domain distinct from worry about practical issues. Moral worry was not related to religiosity, age, gender, or Eysenck personality traits. Whereas the US sample scored higher in religiosity than the Canadian sample, the Canadian sample scored higher on moral worry. The present study supports our previous work and that of others that worry about one's moral emotions and behaviors is an important aspect of daily life. As such, consideration should be given to including some inquiry about moral worries (guilt, shame, regret, remorse, and others) in psychiatric assessments.     

‘Goals’ are not an integral component of imitation

Several theories suggest that actions are coded for imitation in terms of mentalistic goals, or inferences about the actor’s intentions, and that these goals solve the correspondence problem by allowing sensory input to be translated into matching motor output. We tested this intention reading hypothesis against general process accounts of imitation using the pen-and-cups task. The task has three components: participants place a pen in one of two cups, using their right or left hand, and one of two grips. Previous research has revealed a colour minimum error pattern; when one of the components is differentially coloured (e.g., one cup is red and the other blue), accuracy is greatest on the coloured dimension. We found the colour minimum error pattern, not only in the standard version of the task, where participants imitate the actions of a human model, but also in three novel variants of the task, in which participants responded on the basis of spatial or arbitrary stimulus–response mappings to ‘geometric’, non-biological stimuli. These stimuli do not afford the attribution of intentions, and therefore our results support generalist theories of imitation by showing that the colour minimum error pattern is due, not to intention reading, but to the operation of task-general processes of perception, attention and motor control.