Across-reinforcement blocking effects in a mediational test of the CS's general signaling property

Rats received Pavlovian aversive (shock) conditioning in which white noise was established for independent groups as a CS+, CSo, or CS−. Then, in an easy (light-dark) T-maze discrimination, the CS was presented either immediately following choice (Locus 1) or at the food cup in the goal (Locus 3), contingent upon either a food-reinforced (right) or nonreinforced (wrong) response. When presented at Locus 3, the CS+ facilitated and the CS− retarded learning for CS/right subjects, with these effects being exactly reversed but somewhat less pronounced for CS/wrong subjects. However, when the CS was presented at Locus 1, the CS+ and CS− effects for both response contingencies were attenuated. These findings oppose an interpretation of the CS's function as a general cue or transformed signal for the presence or absence of the new appetitive reinforcer and argue instead for across-reinforcement blocking effects: By signaling in the presence of food reinforcement an outcome (safety or shock) which is consonant with or discrepant from the “good” outcome obtained, the CS− blocks (retards) and the CS+ counterblocks (enhances) the association of food reinforcement and the S^D; conversely, in the presence of nonreinforcement (a “bad” outcome), the CS− counterblocks and the CS+ blocks inhibitory conditioning to the S^Δ. As in Kamin's (1968) original research, such effects are attenuated when the CS is presented early in the compound, distal to the reinforcer.     

Choosing what to choose from: Preference for inclusion over exclusion when constructing consideration sets from large choice sets

Decision making is a two‐stage process, consisting of, first, consideration set construction and then final choice. Decision makers can form a consideration set from a choice set using one of two strategies: including the options they wish to further consider or excluding those they do not wish to further consider. The authors propose that decision makers have a relative preference for an inclusion (vs. exclusion) strategy when choosing from large choice sets and that this preference is driven primarily by a lay belief that inclusion requires less effort than exclusion, particularly in large choice sets. Study 1 demonstrates that decision makers prefer using an inclusion (vs. exclusion) strategy when faced with large choice sets. Study 2 replicates the effect of choice set size on preference for consideration set construction strategy and demonstrates that the belief that exclusion is more effortful mediates the relative preference for inclusion in large choice sets. Studies 3 and 4 further support the importance of perceived effort, demonstrating a greater preference for inclusion in large choice sets when decision makers are primed to think about effort (vs. accuracy; Study 3) and when the choice set is perceived as requiring more effort because of more information being presented about each alternative (vs. more alternatives in the choice set; Study 4). Finally, Study 5 manipulates consideration set construction strategy, showing that using inclusion (vs. exclusion) in large choice sets leads to smaller consideration sets, greater confidence in the decision process, and a higher quality consideration set.     

Object onset and parvocellular guidance of attentional allocation

The parvocellular visual pathway in the primate brain is known to be involved with the processing of color. However, a subject of debate is whether an abrupt change in color, conveyed via this pathway, is capable of automatically attracting attention. It has been shown that the appearance of new objects defined solely by color is indeed capable of modulating attention. However, given evidence suggesting that the visual system is particularly sensitive to new onsets, it is unclear to what extent such results reflect effects of color change per se, rather than effects of object onset. We assessed attentional capture by color change that occurred as a result of either new objects appearing or already-present "old" objects changing color. Results showed that although new object onsets accrued attention, changing the color of old objects did not. We conclude that abrupt color change per se is not sufficient to capture attention.     

Conscious and effortful or effortless and automatic: a practice/performance paradox in motor learning

High cognitive effort has been frequently related to better indices of motor learning through the study of many different paradigms. However, automaticity presumably invokes minimal cognitive processing but has often been related to high-level motor performance, which suggests a paradox. The objective of this study was to approach this paradox by examining the viability of the use of different cognitive strategies during practice and performance which promote the benefits of high cognitive effort and automaticity. Members of the university community (14 men and 15 women) divided into 3 groups practiced a discrete precision task. All participants completed four sessions totaling 320 trials and were tested on retention and transfer seven days later. Findings suggest that it is indeed possible to benefit from both effortful and minimal cognitive processing strategies and that they should be used complementarily.     

Cultivating expertise in informal reasoning.

People generally develop some degree of competence in general informal reasoning and argument skills, but how do they go beyond this to attain higher expertise? Ericsson has proposed that high-level expertise in a variety of domains is cultivated through a specific type of practice, referred to as "deliberate practice." Applying this framework yields the empirical hypothesis that high-level expertise in informal reasoning is the outcome of extensive, deliberate practice. This paper reports results from two studies evaluating the hypothesis. University student participants completed 12 weeks of deliberate practice in informal reasoning. Quantity of practice was recorded by computer, and additionally assessed via self-report. The hypothesis was supported: Students in both studies showed a large improvement, and practice, as measured by computer, was related to amount of improvement in informal reasoning. These findings support adopting a deliberate practice approach when attempting to teach or learn expertise in informal reasoning.     

Feedback specificity, exploration, and learning

Greater feedback specificity is generally considered to be beneficial for performance and learning, but the evidence for this generalization is limited. The authors argue that increasing the specificity of feedback is beneficial for initial performance but discourages exploration and undermines the learning needed for later, more independent performance. The results of their transfer experiment demonstrate that increasing the specificity of feedback positively affected practice performance, but its benefits did not endure over time or modification of the task. In addition, feedback specificity negatively affected levels of exploration during practice and interacted with exploration strategies to affect learning. The results suggest that those who received feedback of varying specificity may have learned through different but equally beneficial mechanisms.