Theory of mind (ToM) is defined as the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others and is often said to be one of the cornerstones of efficient social interaction. In recent years, a number of authors have suggested that one particular ToM process occurs spontaneously in that it is rapid and outside of conscious control. This work has argued that humans efficiently compute the visual perspective of other individuals. In this article, we present a critique of this notion both on empirical and theoretical grounds. We argue that the experiments and paradigms that purportedly demonstrate spontaneous perspective-taking have not as yet convincingly demonstrated the existence of such a phenomenon. We also suggest that it is not possible to represent the percept of another person, spontaneous or otherwise. Indeed, the perspective-taking field has suggested that humans can represent the visual experience of others. That is, going beyond assuming that we can represent another’s viewpoint in anything other than symbolic form. In this sense, the field suffers from the same problem that afflicted the “pictorial” theory in the mental imagery debate. In the last section we present a number of experiments designed to provide a more thorough assessment of whether humans can indeed represent the visual experience of others.
People from diverse backgrounds enrich the rural, regional, and remote communities where they relocate and settle. Research about rural diversity tends to focus on demographics (age, gender, country of origin) while ignoring personal narratives of integration, for example, engagements with religious institutions (such as the local Christian church). This article presents the research themes from an investigation using co-operative inquiry into rural diversity and the Anglican Church, with specific reference to the Australian experience. It is a cross-disciplinary dialogic exchange between social workers and theologians. Positive narratives about connection, welcome, participation, and belonging are shared. 相似文献
Continuous bag of words (CBOW) and skip-gram are two recently developed models of lexical semantics (Mikolov, Chen, Corrado, & Dean, Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, 26, 3111–3119, 2013). Each has been demonstrated to perform markedly better at capturing human judgments about semantic relatedness than competing models (e.g., latent semantic analysis; Landauer & Dumais, Psychological Review, 104(2), 1997 211; hyperspace analogue to language; Lund & Burgess, Behavior Research Methods, Instruments, & Computers, 28(2), 203–208, 1996). The new models were largely developed to address practical problems of meaning representation in natural language processing. Consequently, very little attention has been paid to the psychological implications of the performance of these models. We describe the relationship between the learning algorithms employed by these models and Anderson’s rational theory of memory (J. R. Anderson & Milson, Psychological Review, 96(4), 703, 1989) and argue that CBOW is learning word meanings according to Anderson’s concept of needs probability. We also demonstrate that CBOW can account for nearly all of the variation in lexical access measures typically attributable to word frequency and contextual diversity—two measures that are conceptually related to needs probability. These results suggest two conclusions: One, CBOW is a psychologically plausible model of lexical semantics. Two, word frequency and contextual diversity do not capture learning effects but rather memory retrieval effects. 相似文献
Geoffrey Loftus, Editor of Memory & Cognition from 1994 to 1997, strongly encouraged presentation of figures with error bars and avoidance of null hypothesis significance testing (NHST). The authors examined 696 Memory & Cognition articles published before, during, and after the Loftus editorship. Use of figures with bars increased to 47% under Loftus's editorship and then declined. Bars were rarely used for interpretation, and NHST remained almost universal. Analysis of 309 articles in other psychology journals confirmed that Loftus's influence was most evident in the articles he accepted for publication, but was otherwise limited. An e-mail survey of authors of papers accepted by Loftus revealed some support for his policy, but allegiance to traditional practices as well. Reform of psychologists' statistical practices would require more than editorial encouragement. 相似文献
We examine the extent to which retrieval from very long-term autobiographical memory is similar when participants are asked
to retrieve from widely differing periods of time. Three groups of 20 participants were given 4 min to recall autobiographical
events from the last 5 weeks, 5 months, or 5 years. Following recall, the participants dated their events. Similar retrieval
rates, relative recency effects, and relative lag-recency effects were found, despite the fact that the considered time scales
varied by a factor of 52. These data are broadly consistent with the principle of recency, the principle of contiguity (Howard
& Kahana, 2002), and scale similarity in the rates of recall (Brown, Neath, & Chater, 2007; Maylor, Chater, & Brown, 2001).
These findings are taken as support for models of memory that predict time scale similarity in retrieval, such as SIMPLE (Brown
et al., 2007) and TCM (Howard & Kahana, 2002). 相似文献
The presentation of a stimulus below the threshold of conscious awareness can exert an influence on the processing of a subsequent target. One such consequence of briefly presented “primes” is seen in the negative compatibility effect. The response time (RT) to determine the left—right orientation of an arrow (i.e., the target) is relatively slow if a prime is also an arrow whose direction corresponds to that of the target. When the direction of the arrow is opposite that of the prime, RTs are relatively fast. In four experiments, we examined whether the prime shifts attention from the location of the subsequent target and whether this attention shift influences target processing. Results showed that the prime does indeed move attention. The consequence of this attention movement is that the representation of direction is affected. Specifically, RTs to process an arrow are shorter if the arrow’s direction is compatible with the last shift of attention. Furthermore, this interference occurs at a conceptual level concerning the representation of left and right rather than at the motor planning level. We argue that a shift in attention brought about by the prime can create a negative compatibility-like effect. 相似文献
ABSTRACT— Replication is fundamental to science, so statistical analysis should give information about replication. Because p values dominate statistical analysis in psychology, it is important to ask what p says about replication. The answer to this question is "Surprisingly little." In one simulation of 25 repetitions of a typical experiment, p varied from <.001 to .76, thus illustrating that p is a very unreliable measure. This article shows that, if an initial experiment results in two-tailed p = .05, there is an 80% chance the one-tailed p value from a replication will fall in the interval (.00008, .44), a 10% chance that p < .00008, and fully a 10% chance that p > .44. Remarkably, the interval—termed a p interval —is this wide however large the sample size. p is so unreliable and gives such dramatically vague information that it is a poor basis for inference. Confidence intervals, however, give much better information about replication. Researchers should minimize the role of p by using confidence intervals and model-fitting techniques and by adopting meta-analytic thinking. 相似文献
When comparing two target elements placed on the same convoluted curve, response times are dependent on the distance between the targets along the curve, despite being separated by a constant Euclidean distance. The present study assessed whether such line tracing is obligatory across the whole of the line even when the task demands do not require it, or whether it is an optional strategy that can be disregarded when the circumstances favor a different method of attentional deployment. Three experiments were conducted to assess whether attention can select only a portion of a curve to trace when it is strategically sensible to do so. The results suggest that attention can indeed jump over portions of a line that are irrelevant to task performance before tracing has begun. However, the final experiment suggests that line tracing may continue beyond the task-relevant portion of the line. We conclude that line tracing is a strategy whose initial deployment can be influenced by top-down factors, rather than an obligatory response triggered by the stimuli-although, once engaged, line tracing may be hard to stop. 相似文献